Reading 5

Reading 5 - i ‘ UNDERSTANDING Em INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS...

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Unformatted text preview: i ‘ UNDERSTANDING Em INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS 32:32:13:an IWWWWWI . 2Hournoan Nat—AND GwB/POLS 3‘“ g An Introduction to Theory and History Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 1 Harvard University HQ 3 Chapter 4 The Failure of Collective Security and World War II THE RISE AND FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY XIII/odd War I caused enormous social disruption and shock waves of revulsion at e sense ess slaughter. Balance—of-power politics was widely blamed fo th war. Woodrow Wilson, the American president during World War I wa r l e 510 nineteenth-century liberal who regarded balance-of-power policiesS :Scilit: aeginbecause flat-31y violated democracy and national self-determination. In ited It’s tvliew,d e balance of power is the great game now forever discred- . s e 01 and ev11 order that prevailed before this war. World War I to do away with an old order, one that was unstable. The balance f was thing that we can do without in the future.”1 0 power 15 a to dzxnllson had a p01nt, because balance-of-power policies do not give priority ocracy or peace. As we have seen, the balance of power is a wa to - serve the sovereign state system. States act to prevent any state from b: p're preponderant. The resulting balance of power is consistent with war ocon‘nllg tions of self—determination if that is the only way to preserve inde e rdVlo a- However, World War I was so devastating, chaotic, and brutal that mfn n encla. gigai; t: feel that war to preserve the balance of power was no longer tglggbrlee its pixel: world could not afford a balance-of-power system, what would take Sovereign states could not be abolished, Wilson admitted but force c Id 6 tamed by law and institutions as it was at the domestic level The 1:11 l olution was to develop international institutions analogous to domestic lleer'a atures and courts so that democratic procedures could be applied at the ' tng- national level. Some liberals of the day thought that not only was World W erI fought to make the world safe for democracy, but in turn democracy coil-Id important. It called for “a general asso ‘Ht ., -m. u. ugh--v...- -— make the world safe. In January 1918, the United States issued a 14-point state- ment of its reasons for joining in the war. The fourteenth point was the most ciation of nations to be formed under ' the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political specific covenants for d small states alike.” independence and territorial integrity to great an The League of Nations Although critics called Wilson a utopian, he believed that organizing inter- national security could be a practical approach to world politics. He knew that mere paper agreements would not be sufficient; organizations and rules werely needed to implement the agreements. This was why Wilson put so much faith in the idea of a League of Nations. Moral force was important, but a military 1/ force was necessary to back it up. security had to be a collective responsibility. If all nonaggressive states banded together, the preponderance of power would be on the side of the good. International security would be a collective respon- I‘ sibility in which nonaggressive countries would form a coalition against aggres— sors. Peace would be indivisible. How could the states bring about such a new system of collective security? First, make aggression illegal and outlaw offensive war. Second, deter aggres- sion by forming a coalition of all nonaggressive states. If all pledged to aid any state that was a victim anywhere in the world, there would be a prepon- derance on the side of the nonaggressive forces. Third, if deterrence failed and aggression occurred, all states would agree to punish the state that com— mitted aggression. This doctrine of collective security bore some similarities to balance-of-power policies, in that states tried to deter aggression by developing a powerful coalition and if deterrence failed, they were willing to use force. But there were three important differences between the collective security and balance-of-power approaches. First, in collective security, the focus was on 'cies of a state rather than its capacity, whereas in balance- lliances were created against any state that was becoming- cus was on the capacity of states. Second, in a collec— since it would not u t 0 strong; that is, the f0 ve security system, alliances were not formed in advance, e known which states would be aggressive. It would be all against one, once e committed aggression, whereas in balance of power, the alliances were . Third, collective security was designed to be global and als or free riders. If too many countries were neutral, the coalition of the good might appear weak and diminish the coalition’s ability deter or punish the aggressor. The doctrine of collective security was embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations which, in turn, was part of the treaties that ended World War I. Several of the articles of the League of Nations Covenant were espe- cially noteworthy. In Article 10, states pledged to protect all members against aggression. In Article 11, any war or threat of war was declared to be of concern to all states. In Articles 12 and 15, states agreed to submit their disputes to arbitration and not to go to war until three months after arbitration failed. . .. . . u. II"\II_\JIII_ VF bULLCblIVt Article 16, the critical article, said that any war disregarding the League of Na- .1ons procedures would be regarded as at war against all the members of the League of Nations. The state that started a war would be immediately subject I to economic sanctions and the Council of the Lea ' ' , gue of Nations m1 t r - nend further military measures. gh ecom This sounds tough, but there were ambiguities. All members had to agree 9 apply collective security. Thus each state had a veto. When they signed the Jovenant, states agreed to abide by Article 16, but in practice, it was up to each tate to decide what kinds of sanctions to apply and how to implement them- hey were not bound by any higher authority. Thus the League of Nations was ot a move toward world government in which a higher authority could commit me member states. It was not the end of the anarchic state system, but an ef- )rt to make the anarchic states discipline unruly members. he United States and the League of Nations 2:: biggest loophole in the League of Nations system was not legal, but polit- : the failure of the United States to join its own creation. The American Sen- e refused to ratify the Covenant. As a result, the League of Nations collective curi s ste ' ' thetgaryle. m was not global or universal. One of the biggest players was not Why did the United States hold back when, to a large extent the League is an American liberal plan to reorder world politics? After World War I )st.Americans wanted to return to “normalcy.” Many defined “normal” as )1d1ng involvement in international affairs. Opponents claimed that the Mon- : Doctrine of 1823 limited American interests to the Western Hemisphere lpOSlthn to 'entangling alliances” went back all the way to George Washing.