Reading 4

Reading 4 - UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

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Unformatted text preview: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS lllfljlfillilflflfljflflflWWII”llllllllfllfifll A A _ _ 0192 8726 Reserve Matenef , Library Use Onéy a mumb GLUE/m5 ; 2 Hour! A * An Introduction to Theory and History WE‘REAEDHJQ — WNJ: Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Harvard University WI 3 fl HarperCollinsCollegePublisbers Ie Nineteenth Century ;— 1871 '— 1901 — 1916 - 1870 —1856 ~1881 —1870 -1890 1905 1871 1914 1902 United Kingdom formed by union of Great Britain and Ireland Napoleon I, emperor of France End of Holy Roman Empire; imperial title renounced by Francis II Kingdom of Holland incorporated in French empire French invasion of Russia; destruction of Napoleon's army Congress of Vienna: monarchies reestablished in Europe Battle of Waterloo: Napoleon escapes from Elba but defeated by British and Prussian armies Unification of Germany Victoria, queen of England: period of great industrial expansion and prosperity Revolutions in France, Germany, Hungary, and Bohemia; publication of Karl Marx’s Communist Manifesto Francis Joseph, emperor of Austria; becomes ruler of the Austro- Hungarian Empire in 1867 Napoleon III, emperor of Second French Empire Crimean War: Britain and France support Ottomans in war with Russia Alexander II, czar of Russia Italian political unification and cultural nationalism led by Garibaldi Emancipation of Russian serfs by Czar Alexander II Otto von Bismarck, premier and chancellor of Germany, forges German Empire Russian expansion in Poland, Balkans, and central Asia Austro-Hungarian Empire founded F ranco-Prussian War: German invasion of France; Third French Repub- lic created European imperialism at peak; industrial growth; rise of labor move~ ments and Marxism The Paris Commune: Paris, a revolutionary center, establishes own gov- ernment and wars with national government Congress of Berlin: division of much of Ottoman empire among Austria, Russia, and Britain Alexander II of Russia assassinated Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy Boer War in South Africa =irst Decade of the Twentieth Century .905 Dual Entente between Britain and France Russo-Japanese War ends in Russian defeat; Japan emerges as world power Russia joins Britain and France in Triple Entente Chapter 3 /__,__ Balance of Power and World War I BALANCE OF POWER alance of power, one of the most fre- . 17 world war I IS Often blamed on the politics. But it is also one of the most ce ts in international - I . f thin S. queiE1 fly gsfihzotlerr: is loosely used to describe and justify all sorts o g con usm . ' ' bal- The eighteenth-century British philosopher PaVId Hurlne (1:322:31 3;: tury constant rule of prudent politics; but t e n1 d Ibed inde- Bigglitzlafichard Cobden calledl it "a chimaaain till: gfiéiicar; prefi- ' ' ” w 1 s , scribable: incomlldewrrs?lfellolllalféhe b33115: of power was an evil principal): dent durlng worra ed statesmen to treat nations like cheeses to be cut up bec'allse It encollenge regardless of the concerns of their peoples. d .t caused pelltlzl/llsginll: disliked the balance-ofl-power becatllll: 31: )bglrlsgzceistability. wars. Defenders of balance of power po iCies argue ' enturies of H ver eace and stability are not the same thing. O\ier :3“. Peace owe , p stem the great powers were an0 ve 1 . 1 t ne the European State 5y , here was war involvmg at eas 0 time t - 'n three-quarters of the .th man of was rare, (:ltmogvers Nine of those wars were large general 1vsarsa :1 Thus itywe of; the gartepovgers involved—what we call hegemonic, or wor w . t e gre e ()(16 ll 5y tel” t e allswel 15 n0. turles of m r S S , h I t 0t 5“ C Se balallce pOWeI [lot to pl 6561 V6 peace ha 15 n ranlllg, be all , but to pIeSeI V6 tllell llldepelldence. balallce of pOWeI to p] e561 V6 ‘lle allalflllfl: 0 Se alate Slales. evely l p . ' S m f p S [6561 Ve(l 10] ex alllple, at end of Century, IOlaIld was, “ldeed, Cut up llke a [[6656 WItll Iolallds IIelgllbOIS—Aust] la, IIuSSla, alld llelplllg C ) 49 H _, -....... uuu AAlllCl uiaue a deal in d gave the Baltic states to the Soviet a spent half a century as Soviet repub- has not preserved peace, and has not each state, but it has preserved the an— changed behavior of others. Thus we have to know about a country’s skill at power conversion as well as its possession of power resources _to predict out- comes correctly. Another problem is determining which resources provide the best basis for power in any particular context. In earlier periods, power resources were easier to judge. For example, in the agrarian economies of eighteenth-century Eu- rope, population was a critical power resource because it provided a base for taxes and recruitment of infantry. In population, France dominated Western Europe. Thus, at the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Prussia presented its fellow victors at the Congress of Vienna with a precise plan for its own reconstruction in order to maintain the balance of power. Its plan listed the territories and vhich they carved up Poland again, an lnion. So Lithuania, Latvia, and Estoni [CS until 1991. The balance of power lways preserved the independence of rchic state system. 0W8 f ) understand the balance, we have to start with power. Power, like love [Sier to experience than to define or measure. Power is the a re s purposes or goals. is I bility to achieve The d1ctionary tells us that it is the ability to do things obert Dahl, a Yale political scientist, defines power as , we may be as mistaken about our 1 - power as the who thought he was hurting Brer Rabbit when he threw him into the briar tch. Knowing in advance how ' ' sence of our efforts is often diffliflrt.people or natlons WOUId behave m the The behavioral definition of power can be useful to analysts and historia o devote considerable time to reconstructing the past, but to practical oll'S .ans and leaders it often seems too ephemeral. Because the ability to cofftrdl .ers is often associated with the possession of certain resources olitical ders commonly define power this way. These resources include po I{llatio ritory, natural resources, economic size, military forces and political stabll, among others. The virtue of this definition is that it makes power a e;- re concrete, measurable, and predictable than the behavioral definIi)tIi)onr Ier in this sense means holding the high cards in the international oke. re. A bas1c rule of poker is that if your opponent is showing cards theft car: t a th‘ ' t i‘ny mg you hold, fold your hand. If you know you Will lose a war, don’t 3r in 1940, but Hitler had greater maneuverabili egy. Ponger conversion is a basic problem that arises when we think of power in s 0 resources. Some countries are better than others at converting their irrges into effective influence, just as some skilled card players win despite , ealt weak hands. Power conversion is the capacity r, as measured by resources, to realized power, a ty and a better military to convert potential s measured by the populations it had lost since 1805, and the territories and populations