- l. The leader of the opposition to the League of Nations, Senator Henry " bot Lodge of Massachusetts, feared that Article 16 of the Covenant of the ague of Nations would draw the United States into distant wars. The debate between President Wilson and Senator Lodge is sometimes 'trayed as a clash between an idealist and a realist, but it can also be seen as w ebate between different forms of American moralism. Lodge’s isolationism lected a long-standing American attitu e owar t e alance of power in Eu- e: ‘European states do nasty things in the name of balance of power, and encans are better than that. In fact, however, the United States was able to 4y conception of the League of Nations is just this, that it shall operate as the rganized moral force of men throughout the world, and that whenever or wher— ver wrong and aggression are planned or contem ' ' ‘ . plated. this searchin onsc1ence shall be turned upon them. 9 light 0f —Woodrow Wilson2 THE RISE AND FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY II ignore the balance of power in the nineteenth century because the Americans were enjoying a free ride behind Britain’s fleet. Other European countries could not get to the Western Hemisphere to threaten Americans. In fact, the United States was not at all isolationist when it came to interfering in the affairs of its weak neighbors in Central America or Mexico. Americans at the end of World War I were torn between two forms of moralism, and it was the isola- tionist impulse toward the European balance of power that won. The result was the country that had tipped the balance of power in World War I refused to accept responsibility for the postwar order. The Early Days of the League What France wanted more than anything else at the end of World War I were military guarantees that Germany could not rise again. Since the United States would not join the League of Nations, France pressed Britain for a security guarantee and wanted military preparations in case Germany recovered. Brit— ain resisted on the grounds that such an alliance would be against the spirit of collective security because it would identify the aggressor in advance. More- over, Britain saw France as stronger than Germany so there was no need for an alliance, even on traditional balance-of-power terms. Britain said it was impor- tant to reintegrate Germany, just as the Congress of Vienna had brought France back into the Concert of Europe at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. War passions had abated more quickly in Britain than in France, and the British felt it was time to appease the Germans by bringing them back into the process. Unmoved by these arguments, FWes with Poland, which had been reborn at the end of World War I, an w1 t e "Little Entente,” the states of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania that had been created out of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire. The French policy fell between two stools: Not only were these alliances against the spirit of collective security, but they did not do very much for France in terms of the balance of power. Poland was on bad terms with its neighbors, and no substitute for Russia, which had been ostracized because of the Bolshevik Revolution. The Little Entente states were destabilized by ethnic problems and domestic divisions. Germany came out of World War I enormously weakened. It lost_25,000 square miles of territory and 7 million of its population. The Treaty of Versailles forced it to reduce its army to only 100,000, and prohibited it from having an air force. The treaty contained the famous “war guilt clause," which said that Germany caused the war. Since Germany was blamed, Germany should pay. The reparations bill was $33 billion, a sum that Germans thought impossibly high in their damaged position. When the Germans did not pay, France sent troops to occupy the Ruhr industrial area of Germany until the Germans did pay. After engaging in passive resistance, Germany suffered an enormous in- flation that wiped out the savings of the middle class. That in turn removed one of the sources of internal stability as the Weimar Republic struggled to create democracy. _ .. ..__..._ v. vVI_|_|_\./IIVI_ OLbUnll 1 AND VVUHLU WAH ll WAR DEA THS, I9I4 -I918 I 900 000 (Incl Empire) "m Danz- m I (tree Cityg) «.5. . r r V —\ a ‘ g Germany lost all oi hercolonies ‘ i I __ Many displaced Germans ‘ returned to Germany. " I \ r e ‘W penaMal .. E" to Belgium 5 Naggvegnment m re ecause oi the rebellion in ma Berlin; hence Germany became known as the ., WeimarRepublic I Saar coalllelds placed under Fr. Vel sallles ruelor 5years to France, (which lost this territory to Germany in 1871) FRANCE I Territory lost by German . Y wm mm C] ‘0 o‘hercountnes THE OTHER PEACE THEATIES: all were signed in French I ' Ireaty of St.Germain 1919 - with deieated Austria pa aces afe Iles‘ Paris 7 Territory lost b Germa fl/A gm League ’ "’ Treaty or Neuilly 1919 - with deieated B | ‘ IS ‘ac T u ‘ u garla _ p ed Germans re y of Sévres 1920 —— :étohpdeeéeaatgd Turkey; but this treatywas not ' n ane ‘ ‘ Treaty of Trlanon 1920 ~ with deieated Hrnzgfyflas Sign“ at Lausannemwza “Gamma Italy had never been keen on the Paris ' - - peace treaties top}; Ezlgyi'nhlad orifgilrlially been allied with Germany and ELIE-Effigy flat om the Alli:zrggao dt 6 war, the. Italians decided they would get a better I; dff 915, it was r0 :lw1tched Sides. In the secret Treaty of London signed, in [ungarian Epnpirésfil tcrampensation at the expense of the part of the Austro- lese promises WOUldab :came postwar Yugoslavia. The Italians expected that Shioned .1 e onored, but Woodrow Wilson objected to such ld- sp01 s of war behav10r. In addition, after Mussolini and the fasfists took power in 1922, one of the motivating forces in Italian foreign policy was to gain glory: to finally fulfill the destiny of a new Roman Empire. With such a start, it is remarkable the League was able to do anything at all. Yet 1924 to 1930 was a period of relative successes. Plans were made to scale down the reparations Germany had to pay. In 1924, governments signed a pro— tocol on the peaceful settlement of disputes in which they promised to arbitrate their differences. Perhaps most important, in 1925 the Treaty of Locarno al- lowed Germany to enter the League of Nations and gave Germany a seat on its Council. The Treaty of Locarno had two aspects. In the west, Germany guaranteed that its borders with France and Belgium would be inviolable. Alsace and Lor- raine, taken by Bismarck in the War of 1870, had been returned to France by the Treaty of Versailles, and Germany promised to demilitarize a zone along the Rhine. Locarno reaffirmed those results. In the east, Germany promised to ar- bitrate before pursuing changes in its eastern border with Poland and Czecho- slovakia. That second clause should have set off a warning bell, however, for there were now two kinds of borders around Germany—an inviolable part in the west and a negotiable part in the east—but at that time these agreements looked like progress. The League managed to settle some minor disputes, such as one between Greece and Bulgaria, and it began a process of disarmament negotiations. Fol- lowing up on the 1922 Washington treaty in which the United States, Britain, and Japan had agreed to a measure of naval disarmament, the League orga- nized a preparatory commission for broader disarmament talks. They set the scene for a worldwide conference that finally met (too late) in 1932. In addi— tion, in 1928, states agreed to outlaw war in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, named after the American and French foreign ministers. Most important, the League