it would need to regain equivalent numbers. In the prenationalist period, it did not much matter that many of the people in those provinces did not speak German or feel themselves to be German. However, within half a century, nationalist sentiments mattered very much. Another change that occurred during the nineteenth century was the growing importance of industry and rail systems that made rapid mobilization possible. In the 18605, Bismarck’s Germany pio- neered the use of railways to transport armies for quick victories. Although Russia had always had greater population resources than the rest of Europe, I they were difficult to mobilize. The growth of the rail system in western Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century was one of the reasons the Germans feared rising Russian power in 1914. Further, the Spread of rail systems on the Continent helped deprive Britain of the luxury of concentrating on naval power. There was no longer time, should it prove necessary, to insert an army to pre- vent another great power from dominating the Continent. The application of industrial technology to warfare has long had a powerful impact. Advanced science and technology have been particularly critical power resources since the beginning of the nuclear age in 1945. But the power derived from nuclear weapons has proven to be so awesome and destructive that its ac- tual application is muscle-bound. Nuclear war is simply too costly. More gen- erally, there are many situations where any use of force may be inappropriate or too costly. _ Even if the direct use of force was banned among a group of countries, mil- itary force would still play an important background role. For example, the American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of pro- tective force can be used in bargaining situations. Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen’s minds. In addition, there is the consideration sometimes called "the second face of power.” Getting other states to change might be called the direct or command- ing method of exercising power. Such "hard" power can rest on inducements ("carrots") or threats (“sticks”). But there is also a soft or indirect way to exer- cise power. A country may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics -. .. ......._ v. - vncn run) vvunLlJ VVAHI because other countries want to follow it or have agreed to a system that pro- duces such effects. In this sense, it is just as important to set the agenda and structure the situations in world politics as it is to get others to change in par- ticular situations. This aspect of power—that is, getting others to want what you want—might be called cooptive, or soft power behavior. Soft power can rest on such resources as the attraction of one’s ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences others express. Parents of teenagers know that if they have structured their children’s beliefs and pref- erences, their power will be greater and will last longer than if they had re- lied only on active control. Similarly, political leaders and philosophers have long understood the power that comes from setting the agenda and determin- ing the framework of a debate. The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions. What resources are the most important sources of power today? A look at the five centuries of modern state systems shows that different power resources Leading States and Major Power Resources Period Leading State Sixteenth century Spain Maior Resources Gold bullion, colonial trade, mercenary armies, dynastic ties Seventeenth century Netherlands Trade, capital markets, navy Eighteenth century France Population, rural industry, public administratiOn, army Nineteenth century Britain Industry, political cohe- sion, finance and credit, navy, liberal norms, island location (easy to defend) Twentieth century United States Economic scale, scien- tific and technical lead- ership, universalistic culture, military forces and alliances, liberal international regimes, hub of transnational communication BALANCE OF POWER 53 played critical roles in different periods. The sources of power are never static and they continue to change in today's world. In an age of information-based economies and transnational interdepen- dence, power is becoming less transferable, leSs tangible, and less coercive. However, the transformation of power is incomplete. The twenty-first century will certainly see a greater role for informational and institutional power, but as the 1991 Gulf War showed, military force remains an important factor. Eco— nomic scale, both in markets and in natural resources, will also remain impor— tant. As the service sector grows within modern economics, the distinction between services and manfacturing will continue tolblur. Information will be— come more plentiful, and the critical resource will be the organizational capac— ity for rapid and flexible response. Political cohesion will remain important, as well as a universalistic popular culture. The difficulty of measuring changing power resources is a major problem for statesmen trying to assess the balance of power. For analysts of international politics, there is an additional confusion when the same word is used for dif- ferent things. We must try to separate and clarify the underlying concepts cov- ered by the loose use of the same words. The term balance of power commonly refers to at least three different things. Balances As Distributions of Power Balance of power can mean, in the first sense, any distribution of power. Who has the power resources? Sometimes people use the term balance of power to refer to the status quo, the existing distribution of power. Thus in the 19805, some Americans argued that if Nicaragua became a communist state, the bal- ance of power would be changed. Such a use of the term is not very enlight- ening. If one little state changed sides, that might slightly alter the existing distribution of power, but it would be a rather trivial change and it would not tell us much about the deeper changes that were occurring in world politics. Another way the term is used is to refer to a special (and more rare) set of situations where power is distributed equally. This usage conjures up the image of a set of scales in balance or equilibrium. Some realists argue that stability occurs when there is an equal balance, but others argue that stability occurs when one side has a preponderance of power, so that the others dare not attack it. Hegemonic theory holds that imbalanced power produces peace. When there is a strong dominant power, there will be stability, and when that strong power begins to slip, and a new challenger rises, war is more likely. Consider Thucydides’s explanation of the Peloponnesian War: The rise of the power in Athens and the fear it created in Sparta fits this hegemonic transition theory. As we see later, so does World War I. However, we must be cautious about such theories, for they tend to over- predict conflict. In the 1880s the United States passed Great Britain as the larg- est economy in the world. In 1895, there was a dispute between the United States and Britain over borders in South America, and it