Although not members, the Americans became a center of diplomatic activity. to the League meetings in Geneva. and the Russians began to send observers The world financial collapse in October 1929 and the success of the National Socialist party in the 1930 German elections were harbingers of problems to come, yet there was still a sense of progress at the September 1930 annual as- sembly of the League of Nations. That optimism about the collective security system was dispelled by two crises in the 19305 over Manchuria and Ethiopia. /The Manchurian Failure The Manchurian episode tested the League, and it failed. To understand the anchurian case, we must understand the situation in Japan. Japan had trans— formed itself from a potential victim of imperialist aggression in the mid nine- ful imperialist by the century's end. Japan U eenth century to a very success defeated Russia in a war of 1904—1905, colonized Korea in 1910, and joined the Allies in World War 1. After the war, Japan sought recognition as a major power. Europeans and Americans resisted. At Paris, the Western governments rejected a Japanese proposal that the Covenant of the League affirm the |r1t: , V. --_-_v..-._ uhvvnli I I-ou VVUnLU VVHI" II ' ' ‘ ' as a clear-cut case I ‘ vaded Ethiopia. The invaSion - In OCtObearfcsfilSie ICtJZEIIIIZil of the League avoided an Italian veto by the pro . . to ' to dec1de what sanctions In for a spec1al conference ' . f CalFiny states attended, and eight days after the invasions t2: (led to member states that they impose four sanction . ' ' ' ' tloans to ' ' ods to Italy; a prohibition agains f all m‘htary goand refusal to sell certain goods that could ‘ d tin. But three things were . t elsewhere, such as rubber an t . ‘ 1 t_ S no't b'e balaglstill allowed to buy steel, 0031’ and 0‘1; d‘plomihclfiifi 11:3), mxssmgt bidken‘ and Britain did not close the Suez Canal throug W were no , shipped materials to Eritrea. Why didn’t the members 0 d general optimism that sanctions woul principle of racial equality. In the 1920s, the Americans passed racist laws ex- cluding Japanese immigrants, and Britain ended its bilateral treaty with Japan. Many Japanese felt that just as they were about to enter the club of the great powers, the rules were changed. China was the other actor in the Manchurian crisis. In the 1920s, China was in chaos, with civil war between regions controlled by different warlords. Manchuria was part of China, though somewhat independent under a separate warlord. The Chinese Nationalist movement was trying to unify the country, and it bitterly criticized the unequal treaties that had been imposed on China in the imperialist era. As the Chinese Nationalists gained strength in the 1920s, friction with Japan increased. The Nationalists declared a boycott against Japanese goods. Inside Japan, civilian and military factions contended for dominance. As the global economic crisis deepened and friction with China in- creased, the military faction in Japan gradually increased its strength. In September 1931, the Japanese army staged an incident along the Man- churian Railway, where they had had a right to station troops since the Russo- Japanese War of 1904-1905. Sabotage on the Manchurian Railway gave the Japanese troops a pretext to take over all of Manchuria. Although Japan said its actions were to protect the Manchurian Railway, it went further and set up a Japanese-controlled puppet state that was called Manchukuo. China appealed to the League of Nations, but Japan prevented passage of a resolution asking it to withdraw its troops. In December, the League agreed to send a committee under the British Lord Lytton to investigate the events in Manchuria. Lord Lytton finally reported to the League in September 1932, and he re- jected Japan’s pretext as an unjustified intervention. Although his report rec- ommended that the members of the League of Nations should not recognize the state of Manchukuo, it did not call for applying Article 16 sanctions against Japan. In February 1933, the Assembly of the League of Nations voted 42 to 1 to accept Lytton’s report on the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. The one op- posing vote was Japan, which then withdrew from the League of Nations. Over- all, the Manchurian case showed the procedures of the League of Nations to be slow, cautious, and totally ineffective. ' of aggression, L cedural device 0 impose against Italy. conference recommen embargo on the sale 0 ' Italy; cessation of imports from Italy, f the League of Nations do more? There W35 work, and to some extent they did. It — ' f the Italian ' x orts declined by about one—third during the yearc,l the va‘liei: ‘ovould be ex- lz'uaedfclined and there were estimates thatlItaly s gfil reaserresidue of concern 1r ’ t er pro em: ‘ ' ' onths. But there was ano . I . Ital haUSteclimblalgficre1of power. Britain and France wanted to .av0id alienagrégman); :bom t 8they were worried about the balance of power in Europe. ecause ' seful as regaining its strength, and Britain and FranceIthogglit :giulictl tilted as w ' ’ ' Germany. n , to have Italy in a coalition to balance Mussonni moved Italian troops to the iloigfglnflbblfdeygg fffflaefllfifclrdtdiwn. The British ins; F332;: hoped that us I ' ' 'tion a ains er . Musselin'i 'coulfldbelgrfirastlsadliildrfgtlflg‘hf t(:ll):lI..eagueg of Nations collective set}: Tradmonah ‘peinterpreted it. From a balance-of-power perspectivellfi-ica my syétem; t ey r ted was to become involved in a distant conflict in I n laSt thmg they warlressing problems in the heart of Europe. Distant aggressii: When lhere rip d'tional realists, was not a threat to European secu in Afrlca’ sax t e tra ‘ were needed to bring the Italians back into t e ' ' ton and negotiation 1d feet abom C0333? Not surprisingly, the British and French began to get co co . SaIICtIOIIS. SI! Sallluel 1103.16 311d Ilelle IJaVal, tlle BI ItISll and I IeIlCh f0] 81g“ IIIIHISteIS "let I“ Decelnbel 311d drew up 3» plail dIVlded EthiopIa ’ l] [to two [)3] ts, ()Ile Italla!‘ alld the ()tllel a ()1 Iqatlolls Zolle. whell SOHle- 0118 e p p l n. C l tlllS 131‘ to tlle IeSS, [81 e was ()utl “I III ‘31 A (:llst 0‘ av In Ifi to resign. . . . But within three months, British opi The Ethiopian Debacle nion turned again. In March 1936, e Locarno treaties and marched German troops into the ritain and France immediately stopped worrying balance ' lt about how to restore the ‘ ' ' . The met w1th Italy to consu - h— alfout EffiflEiropefl The balance of power in Europe prevailelgstgve: 1:1: Spian Sago): of the collective security doctrine in Africa. In May , Hele to COInplete tllexl lxulltal> "CtOI,’ alld tlle saIlCtIOIIS were oved. remThe best line in this tragedy was spoken by t League of Nations: “Great or small, strong or w , ' The last great test of the League of Nations’s collective security system came in Ethiopia in 1935. This time, sanctions were applied but the outcome was again failure. Italy had long planned to annex Ethiopia; not only was it near Italy’s colonies in Eritrea on the Red Sea, but the fascists felt affronted that the Ethi- opians had defeated an Italian effort to colonize them during the imperialist era in the nineteenth century. Fascist ideologists argued that this historic “wrong” should be rectified. Between 1934 and 1935, Italy provoked incidents on the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea. It did so despite the existence of a peace treaty between Ethiopia and Italy, and the fact that Italy had signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war and as a member of the League of Nations was committed to arbitrate for three months before doing anything. _ _,-__....-._ uLuulllll HIVU VVUHLU WAR II colored, let us never forget that one day we may be somebody’s Ethiopia.”3 And, within a few years, most European nations were to be victims of Hitler’s aggression in World War II. The world’s first efforts at collective security were a dismal failure. THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR II World War II overshadows all other wars in terms of its human costs, estimated to be between 35 and 50 million people. The war was noted for advances in weaponry. Tanks and planes that had just been introduced and played an in- significant role in World War I dominated World War II. Radar played a sig- nificant role, for example, in the Battle of Britain, one of the turning points in World War II. And at the end of the war, of course, there was the atomic bomb and the dawn of the nuclear age. World War II ended with unconditional surrender. Unlike World War I, the Western Allies occupied Germany and Japan and transformed their soci- eties during the occupation. The “German problem" was solved for half a cen- tury by dividing Germany. World War II also created the bipolar world in which the United States and the Soviet Union emerged from the conflict much stronger than the rest. The war represented the replacement of Europe as the arbiter of the balance of power. Instead, Europe became an arena where out- siders contended, somewhat like Germany before 1870. The end of World War 11 created the framework of the world order until 1989. Hitler’s War? World War II is often called "Hitler’s war.” While true, it is too simple. World War II was also old business, Act II of the great war that ended Europe’s he- gemony in 1918; the interwar period was only an intermission. Hitler wanted war, but not the war we now know as World War II. He wanted a short sharp war, a blitzkrieg. Another reason it was not simply Hitler’s war was the war in the Pacific. Hitler had continually but unsuccessfully urged the Japanese to at- tack the British colony of Singapore or to attack Siberia to divert Soviet troops away from Europe. Japan did neither; it surprised Hitler by attacking the American naval base at Pearl Harbor instead. The war in the Pacific, while part of World War II, had its own roots and was more a traditional imperial effort at regional hegemony. On the other hand, we can go too far in stressing other causes. Some his- torians have nearly exonerated Hitler. A. J. P. Taylor argues that While Hitler was a terrible person and a very unpleasant adventurer, he was merely an op- portunist stepping into the power vacuums created by the appeasement poli- cies of the Western democracies. But Taylor goes too far. For example, Hitler’s 1924 book, Mein Kampf, set forth a vague plan that Taylor dismisses as Hitler’s ranting in resentment of the French invasion of the Ruhr. But Hitler wrote an- THE ORlGlNS OF WORLD WAR ll 83 Here it seems to me, is the key to the problem whether Hitler deliberately aimed at war. He did not so much aim at war as expect it to happen, unless he could evade it by some ingenious trick, as he had evaded ClVll war at home. Those who have evil motives easily attribute them to others; and Hitler ex- pected others to do what he would have done in their place. —A. J. P. Taylor“ other, secret book in 1928 that repeated many of the arguments in Mein Kamp Even if it was not a detailed plan, it was a clear indication of where he wante to g(Taylor also deals too lightly with the “Hossbach memorandum.” Golonel Hossbach, an aide to Hitler, took notes at a meeting at Berchtesgaden in 1937 that reported Hitler planning to take territory by 1943 before Germany 5 pre- eminence became obsolete. Hitler felt it was important to take opportupétites when they arose in the East, and that Austria and Czechoslovakia wou e first. Taylor dismisses the importance of this memo by saying that it was not atn official memorandum. Since Taylor wrote, additional ev1dence has corrli: 0 light. We know that Hitler talked often of this timetable “and, of these 0 )ec- tives. The Hossbach memorandum generally predicted Hitlers actions. Hitler’s Strategy Hitler had four options after he came to power in 1933, and he,rejected three1 of them. He could have chosen passivity, accepting Germanys internationa . position. He could have tried expansion through economic growth (like Japan after World War II) and led Germany to international influence through'llln- dustrial expansion. He could have limited his goals to reVision of the Versai es Treaty and regained some of Germany’s 1918 losses. By the 19303, the Westeiig democracies were sensitive to the injustice of blaming Germany for all 'ofWoir1 War I. But these three strategies were rejected by Hitler, who chose 1115163.. a breakout. In his view, Germany, stuck in the middle of Europe, could not 11v: forever encircled. It had to gain land. He would g]: easlt for liVing space, expan ' nd at a later sta e go for a larger wor ro e. hls b12312: followed this fofrth option through four phases. First, he set out to destroy the Versailles framework by a very clever set of diplomatic maneuvirs. In October 1933, he withdrew from the League of Nations and from the .15- armament conference that the League had convened. He blamed tdelth- drawal on the French, who he said were not willing to cut their forces in the disarmament conference, thereby making it impossible for Germany to con- tinue in the League or the conference. In January of 1934, he Signed a treatl}; , with Poland, disrupting the arrangements France had been trying to make Wit w u... Ir-uLun: ur bULLELIlVl: Stun-(I I Y AND WORLD WAR ll Poland and the smaller Eastern European states. In March 1935, Hitler de nounced the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty, saying Germany would n longer be restricted to an army of 100,000. Instead he announced plans to tripl the army and build an air force. The British, French, and Italians met at Stresa (in Italy) to respond to Hit- ler's activities, but before they could get organized, Hitler offered Britain ne- gotiations on a naval treaty. Britain leapt at the opportunity, thereby disrupting any coordinated response from the Stresa meeting. In March 1936, when events in Ethiopia diverted attention from central Europe, Hitler moved his troops into the Rhineland, which had been demilitarized by the Locarno Pact. He blamed France for forcing him to do this. He said France had destroyed ‘7 the Locarno treaty by developing an arrangement with the Soviet Union. He dropped hints that he might return to the League of Nations after the other states in Europe accepted his views about the revisions of the Versailles treaty, a clever maneuver that played on guilt and uncertainty in the Western democracies. The second phase (1936 to 1940) was Hitler’s expansion into the small neighboring countries. In 1936, Hitler laid out a four-year economic plan for a military buildup in order to be ready for war by 1940. He signed the Axis Pact with Italy and an anti-Comintern (the Communist International) pact with Ja- pan. He also intervened on the side of the fascists in the Spanish civil war. Hit- ler justified sending troops to support the fascist general Francisco Franco in Spain’s civil war as part of the protection of the West against the threat of bol- shevism. In 1938, Chancellor Schuschnigg of Austria called for a plebiscite on whether Austria should