looked as if there might be war. There was a rising challenger, an old hegemon, and a cause of 4 BALANCE OF POWER AND WORLD WAR l onflict, but you do not read about the great British-American War of 1895 be- ause it did not occur. As Sherlock Holmes pointed out, we can get important lues from dogs that do not bark. In this case, the absence of war leads us to )ok for other causes. Realists point to the rise of Germany as a more proximate hreat to Britain. Liberals point to the increasingly democratic nature of the N0 countries and to transnational cultural ties between the old leader and me new challenger. The best we can conclude about the balance of power in the rst sense of the term is that changes in the unequal distribution of power mong leading states may be a factor, but not the sole factor, in explaining war nd instability. lalance of Power As Policy he second use of the term refers to balance of power as a policy of balancing. valance of power predicts that states will act to prevent any one state from de- eloping a preponderance of power. This prediction has a long pedigree. Lord 'almerston, British foreign secretary in 1848, said that Britain had no eternal llies or perpetual enemies; Britain thought only of its interests. Sir Edward lrey, the British foreign minister in 1914, did not want to go to war, but even- ially did because he feared that Germany would gain preponderance in Eu- )pe by controlling the Continent. And in 1941, when Hitler invaded the Soviet lnion, Prime Minister Winston Churchill said that Britain should make an al- ance with Stalin, against whom he had been fulminating just a few years be- )re. Churchill said, “If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable 3ference to the Devil in the House of Commons.”2 These are good examples fbalance of power as policy. Predicting such behavior rests on two basic assumptions: (1) The structure f international politics is an anarchic states system, and (2) states value their idependence above all else. A balance-of-power policy does not necessarily as- ume that states act to maximize power. In fact, a state might choose a very ifferent course of action if it wished to maximize power. It might choose to andwagon, that is, join whoever seems stronger and share in the victors gains. landwagoning is common in domestic politics where politicians flock to an pparent winner. Balance of power, however, predicts that a state will join who- ver seems weaker because states will act to keep any one state from develop- 1g a preponderance of power. Bandwagoning in international politics carries he risk of losing independence. In 1939 and 1940, Mussolini joined Hitler’s ttack on France as a way to get some of the spoils, but Italy became more and more dependent on Germany. That is why a balance of power policy says join he weaker side. Balance-of-power is a policy of helping the underdog because : you help the top dog, it may eventually turn around and eat you. States can try to balance power unilaterally by developing armaments or by arming alliances with other countries whose power resources help to balance be top dog. This is one of the more interesting and powerful predictions in nternational politics. The contemporary Middle East is a good example. As we ee in Chapter 6, when Iran and Iraq went to war in the early 19805, some observers thought all Arab states would support Saddam Hussein's Iraq, which represented the Ba’ath party and Arab forces against the Ayatollah Khomeini’s Iran, which represented Persian culture and the minority Shi’ite version of Is- lam. But Syria, despite having a secular leader from the Ba’ath party, became an ally of Iran. Why? Because Syria was worried about the growing power in the Arab world of its neighbor Iraq. Syria choose to balance Iraqi power, re-’ gardless of its ideological preferences. Efforts to use ideology to predict state behavior are often wrong whereas counterintuitive predictions based on bal— ancing power often get the answer right. Of course, there are exceptions. Human behavior is not fully determined. Human beings have choices, and they do not always act as predicted. Certain situations predispose people toward a certain type of behavior, but we cannot always predict the details. If someone shouts "Fire!" in a crowded lecture hall, we could predict that students would run for the exits, but not which exits. If all choose one exit, the stampede may prevent many from getting out. Theories in international politics often have large exceptions. Even though balance of power in a policy sense is one of the strongest predictors in international pol- itics, its record is far from perfect. Why do countries sometimes eschew balance of power and join the stron- ger rather than the weaker side or stand aloof, thus ignoring the risks to their independence? Some countries may see no alternatives or believe they cannot affect the balance. If so, a small country may decide that it has to fall within the sphere of influence of a great power while hoping that neutrality will preserve some freedom of action. For example, after World War II Finland was defeated by the Soviet Union and far away from the center of Europe. The Finns felt that \ neutrality was safer than trying to become part of the European balance of power. They were in the Soviet sphere of influence, and the best they could do was bargain away independence in foreign policy for a large degree of control over their domestic affairs. Another reason that balance-of-power predictions are sometimes wrong has to do with perceptions of threat. For example, a mechanical accounting of the power resources of countries in 1917 would have predicted that the United States would join World War I on the side of Germany because Britain, France, and Russia had 30 percent of the industrial world’s resources while Germany and Austria had Only 19 percent. It did not happen that way because the Amer- icans perceived the Germans as militarily stronger and the aggressor in the war, and because the Germans underestimated America’s military potential. Perceptions of threat are often influenced by the proximity of the threat. A neighbor may be weak on some absolute global scale, but threatening in its re— gion or local area. Consider Britain and the United States in the 18905: Britain could have fought, but instead chose to appease the United States. It gave in on many things, including the building of the Panama Canal, which allowed the United States to improve its naval position. One reason is that Britain was more worried about its neighbor Germany than it was about the distant Americans. The United States was larger than Germany but proximity affected which threat loomed larger in British eyes. Proximity also helps explain the alliances 56 BALANCE OF POWER AND WORLD WAR l after 1945. The United States was stronger than the Soviet Union, so why didn’t Europe and Japan ally with the Soviet Union against the United States? The answer lies partly in the proximity of the threat. From the point of view of Eu~ rope and Japan, the Soviets were an immediate threat and the United States was far away. The Europeans and the Japanese called in the distant power to rebalance the