reunite with Germany, hoping that the Austrian people would vote against it before Hitler forced it upon them. But Hitler intervened. German troops marched into Vienna, ending Austrian independence. Czechoslovakia was next. Hitler pressured Czechoslovakia by pushing the issue of the national self-determination for the 3 million Germans in the Su- detenland section of Czechoslovakia. This area where Czechoslovakia borders Germany was militarily important because it included the Bohemian massif, the natural line of defense for Czechoslovakia and the logical place for Czechs to start their defense against potential German attack. Hitler argued that the post—World War I settlement that put these German-speaking people in Czechoslovakian territory was a violation of their self-determination and an- other example of the perfidy of the Western countries. He demanded the German-speaking territory be permitted to leave Czechoslovakia to join the German fatherland. The Czechs became worried and mobilized portions of their reserves. That infuriated Hitler, who vowed to crush Czechoslovakia. These events also alarmed Britain, which did not want war to break out in Europe. Neville Chamberlain, the British prime minister, made three trips to Germany to try to stave off the war. Chamberlain believed that it was not pos- sible for Britain to defend Czechoslovakia because of the distance and because Britain had no troops on the Continent. More important, he did not think Czechoslovakia was worth war and he knew that Britain was not ready for war. Air power was becoming more significant, fear of bombing campaigns was _ growing, d ‘ tem were not rea y ‘ ’ lain met with Hitler at Munich in Septe of Czechoslovakia, giving to leave the rest 0 . ’ ' returned to Britain claimm in our time. Czechoslovakia and took the ca Hitler might seek further conqu Divided in the eighteenth century, War I and given a corri area included German—spe tics. He claime was a violation of self- sailles system. guarantee to defend Poland. ’ ' ' ' defense and radar sys- ' ' ealized that the British air - and Chambferlam arir war For this combination of reasons, Chamber or an . mber 1938 and agreed to the partition the Sudetenland to Germany if Hitler would promise f Czechoslovakia alone. Hitler promised, and Chamberlain g that he saved Czechoslovakia and achieved “peace ter in March 1939, German troops rolled into the rest of pital city, Prague. A shocked Britain realized ests and that his next target might be Poland. Poland was recreated as a state after World ' he ' on the Baltic Sea, though t dor to the port 0f Danz‘g ' , Hitler used the same tac— inside Polish territory another example of the perfidy of the-Ver- tried to deter Hitler by issumg a Only six months la determination, This time Britain and France lled off a brilliant diplomatic coup. Despite having said he . . t a uld protect the West against bolshevism, Hlitler sfuddizlzdsigngg it}: 1:: wo Hit er a ree ' ' ' t 1939. The pact gave . ' f wuh Sda-lmtlli: It also included a secret protocol for anotheapaiZtitfrrti toy vIZallted uSltalin and Hitler each agreed to take a part. Hitler seize p 0 an . f 1 . 1 E .l.] 1 . i . Startlnga a ag IDS P l n h agreement in whic f mOderation ‘ o . . him part Of POIamliblftreHlirtlbfoachfgjegerhilitary mastery on the Contineéiz‘; Phase 3 “fals S t 0k Poland things were temporarily quiet; this pine r.“ 1940. Aftef‘Hlt er oar” Hitler,expected Britain to sue for peace. In t e spNiorg called the phony ‘Hitler feared that Britain was going to move troops tothere Of 1940’ however’ted a British landing in Norway by sending his troops way. He preemp hed his blitzkrieg into Holland, Be lgium, and France. first. Then he launc dly impene trable Ardennes Forest, ' ose . sending hls tanks thriflffd Blrfftissllipgy surprise. He had skirted the Magmot Hitler t°°k the Frénc . ' t of the French border with Ger- line of French fortifications that lingjcinfs Dunkirk where they had to leave he British troo [161. He dro‘fft tand evacuate what was left of the men across the Chan Hitler then pu many. their equipme . . l am only afraid that at ' ted her. . ‘ ' |Ch l wan n for mediation. ' ' ‘tion in wh . NOW Peland '5 m the p05. her will submit to me a pla the last moment some swine or ot ——Adolf Hitler, August 27, 19395 7 _. _.,___v..-.. VI—VUII'I I HIVU VVUHLU VVAH ll 1 ill VOL ’ INVASION 152M. ‘9 » fi ‘2 W N NAZI G E R M A N Y m m I MAGINOT W W‘ I r "‘ . v M g“ ' BA TTLE 0F BRITAIN 2 German bomber 5 AUGUSTioOCTOBER.1940 g ileet with fighter escorts R.A.F. Spitfire or ‘- Hurricane base LUFTFLOTTE Town bombed . "0"" *Cmnirv by Luftwaffe , . * J FROM German long-range Vi * * , + NORWAY guns fire on Dover : ' _ V i V r r 7 “my *gzgfil Coventry Thus Hitler became master of the European continent west of the Soviet Union through a brilliant set of moves in 1940. A The fourth phase, "the phase of overreaching," unleashed the full-scale war. Hitler had long wanted to move east against the Soviet Union. But he wanted to dispose of Britain first to avoid the possibility of a war on two fronts. If he could gain air supremacy, he could then cross the Channel and invade Britain. But Hitler's air force was defeated in the Battle of Britain. Unable to THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR II 87 gain air supremacy, Hitler was faced with a conundrum: Should he put off his plans to attack the Soviet Union? Hitler decided to attack the Soviet Union even though he had been unable to defeat Britain, thinking that he could beat Stalin quickly and then go at Brit- ain once again. Furthermore, he would have deprived the British of any po- tential alliance with the Soviet Union. In June 1941, Hitler attacked the Soviet Union, a massive mistake. In December 1941, after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, he made another huge mistake: He declared war on the United States. Hitler did this to keep Japan locked into the war, since he had been urging Japan to join him, and he took the occasion to unleash his U-boat campaign against American shipping. In doing so, he also unleashed the global war that ended his Third Reich. The Role of the Individual What role did Hitler’s personality play? It was probably not the crucial factor in the first phase. The Western democracies were so guilt-ridden, weak, and in- ternally divided that any clever German nationalist probably would have been able to revise the Versailles system. But the second and third phases that brought mastery over Europe depended on Hitler’s skill, audacity, and belli- cose ideology. He often overruled his conservative generals and staff. Hitler wanted war and was willing to take risks. The fourth phase, which brought on global war and failure, is also attributable to two aspects of Hitler’s personality. First, Hitler’s appetite grew with the eating. He was convinced of his own ge- nius, but that conviction led him to two crucial mistakes: invading the Soviet Union before he finished off Britain and declaring war on the United States, which gave Franklin Roosevelt, the American president, a pretext to become engaged in a war in Europe as well as in the Pacific. Hitler’s other great flaw was his racist ideology, which deprived him of crit- ical assets. For example, when Germany first invaded the Soviet Union, many Ukrainians and others revolted against Stalin's brutality. But Hitler regarded them as Slavic underpeople, unworthy of an alliance with him against Stalin. He also thought the United States was weak because of its population of blacks and Jews. He used to joke about Roosevelt having a Jewish ancestor. He failed to understand that American pluralism could be a source of strength. Moreover, his anti-Semitism led him to expel some of the scientists crucial to developing the atomic bomb. In short, an individual was one of the crucial causes of World War II. The kind of war it was and its outcome depended very much on Hitler. Systemic and Domestic Causes Of course, there were also other causes. World War II was more than just Hit— ler's war, and that is the value of A. J. P. Taylor’s interpretation. There were systemic causes, both structural and process. At the structural level, World War I did not solve the German problem. The Versailles treaty was both too harsh because it stirred up German nationalism and too lenient because it left -_.... . . \I‘U vvunLU VVAI‘I II the Germans the capability to do something about it. Furthermore, the ab- sence of the United States and the Soviet Union from the balance of power until very late in the game meant that Germany was not deterred. In addition, the process of the international system was immoderate. Germany was a revisionist state bound on destroying the Versailles treaty system. In addition, the growth of ideologies, the great “isms” of fascism and communism, engendered hatreds and hindered communication in the 1930s. Three domestic level changes were also particularly important. First, the Western democracies were torn apart by class cleavages amd ideological dis- putes. Coordinated foreign policy-making was nearly impossible. For example, when Leon Blum, a French socialist, came to power after 1936, French con- servatives used the slogan "Better Hitler than Blum.” In 1939, the British con- servative government sent a mission to Moscow to see whether they could sign a treaty with Stalin, but both the mission and the government was internally divided. Before they decided, Hitler had beat them to it. One reason for the delay was the British upper class reluctance to deal with communists. A second domestic level cause of the war was economic collapse. The Great Depression was systemic in the sense that it affected all countries and grew out of the inability of the major capitalist states to establish effective international economic coordination to deal with imbalances in transnational trade and finan- cial flow5. But the Depression had powerful effects on domestic politics and class conflict. The enormous amount of unemployment had the political effect of pouring gas on a fire: It contributed to the Nazi takeover in Germany and weakened the governments of the democracies. The third domestic cause was the US. policy of isolationism. The United States came out of World War I with the world’s strongest economy, but it re- fused to accept the responsibilities of that position. In the 19305, the Great De- pression increased internal preoccupation and deepened isolationism. In his first term, President Franklin Roosevelt, along with other Americans, paid lit- tle attention to Europe. After his reelection in 1936, Roosevelt began to realize that if Hitler became too strong, he might dominate Europe and eventually threaten the United States. In 1937, Roosevelt began to speak about events in Europe, but the American public did not want to get involved. In 1940, Roosevelt traded destroyers to the British in return for base rights on British territories in the Western Hemisphere. In 1941, he persuaded Congress to ap- prove “lend-lease” war supplies to Britain to prevent it from being defeated by Hitler. However, Roosevelt was limited by domestic opinion on how far he could go in resisting Hitler. Only Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and Hitler’s declaration of war ended America’s isolationism. How do these domestic, personal, and systemic causes fit together? We could say that the deep causes of World War II were systemic—the unfinished business of World War I. The intermediate causes were largely domestic—the social and ideological disruptions that produced Hitler in Germany and the weakness in the democracies. The precipitating cause was Adolf Hitler’s strat- egy for domination. (See Figure 4.1.) THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR II 89 IMAGE 2 IMAGE 1 Domestic Individuals Class conflict I Great —~——> Ideological -——> Hitler's Depression politics rise to I l polwer Inadequate Appeasement Hitler 5 economic schemes coordination l IMAGE 3 T Systemic war in Unfinished ——> Versailles ——> US. and Unstable ——-> 1939 World War I Treaty Soviet isolation balance Figure 4.1 Three Images of the Causes of World War II in Europe Was War Inevitable? Was a second world war inevitable? No, but it became increasifngly 1112:1311 as time passed. In 1918, there was already some probability (:1. Elise; d world war. In 1926 (after the Locarno treaties'), that probability 1111111181933, but after the Great Depression in 1929 and Hitlers ascent to plowerlén11 (set; the funnel of choices closed down until the war became globa in ' 4.2 . Flgu'Ir'leie failure of World War I to solve the German problem meant there was some probability of a second war already in 1918. If the Wistegn decipft: racies had chosen to appease Germany in the 1920s, however, t ed ignof the government of the Weimar Republic might have been preserve . rti re- United States had signed the Treaty of Versailles and stayed in Eurolpe 0 psen serve the balance of power (as it did after 194.5), Hitler might not ave 1;“ to power. There might have been some war in Europe, but not l[Secessssmy the global World War II. In the 1930s, the shock of the economici epre ore fueled the rise of ideologies that glorified aggreSSion, which ma e war In llkeléounterfactually, suppose Britain and France had confronted Germteili; and made an alliance with the Soviet Union early.in the 1930s. Or 1mljiginebeen the United States had joined the League of Nations. Hitler might ave and deterred or delayed. He might not have had such dramatic early succesilseg,con- might have been overthrown by his own generals, who several timfiestl a,S er- templated such a coup. But since these things did not happeni] 1i ter1 9305 sonality and strategy became the key prec1p1tating cause. By t e a e 6 his: once Hitler began to plan war, it became almost 1nev1table. Even so, sgm tem- torians believe that if France and Britain had launched an offensive in ep ber 1939, they might have defeated Germany. 