situation in their immediate neighborhood. The fact that prox- imity often affects how threats are perceived qualifies any predictions based on simple mechanical toting up of power resources. Another exception to balance~of-power predictions relates to the growing role of economic interdependence in world affairs. According to a balance-of~ power policy, France should not wish to see Germany grow, but because of economic integration, German growth stimulates French growth. French poli- ticians are more likely to be reelected when the French economy is growing. Therefore, a policy of trying to hold back German economic growth would be foolish because the French and German economies are so interdependent. In economic considerations, there are often joint gains that would be lost by fol~ lowing too simple a balance-of-power policy. Finally, ideology will sometimes cause countries to join the top dog rather than the underdog. Even in Thucydides’s day, democratic city-states were more likely to align with Athens and oligarchies with Sparta. Britain’s appease~ ment of the United States in the 1890s, or the Europeans joining with the Americans in an alliance of democracies after 1945, owed something to the in~ fluence of ideology, as well as to the proximity of the threat. On the other hand, we must be careful about predicting too much from ideology, because it often leads to colossal mistakes. Many Europeans believed that Stalin and Hitler could not come together in 1939 because they were at opposite ends of the ideological spectrum; but balance-of-power considerations led them to an alli- ance against the countries in the middle of the ideological spectrum. Likewise, in the 1960s, the United States mistakenly treated China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and Cambodia as similar because they were all communist. A policy based on balance of power would have predicted that those communist states would balance each other (as they eventually did), which would have been a less expensive way to pursue stability in the East Asian region. Balance of Power As Multipolar Systems The third way in which the term balance of power is used is to describe mul- tipolar historical cases. Europe in the nineteenth century is sometimes held up as the model of a moderate multipolar balance-of-power system. Historians such as Edward Gulick use the term classical balance of power to refer to the European system of the eighteenth century. In this sense, a balance of power requires a number of countries, usually five or six, that follow a set of rules of the game which are generally understood. Since this use of the term balance of power refers to historical systems, we look at the two dimensions of systems, structure and process, which we introduced in Chapter 2. It is true that the BALANCE OF POWER 57 Structure of the Pre—World War I Balance of Power 1815—1870 Loose Multipolarity 1870—1907 Rise of Germany 1907—1914 Bipolarity of Alliances multipolar balance-of-power system in the nineteenth century produced the longest interval without world war in the modern state system—1815 to 1914— but we should not romanticize or oversimplify a complex story. The structure of the nineteenth-century European balance of power changed toward the end of the century. From 1815 to 1870, there were five major powers that often shifted alliances to prevent any one from dominating the Continent. From 1870 to 1907, there were six powers after the unification of Germany and Italy, but the growing strength of Germany eventually led to the problems that brought about the end of the system. As we have seen, from 1907 to 1914, the two alliance systems polarized into tight blocs whose loss of flexibility contributed to the onset of World War I. In terms of process, the nineteenth-century balance-of-power system di- vides into five periods. At the Congress of Vienna, the states of Europe brought France back into the fold, and agreed on certain rules of the game to equalize the players. From 1815 to 1822, these rules formed the "Concert of Europe.” The states concerted their actions, meeting frequently to deal with disputes and maintain an equilibrium. They accepted certain interventions to keep gov- ernments in power domestically when their replacements might lead to a de— stabilizing reorientation of policy. This became more difficult with the rise of nationalism and democratic revolutions, but a truncated concert persisted from 1822 to 1854. This concert fell apart in mid-century when the revolutions of liberal nationalism challenged the practices of providing territorial compensa— tion or restoring governments to maintain equilibrium. Nationalism became too strong to allow such an easy cutting up of cheeses. The third period in the process, from 1854 to 1870, was far less moderate and was marked by five wars. One, the Crimean War, was a classic balance- of-power war in which France and Britain prevented Russia from pressing the declining Ottoman Empire. The others, however, were related to the unifica- tion of Italy and Germany. Political leaders dropped the old rules and began to use nationalism for their expedient purposes. Bismarck, for example, was not an ideological German nati0nalist. He was a deeply conservative man who wanted Germany united under the Prussian monarchy. But he was quite pre- pared to use nationalist appeals and wars to] defeat Denmark, Austria, and France in bringing this about. Once he had accomplished his goals, he re- turned to a more conservative style. 58 BALANCE OF POWER AND WORLD WAR I Process of the Pre-World War I Balance of Power 1815—1822 Concert of Europe 1822—1854 Loose Concert 1854—1870 Nationalism and the Unification of Germany and Italy 1870—1890 Bismarck's Balance of Power 1890—1914 The Loss of Flexibility The fourth period, 1870 to 1890, was the Bismarckian balance of power in which the new Prussian-led Germany played the key role. Bismarck played flexibly with a variety of alliance partners and tried to divert France overseas into imperialistic adventures and away from its lost province of Alsace and Lor- raine. He limited German imperialism in order to keep the balancing act in Europe centered on Berlin. Bismarck’s successors, however, were not as‘ agile. From 1890 to 1914, there was a balance of power, but flexibility was gradually lost. Bismarck’s successors did not renew his treaty with Russia; Germany be— came involved in overseas imperialism, challenged Britain’s naval supremacy, and did not discourage Austrian confrontations with Russia over the Balkans. These policies exacerbated the fears of rising German power, polarized the sys- :em, and led to World War I. THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR I World War I killed some 15 million people. In one battle, the Somme, there were 1.3 million killed and wounded. Compare that to 36,000 casualties when Bismarck defeated Austria in 1866. The United States lost about 55,000 each in Korea and in Vietnam. World War I was a horrifying war of trenches, barbed wire, machine guns, and artillery that ground up a generation of Europe’s youth. It not only destroyed people, it destroyed three European empires: the German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian. Until