1926 1930 El 5’ 3 ‘t: 8 r: :I O 0 possible Degrees of freedom futures \ \ \ \ Figure 4.2 The Narrowing Funnel of Choices in Europe THE ORIGINS Ol- WUHLU WAH n a I The Pacific War The war in the Pacific had separate origins. Japan was a much more traditional s0ciety and not so deeply involved in European events. In the 1920s, Japan was far from being a perfect democracy, but it did have a parliamentary system. In the 1930s, the military and extreme nationalists gained control of the govern- ment. Their policy of imperialist expansion was widely popular. Japan had al- ways worried about being prevented from obtaining the raw materials it had to import. When the Depression of the 1930s cut Japan’s trade, the Japanese feared that if they did not change their situation, they would face a bleak fu— ture. The Japanese tried to create a regional hegemony, which they called the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (a wonderful euphemism for conquest of one’s neighbors). Japan believed the sphere would allow them to resist threats from Britain and the United States, who were still major naval powers in the Pacific. Japan first expanded at the expense of China. The brutal war in China brought them into diplomatic conflict with the United States, which supported China. After France fell to Hitler in 1940, the Japanese took advantage of the opportunity to seize the French colonies in Southeast Asia, Vietnam and Cam- bodia. At this point, the Japanese expansionists had three options. One was to strike westward against the Soviet Union. Since there had already been clashes between Japanese and Soviet forces along the border in Manchuria, some people thought a Japanese—Soviet war along the Manchurian border was most likely. The second option for the Japanese was to strike south, for although they had already taken the French colonies in Southeast Asia, the biggest prize was the Dutch East Indies (today’s Indonesia), which had the oil Japan needed. Option 3 was to strike east against the United States, by far the riskiest of the three options. Why did the Japanese choose to attack the United States? For one thing, Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union had removed the Soviet threat to Japan, and until the last weeks of World War 11, Japan and the USSR maintained a neu- trality of convenience. At the same time, the Americans tried to deter the lap— anese from striking south by putting an embargo on oil shipments to Japan. As President Roosevelt put it, “The US. would slip a noose around Japan’s neck and give it a jerk now and then." Assistant Secretary of State Dean Acheson was quoted at the time as saying this would not lead to war because “no rational Japanese could believe that an attack on us could result in anything but disaster for his country."6 But the Japanese felt that if they did not go to war, they would eventually suffer defeat in any case. With 90 percent of their oil imported, they felt their navy could not last for even a year if they were cut off; therefore they concluded that it was better to go to war than to be slowly strangled. In addition, the United States demanded that Japan withdraw from China. The Japanese felt this would cut them off from the area they viewed as their economic hinterland. As a Japanese military officer explained to Emperor Hi- rohito, the situation was like that of a patient with a serious illness: “An oper- ation, while it might be extremely dangerous, would still offer some hope of - -__._u. n... ngunll I AND VVUHLU WAR ll ms armx 0N PEARL HARBOR, Dec. 7, 1941 \ \ J apanese \\\Carrier Fleet \\ \‘kii '1" R U s s I A 0‘ Pacific Ocean ‘ ALEUTIANE] “ “THE JAPANESE SOLDIER" Indrfferentty clothed in cotton tunic, trousers and peaked cap,poorly paid,sav« :9er treated by his officers, required to _ undergo arduous marches and tactical exercrses in the most severe weather, accustomed to maintain himseli tor iive days merely on the rice he carried him selflhe had no‘comiorts' but the glory oi dylngfor his Emperor...he was expected to maintain himse" by capturing his ,' enemy’s supplies? mmtum‘wmuuiovmflmnm.) C I C n . .ll.-... . Captured by Japanon v IIIIIIII Xmas Day '41 I + a Japan occupied most of French lndo-Chma aiterialloi FrancngA - Territory held by Ja pan in December.1941 . l- A Smking O'Repulse j dvances by Japan . . Territory ca lured b a Prince ofWales - Japantc Jule,1942 y 0 400 800 1200 K m. saving his life."7 From their point of view, it was not totally irrational for Japan to go to war because it was the least bad of the alternatives they saw. If Ger- many defeated Britain and American opinion was discouraged by the sudden- ness of the attack, there might be a negotiated peace. A poorly reasoned form of the Japanese leaders’ mood was expressed by Vice Army Chief of Staff Tsukuda: A THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR II 93 Even if we should make concessions to the United States by giving up part of our national policy for the sake of a temporary peace, the United States, its mil- itary position strengthened, is sure to demand more and more concessions on our part; and ultimately our empire will lie prostrate at the feet of the United States. —Records of Japan's 1941 Policy Conferences In general, the prospects if we go to war are not bright. We all wonder if there isn't some way to proceed peacefully. There is no one who is willing to say, "Don’t worry, even if the war is prolonged, I will assume all responsibility.” On the other hand, it is not possible to maintain the status quo. Hence, one unavoidably reaches the conclusion that we must go to war.” Of course, Japan had the option of reversing its aggression in China and South- east Asia, but that was unthinkable for the military leaders. Thus on Decem- ber 7, 1941, the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor. Appeasement and Two Types of War What lessons can we draw from this? Some say that the key lesson of the 19305 is the evil of appeasement. But appeasement is not bad per se; it is a classic tool of diplomacy. It was used successfully in 1815 when the victorious powers ap- peased the defeated France. In the 18905, Britain appeased the rising United States. We could even argue that appeasement might have been the right pol- icy for the Western Allies to have taken toward Germany in the 19205. One of the great ironies of the interwar period is that the West confronted Germany in the 19205 when it should have been appeased, and appeased Germany in the 1930s when it should have been confronted. Appeasement was the wrong approach to Hitler, but British Prime Minis— ter Neville Chamberlain was not such a coward as the Munich experience makes him out to be. He wanted to avoid another World War I. In July 1938, he said, When I think of those four terrible years and I think of the 7 million young men who were cut off in their prime and 13 million who were maimed and mutilated, the misery and suffering of the mothers and fathers, sons and daughters, I must say that there are no winners in a war, but all losers. It is those thoughts which make me feel that it is my prime duty to strain every nerve to avoid repetition of the Great War in Europe.9 Chamberlain’s sins were not his intentions, but his ignorance and arrogance in failing to appraise the situation properly. And in that failure, he was not alone. World Wars I and II are often cast as two quite different models of war: accidental war versus planned aggression. World War I was an unwanted spiral ____ . . . ._ vhUUI II I I HIVU VVUr‘LU VVAH of hostility. To some extent it might have been avoided with appeasement. As political scientist David Calleo has said, “The proper lesson is not so much the need for vigilance against aggressors, but the ruinous consequences of refusing reasonable accommodation of upstarts.”10 World War II was not an unwanted spiral of hostility—it was a failure to deter Hitler’s planned aggression. In that sense, the policies appropriate for preventing World Wars I and II were almost opposite. Appeasement of Germany might have helped forestall World War I and deterrence of Germany might have prevented World War II, but the pol- icies were reversed. In trying to avoid a repetition of World War 1, British lead- ers in the 1930s helped to bring on World War 11. At the same time, the efforts of US. leaders to deter Japan helped to bring on war in the Pacific. Deterrence failed because the Japanese felt cornered in a situation where the alternative of peace looked worse than losing a war. Of course, these two models of war are too simple. World War I was not purely accidental, and World War II, in the Pacific at least, was not merely Hitler’s planned aggression. The ultimate lesson is to be wary of overly simple historical analogies. Always ask whether a model is true to the facts of history and whether it really fits the current reality. It helps to remember the story of Mark Twain’s cat. As Twain pointed out, a cat that sits on a hot stove will not sit on a hot stove again, but neither will it sit on a cold one. It is necessary to know which stoves are cold and which are hot when using historical analogies or po- litical science models based on World Wars I and II. NOTES 1. Woodrow Wilson in Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Vol. I (New York: Harper, 1925), pp. 182—183. 2. Quoted in Inis L. Claude, Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 104. 3. Quoted in F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 1952), p. 653. 4. A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War, 2nd ed. (Greenwich: Fawcett, 1961), p. 281. 5. Adolf Hitler on August 27, 1939, in Gordon Craig, Germany, 1866—1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 712. 6. Quoted in Scott Sagan, “The Origins of the Pacific War," in Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabbs, eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 1989), pp. 335, 336. Sagan, “The Origins of the Pacific War,” p. 325. Quoted in Scott Sagan, "Deterrence and Decision: An Historical Critique of Mod- ern Deterrence Theory," Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, p. 280. 9. Neville Chamberlain, In Search of Peace: Speeches 1937—38 (London: Hutchinson, n.d.), p. 59. 10. David P. Calleo, The German Problem Reconsidered: Germany and the World Or- der, 1870 to the Present (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 6. 9°51 FURTHER READINGS 95 SELECTED READINGS 1. Graham Ross, The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System, 1919—1945 (London: Longman, 1983), pp. 109—126. 2. P. M. H. Bell, The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (London: Longman, 1986), pp. 14—38. ” . . I . 3. Scott Sagan, "The Origins of the Pacific War, journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 893—922. . 4. A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Hamilton, 1961), pp. 102—109, 272—278, xi—xxviii. ” t . 5. Alan Bullock, "Hitler and the Origins of the Second World war, R. Louis, ed., The Origins of the Second World War: A. j. P. Taylor and His Critics (New York: Wiley, 1972), pp. 117—145. FURTHER READINGS Barnhart, Michael A., japan Prepares for Total War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). Bell, P. M. H., The Origins of the Second World War in Europe (London: Longman, 1986). Bullock, Alan, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). Carr, E. H., The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919—1939: An Introduction to the History of In- ternational Relations (London: Macmillan, 1940). Claude, Inis L., Power and International Relations (New York: Random House, 1962). Heinrichs, Waldo, Jr., Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988). Hilderbrand, Klaus, Foreign Policy of the Third Reich, Anthony Fothergill, trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973). " ' ' ' - British Deterrence Failure Hughes, Jeffrey, The Onglns of World War II in Europe. and German Expansionism," in Robert Rotberg and Theodore Rabb, eds., he Or- igin and Prevention of Major Wars (Cambridge, England: Cambridge UniverSIty Press, 1989), pp. 281—322. Iriye, Akira, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (London: Longman, 1987). Jervis, Robert, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985). Middlemas, Keith, The Strategy of Appeasement: The British Government and Ger— many (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1962). Ross, Graham, The Great Powers and the Decline of the European States System, 1914-— 1945 (London: Longman, 1983). Storry, Richard, A History of Modern japan (Baltimore: Penguin, 1960). Utley, Jonathan, Going to War with japan, 1937—1941 (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1985). :10 IHI: I-AILURE OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND WORLD WAR II Walters, F. P., A History of the League of Nations (London: Oxford University Press, 1952). Wolfers, Arnold, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Balti- more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962). STUDY QUESTIONS 1. What “lessons” of World War I did policymakers draw at the time? How did it affect their behavior in the interwar period? 2. How did the concept of collective security differ from balance-of-power politics? Is the notion of collective security utopian? If not, how might collective security have worked better during the interwar period? 3. Was World War II inevitable? If so, why and when? If not, when and how could it have been avoided? 4. To what extent can the outbreak of World War II be attributed to the personalities of the leaders involved? ‘ 5. What might be some lessons of the interwar period that might help policymakers avoid war today? 6. Was Japan irrational to attack the United States? CHRONOLOG Y: BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS 1919 Peace Conference opens at Versailles; adoption of Weimar Constitution 1920 Creation of the League of Nations l921~1922 Washington conference on naval armaments 1922 Permanent Court of Justice at the Hague established; Treaty of Rapallo between Germany and the Soviet Union; Mussolini assumes power in Italy 1923 France and Belgium occupy the Ruhr in response to German default on coal deliveries; Nazi Beer Hall Putsch aborted 1924 Dawes Plan for reparations accepted; Geneva Protocol for the peaceful settlement of international disputes adopted 1925 Locarno Conference and treaties 1926 Germany admitted to the League of Nations 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact signed 1930 London Naval Conference 1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria; failure of the Austrian Credit-Anstalt; Bank of England forced off the gold standard 1932 Disarmament conference; Lausanne Conference on German reparations 1933 Adolf Hitler becomes chancellor of Germany; Reichstag fire; Enabling Act passed establishing Nazi dictatorship; Germany withdraws from the disarmament conference and League of Nations 1934 Soviet Union joins the League of Nations 1935 1936 ’ 1936- 1939 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 CF ,7. ._._.. ..-.. . .u .u._ uunuinuuuH\ :1] Germany renounces the disarmament clauses of the Versailles treaty; Franco-Russian alliance formed; Anglo-German naval agreement reached; Italian invasion of Ethiopia; Hoare-Laval Pact I 1 Germany renounces Locarno Pacts and reoccupies the Rhmeland; Ita y wins the war in Ethiopia; League of Nations discredited as a politlcal instrument; Rome-Berlin axis formed; Anti-Comintern Pact formed Civil war in Spain d Hostilities begin between China an Japan . ' German invasion and annexation of Austria; Chamberlam meets Hitler at Berchtesgaden, Godesberg, and Munich to resolve the German- Czech crisis; Munich agreement signed . . Crisis in Czechoslovakia; Germany occupies all of Czechoslovakia; Brlt- ish and French pledges to Poland and guarantees to Greece and Ru- mania; Italy invades Albania; German—Russian Pact; Germany invades Poland; Britain and France declare war on Germany Hitler invades France; Battle of Britain; Japan occupies French Indo- china Hitler invades Soviet Union; Japan attacks Pearl Harbor ...
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