World War I, the global balance of power was centered in Europe. After World War I, Europe still mattered, but the United States and Japan had become major players. World War I also ushered in the Russian Revolution and the beginning of the ideo- logical battles that racked the twentieth century. How could such an event happen? Prince Bernhard von Bulow, the Ger- man chancellor from 1900 to 1909, met with his successor, Bethmann Hollweg, in the chancellor’s palace in Berlin shortly after the war broke out. Here is how von Bulow described what he remembered: THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR l 59 Bethmann stood in the center of the room; shall I ever forget his face, the look in his eyes? There is a picture by some celebrated English painter which shows the wretched scapegoat with a look of ineffable anguish in its eyes, such pain as I now saw in Bethmann’s. For an instant we neither of us spoke. At last I said to him, “Well, tell me, at least, how it all happened.” He raised his long, thin arms to heaven and answered in a dull, exhausted voice: “Oh, if I only knew!” In many later polemics on war guilt I have often wished it had been possible to produce a snap- shot of Bethmann Hollweg standing there at the moment he said those words. Such a photograph would have been the best proof that this wretched man had never wanted war.3 Three Levels of Analysis Parts. of the answer lie at each of the three levels of analysis. Parsimony sug- gests that we start with the simplest causes, see how much they explain, and go on to more complexity as needed. Thus we look first at the system level expla- nations, both the structure and the process; then at the domestic societal level, and finally turn to the individuals. Then we use counterfactual thought exper- iments to see how the pieces fit together in an explanation of World War I. At the structural level, there were two key elements: the rise of German power and the increased rigidity in the alliance systems. The rise of German power was truly impressive. German heavy industry surpassed that of Great Britain in the 18905, and the growth of German GNP at the beginning of the Either Germany is definitely aiming at a general political hegemony and maritime ascendency, threatening the independence of her neighbours and ultimately the existence of England; Or Germany, free from any such clear-cut ambition, and thinking for the present merely of using her legitimate position and influence as one of the lead- ing Powers in the council of nations. is seeking to promote her foreign com- merce, spread the benefits of German culture, extend the scope of her national energies, and create fresh German interests all over the world wherever and whenever a peaceful opportunity offers. . . . It will, however, be seen, upon re- flection, that there is no actual necessity for a British Government to determine definitely which of the two theories of German policy it will accept. For it is clear that the second scheme (of semi-independent evolution, not entirely unaided by statecraft) may at any stage merge into the first, or consciousdesign scheme. Moreover, if ever the evolution scheme should come to be realized, the position thereby accruing to Germany would obviously constitute as formidable a men- ace to the rest of the world as would be presented by any deliberate conquest of a similar position by "malice aforethought." —-Eyre Crowe, Memorandum, January 1, 19074 ._ ..v.u.v va-ull - Triple Alliance Triple Entent'e Circles indicate relative sizes oi armies , ' ‘ as: Q r Division: IA. 2. Diva. pl E 114 Inlantry Divilions ‘* 50 division- 36 Cavalry Dlvilionl Superbly trained Poorly trained and badly equipped 21mm Division? 10 Cavalry Divs. All trained to attac in the besttradition ’ oi Napoleon ‘ 5‘ Divlllonl but eiiiciency re- duced bynumerous nationalities and languages One cynical Frenchman observed that the ltalian army would "rush to the Old oi the victors? .1 A comparison I).th difiamu organization: oi inllntry division: BRITISH DIVISION 18 000 men. 5000 lion“. 76 MI. 24 ill-dune gun- GERMAN DIVISION 17 500 men, 4000 hon-I. 72 gum. 24 inan gun- FRENCH DIVISION 15 000 men, 5000 hon-I. 36 gum. 24 inactian gun- IMWES AND NA VAL BASES. 1914 mGerman naval base A Allied naval base & / 79% ( Triple Entente i ltalydid not iighionGer- ‘ ' egzjzrn'zszwiia‘l . Hang..." £3 30W Sea EEK . b iel omgs erg 4Wilhelmshaven R U s s I A ‘ G E R M A N Y -\ 1K. ’ .7 l / . ‘i U /% Dreadnoughls \1 , « OlderBattleships' R Co Batilecruisers 8 a . * Cruisers \ MC dz. Te rra Light Cruisers 44 34 6mm” Destroyers &MTle30 144 a Submarines‘ 178 28 "Nolice that even here Brilamhad a marked numericalsupei lOrlly century was twice that of Great Britain. In the 18605 Britain had one-quarter of the worlds industrial production, but by 1913 that had shrunk to 10 percent and Germany 5 share had risen to 15 percent. Germany transformed some of its industrial strength into military capability, including a massive naval arma- ments program. As a result of the increase in Germany’s power Britain began to fear becoming isolated. Britain began to worry about how it would defend its :ar-flung empire. These fears were exacerbated in the Boer War by German THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR I 61 sympathy for the Boers, the Dutch settlers in South Africa, against whom Brit- ain was fighting at the end of the century. In 1907, Sir Eyre Crowe, permanent secretary of the British foreign office, wrote a document famous in the history of British foreign policy, a long mem~ orandum in which he tried to interpret German foreign policy. He concluded that although German policy was vague and confused, Britain clearly could not allow one country to dominate the continent of Europe. Crowe argued that the British response was nearly a law of nature. Britain’s response to Germany’s rising power contributed to the second structural cause of the war: the increasing rigidity in the alliance systems in Europe. In 1904, parting from its geographically semi-isolated position as a balancer off the coast of Europe, Britain moved toward an alliance with France. In 1907, the Anglo-French partnership broadened to include Russia and be- came known as the Triple Entente. Germany, seeing itself encircled, tightened its relations with Austro-Hungary. As the alliances became more rigid, diplo- matic flexibility was lost. No more were there the shifting alignments that characterized the balance of power during Bismarck’s day. Instead, the major powers wrapped themselves around two poles. What about changes in the process? The structural shift to bipolarity af- fected the process by which the nineteenth-century balance-of-power system had worked. In addition, there were three other reasons for the loss of mod— eration in the early twentieth-century balance of power. These included trans- national ideas that were common to several countries. One was the rise of nationalism. In Eastern Europe there was a movement calling for all Slavic- speaking peoples to come together. Pan-Slavism threatened both the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, which each had large Slavic populations. A na- tionalistic hatred of Slavs arose in Germany. German authors wrote about the inevitability of the Teutonic-Slavic battles and schoolbooks inflamed nationalist passions. Nationalism proved to be stronger than socialism when it came to bonding working classes together, and stronger than the capitalism that bound bankers together. Indeed, it proved stronger than family ties among the mon- archs. Just before the war broke out, the kaiser wrote to the czar and appealed to him to avoid war. He addressed his cousin as "Dear Nicky” and signed it “Yours, Willie.” The kaiser hoped that because war was impending over the assassination of a fellow royal family member, the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the czar would see things the same way he did. But by then na- tionalism had overcome any sense of aristocratic or monarchical solidarity, and that family telegram had no effect at all. A second cause for the loss of moderation in the early twentieth-century balance of power was a rise in complacency about peace. For 40 years, the great powers had not been involved in a war in Europe. There had been crises—in Bosnia in 1908, in Morocco again in 1911, and the Balkan wars in 1912, but they had been mastered. However, the diplomatic compromises caused frustration. Afterward, there was a tendency to ask, “Why should my side back down? Why didn’t we make the other side give up more?” There was growing acceptance of BALANCE OF POWER AND WORLD WAR I la] Darwinism. Charles Darwin’s ideas of survival of the fittest made good se as a statistical construct about genetics of natural species over genera- 15, but they were misapplied to human society and unique events. Darwin’s as were used to justify the view that “the strong should prevail.” And if the )ng should prevail, why worry about peace? Long wars seemed unlikely, and ny leaders believed that short decisive wars won by the strong would be a [come change. A third contributor to the loss of flexibility in the early twentieth-century ance of power was German policy. As Eyre Crowe said, it was vague and ifusing. There was a terrible clumsiness about the kaiser’s policy. The Ger- ns were no different in having “world ambitions," but they managed to press =m forward in a way that antagonized everybody at the same time—just the )osite of the way Bismarck played the system in the 18705 and 1880s. The rmans antagonized the British by starting a naval arms race. They antago- ed the Russians over issues in Turkey and the Balkans; and they antagonized : French over a protectorate in Morocco. The kaiser tried to shock Britain 3 a friendship, believing that if he scared Britain enough, it would realize v important Germany was and the need for good relations with Germany. tead, he scared the British into the arms of the French, first, and then of the ssians. So by 1914, the Germans felt they had to break out of this encircle- nt, and thereby deliberately accepted the risk of war. Thus the rise of na- nalism, increased complacency, social Darwinism, and German policy all itributed to the loss of moderation in the process of the international system, 1 helped contribute to the onset of World War I. The second level of analysis provides a look at what was happening in do- stic society and politics. At that level, there is one explanation we can safely ect: Lenin’s argument that the war was caused by the financial capitalists. In nin’s view, World War I was simply the final stage of capitalist imperialism. t the war did not arise out of imperialist conflicts on the colonial peripheries Lenin had expected. In 1898, Britain and France confronted each other at ;hoda in the Sudan as the British tried to complete a north-south line from 1th Africa to Egypt, while the French tried to create an east-west line of col- ies in Africa. If war had occurred then, it might have fit Lenin’s explanation. t, in fact, the war broke out 16 years later in Europe, and the bankers’ ac- ity on the eve of World War I strongly resisted it. Bankers believed that the r would be bad for business. Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign minister, t he had to follow Eyre Crowe’s advice and that Britain had to prevent :rmany from gaining mastery of the balance of power in Europe, but Grey Irried about getting the London bankers to go along with declaring war. We can reject the Leninist explanation, but there are two other domestic .1565 that need to be taken more seriously. One was the internal crises of the clining Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires; the other was the domestic litical situation in Germany. Both Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Turkey were multinational empires d were therefore threatened by the rise of nationalism. In addition, the Otto- in government was very weak, very corrupt, and an easy target for nationalist /\ THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR l 63 groups in the Balkans that wanted to free themselves from centuries of Turkish rule. The Balkan wars of 1912 pushed the Turks out, but in the next year the Balkan states then fell to war among themselves in dividing the spoils. The wars whetted the appetite of some Balkan states to fight Austria: If the Turks could be pushed out, then why not the Austrians too? Serbia took the lead among the Balkan states. Austria feared disintegration from this nationalistic pressure and worried about the loss of status that would result. In the end, Austria went to war against Serbia not because of the assas- sination of its archduke Franz Ferdinand by a Serbian terrorist, but because Austria wanted to weaken Serbia and prevent it from becoming a magnet for nationalism among the Balkan Slavs. General Conrad, the Austrian chief of staff, exposed his motives very clearly: “For this reason, and not as vengeance for the assassination, Austria-Hungary must draw the sword against Ser- bia. . . . The monarchy had been seized by the throat and had to choose be- tween allowing itself to be strangled, and making a last effort to prevent its destruction."5 Disintegration of an empire because of nationalism was the real precipitating cause of the war; Franz Ferdinand was a pretext. Another important domestic level eXplanation lay in the domestic politics of Germany. German historian Fritz Fischer and his followers argue that the German social problems were a key cause of the war. According to Fischer, Germany’s efforts toward world hegemony were an attempt by the German elites to distract attention from the poor domestic integration of German soci- ety. According to this school of thought, Germany was ruled by a domestic co- alition of landed aristocrats and some very large industrial capitalists, called the Coalition of Rye and Iron. This ruling coalition used expansionist policies to provide foreign adventures instead of domestic reform, circuses in place of bread. Expansionism was an alternative to social democracy. This is not suffi- cient to explain World War I, but it does help to explain the source of the pres- sure that Germany put on the international system after 1890. Germany's Reaction to Britain's Declaration of War Edward VII [the kaiser’s uncle and former king of England] in the grave is still stronger than I. who am alive! And to think there have been people who be- lieved England could be won over or pacified with this or that petty mea- sure!!! . . . Now this whole trickery must be ruthlessly exposed and the mask of Christian pacifism roughly and publicly torn from the face [of Britain], and the pharisaical sham peace put in the pilloryI! And our consuls in Turkey and India. agents and so forth; must fire the whole Mohammedan world to fierce revolt against this hateful, lying, unprincipled nation of shopkeepers; for if we are to bleed to death, England will at least lose India. -—Kaiser Wilhelm ll 6 64 BALANCE OF POWER AND WORLD WAR | IMAGE 2 Domestic . i . . IMAGE 1 Rising . Ris1ng popular W nationalism —> participation of Leaders l Domestic class conflict Collapse of i Austro-Hungary Aggressive l German policy IMAGE 3 Rise in Biopolarity Loss of Escalating War International German—» of —> moderation in —> crises —> in System power alliances system process 1914 Figure 3.1 Three Images of the Causes of World War I What about the first level of analysis, the role of individuals? What distin- guished the leadership on the eve of World War I was its mediocrity. The Austro-Hungarian emperor, Franz Josef, was a tired old man who was putty in the hands of General Conrad and Count Berchtold, the duplicitous foreign minister. Ironically, Franz Ferdinand, the crown prince who was assassinated at Sarajevo, would have been a restraining force, for the potential heir had liberal political views. In Russia, Czar Nicholas was an isolated autocrat who spent most of his time resisting change at home. He was served by incompetent for- eign and defense ministers, and was strongly influenced by his sickly and neu- rotic wife. Most important was the kaiser, who had a great sense of inferiority. He was a blusterer, a weak man and extremely emotional. He led Germany into 1 risky policy without any skill or consistency. To quote von Bulow: William 11 did not want war, if only because he did not trust his nerves not to give way under the strain of any really critical situation. The moment there was danger his majesty would become uncomfortably conscious that he could never lead ari army into battle. He was well aware that he was neurasthenic. His more menacing jingo speeches were intended to give the foreigner the impression that here was another Frederick the Great or Napoleon.7 Personality did make a difference. There was something about the leaders, :he kaiser in particular, that made them significant contributory causes of the var. The relationship among some of the systemic, societal, and individual :auses are illustrated in Figure 3.1, above. L Nas War Inevitable? When there are several causes, each of which could be sufficient, we call a sit- iation over-determined. If World War I was overdetermined, does that mean it was ineVitable? The answer is no, war was not inevitable until it actually broke )ut in August 1914. And even then it was not inevitable that four years of car- iage had to follow. F. lHt UHlble Ur VVUnLu vw-m I uu Let us distinguish three types of causes in terms of their proximity in time to the event we are studying. The most remote are deep causes, then come intermediate causes, and those immediately before the event are precipitating causes. By analogy, ask how the lights came to be on in your room. The pre- cipitating cause is that you flicked the switch, the intermediate cause is that someone wired the building, and the deep cause is that Thomas Edison dis- covered how to deliver electricity. Another anology is building a fire: The logs are the deep cause, the kindling and paper the intermediate cause, and the actual striking of the match is the precipitating cause. In World War I, the deep causes were changes in the structure of the bal- ance of power and certain aspects of the domestic political systems. Especially important reasons were the rise of German strength, the development of a bi- polar alliance system, the rise of nationalism and the resultant destruction of two declining empires, and German politics. The intermediate causes were German policy, the rise in complacency about peace, and the personal idio- syncracies of the leaders. The precipitating cause was the assassination of Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo by a Serbian terrorist. Looking back, things always look inevitable. Indeed, we might say that if it had not been the assassination, it would have been some other incident. Some say that precipitating events are like trolley cars: They come along every ten minutes. Thus the specific event at Sarajevo was not all that important; some incident would probably have occurred sooner or later. This type of argument can be tested by counterfactual history. We can ask “what if” and “what might have been" as we look carefully at the history of the period. What if there had been no assassination in Sarajevo? What if the Social Democrats had come to power in Germany? There is also the issue of probability. Given the deep and intermediate causes, there was a high probability of war, but a high prob- abilty is not the same as inevitability. ,Using the metaphor of the fire again, logs and kindling may sit for a long time and never be lit. Indeed, if it rains before somebody comes along with a match, they may not catch fire even when a Sarajevo occurs. Suppose there had been no Sarajevo in 1914, and no crisis occurred until 1916; what might have happened? One possibility is that the growth in Russian strength might have deterred Germany from recklessly backing Austria. [n 1914, General von Moltke and Foreign Secretary Jagow, two of the German leaders who were most influential in precipitating the war, believed that war with Russia was inevitable. They knew that Germany would have a problem fighting a war on two fronts and would have to knock out one side before fight- ing the other. Russia, although larger, was technologically backward and had a poor transportation system, so it could be put off for the second strike. Ger— many ought first to rush westward to knock out the French. After victory in the west, Germany could turn east and take its time to beat the Russians. Indeed, that was the Schlieffen Plan, the war plan of the German general staff, which called for a rapid sweep through Belgium (violating Relgian neutrality in the process) to knock out France quickly, and then to turn east. But this strategy might have become obsolete by 1916 because Russia was using French money to build railroads. In the 1890s, it would have taken the -- _..._........_ v. I V'II—IIr‘I‘U VVUFILU VVAnI ViennaO "IE BAUMNS, 1914 < ., (foo AUSTRIAN R USSIA _, 9; EMPIRE «4-- 0 ’~ RUMANIA MeditmwanVSea ‘- «‘ -~ m _ , M M . I THE SGHLIEFFEN PLAN- and its assumptions, 1914 It shows how German h ' y oped to avord a war on two fronts simultaneously RUSSIA "Ruulan mobllinllon would take many wake, so there would be time to defeat France first and then tron-port by rall the German Innlu In the van to the not “ § armies would contain the g anticipated French attack In theVusges while iive ar— rnies advanced through Bei- gium to encircle the French" “Austria would easily defeat Serbia" Regmaraa Russians two or three months before they could have transported all their troops to the German front, giving Germany ample time to fight France first By 1910, that time had shrunk to 18 days, and the German planners knew the. no longer had a large margin of safety. By 1916, the margin would have beer); gone and Germany might have had to drop its two-front strategy. Some German leaders thought that a war in 1914 was better than a war later The wanted t seize the crisis to wage and win a preventive war. . y o H'IC Unlulnu VI vvv.._., ... . If there had been no assassination and crisis in 1914, and the world had made it to 1916 without a war, it is possible that the Germans might have felt deterred, unable to risk a two-front war. They might have been more careful before giving Austria a blank check, as they did in 1914. Or they might have dropped the Schlieffen Plan and concentrated on a war in the east only. Or they might have come to terms with Great Britain or changed their view that the offense had the advantage. In summary, in another two years, a variety of changes related to Russian strength might have prevented the war. Without war, German industrial strength would have continued to grow. Ironically, without war, the British historian A. I. P. Taylor has speculated, Germany might have won mastery over Europe. Germany might have become so strong that France and Britain would have been deterred. We can also raise counterfactuals about what might have happened in Brit- ain’s internal affairs if two more years had passed without war. In The Strange Death of Liberal England, historian George Dangerfield tells of Britain's d0- mestic turmoil. The Liberal party was committed to getting out of Ireland while the conservatives, particularly in Northern Ireland, were bitterly op- posed. There was a prospect of mutiny in the British army. If the Ulster Revolt had developed, it is quite plausible that Britain would have been so internally preoccupied it would not have been able to join the coalition with France and Russia. Certainly many historically significant changes could have occurred in two more years of peace. What Kind of War? Another set of counterfactuals raises questions about what kind of a war would have occurred rather than whether some war'would have occurred. It is true Germany’s policies frightened her neighbors and that Germany in turn was afraid of being encircled by the Triple Entente, so it is reasonable to assume that some war was more likely than not. But what kind of war? The war did not have to be what we now remember as World War I. Counterfactually, four other wars were possible. One was a simple local war. Initially, the kaiser expected a replay of the Bosnian crisis of 1908- 1909 when the Germans backed the Austrians, and Aus- tria was therefore able to make Russia stand down in the Balkans. On July 5, 1914, the kaiser promised full support to Austro-Hungary. And with that, he went on vacation. When the kaiser returned from his cruise, he found that the Austrians had filled in the blank check he left them by issuing an ultimatum to Serbia. When he realized that, the kaiser made great efforts to keep the war from escalating, thus the Nicky-Willie telegrams referred to earlier. If his ef- forts had been successful, we might today recall not World War I, but merely a little Austrian-Serbian War of August 1914. A second counterfactual possibility was a one-front war. When the Russians mobilized their troops, the Germans also mobilized. The kaiser asked General von Moltke whether he could limit the preparations to just the eastern front. Von Moltke replied that it was impossible because any change in the timetables for assembling the troops and supplies would create a logistical nightmare. He told the kaiser that if he tried to change the plans, he would have a disorganized mass instead of an army. However, after the war, General von Staab of the rail- way division of the German army admitted that it might have been possible after all to have altered the mobilization schedules successfully. Had the kaiser known that and insisted, there might have been a one-front war. A third counterfactual is to imagine a two-front war without Britain: Ger- many and Austria versus France and Russia. If the British had not been there to make the difference, Germany might well have won. It is possible that Brit- ain might not have joined if Germany had not invaded Belgium, although Bel- gium was not the main cause of Britain entering the war. For some people, like Sir Edward Grey and the Foreign Office, the main reason for entering the war was the danger of German control of the Continent. But Britain was a democ- racy, and the Liberal party in the Cabinet was split. The left Liberals opposed war, but when Germany swept through Belgium and violated Belgian neutral- ty, it allowed the prowar Liberals to overcome the reluctance of the antiwar iberals and to repair the split in the British Cabinet. Finally, a fourth counterfactual is a war without the United States. By early .918, Germany might have won the war if the United States had not tipped the nilitary balance by its entry in 1917. One of the reasons the United States be- ame involved was the German submarine campaign against Allied and Amer- :an shipping. There was also some German clumsiness: Germany sent a iessage, now known as the Zimmerman telegram, instructing its embassy in Iexico to stir up trouble against Americans there, and the United States re- arded this as a hostile act. These factors ensured that the United States would nter the war. Our counterfactual analysis first suggests ways in which the war might not ave occurred in 1914, and second, ways in which the war that occurred did not ave to become four years of carnage which destroyed Europe as the heart of ie global balance of power. It suggests that World War I was probable, but not levitable. Human choices mattered. he Funnel of Choices istory is path dependent. Events close in over time, degrees of freedom are st, and the probability of war increases. But the funnel of choices available to aders might open up again, and degrees of freedom could be regained (see .gure 3.2). If we start in 1898 and ask what was the most likely war in Europe, e answer would have been war between France and Britain that were eyeball- -eyeball in a colonial dispute in Africa. But after the British and French rmed the Entente in 1904, and included the Russians in 1907, a Franco- 'itish war looked less likely. The first Moroccan crisis in 1905 and the Bosnian isis in 1908 made war with Germany look more likely. But some interesting ents occurred in 1910. Bethmann Hollweg, the German chancellor, sought tente with Britain. Britain implied that it would remain neutral in any Eu- THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR I 63 1870 / / / Counterfactual ‘7 / possible . \ \ futures \ \ \ \ Figure 3.2 The Narrowing Funnel of Choices ropean war if Germany would limit its navy. At that same time,d1tblotol<ed atShl: renewed colonial friction between Britain and RuSSia in ASia an . le Eeetn te British and the French threatened a collapse or erosion of the Trip.e n en . In other words, in 1910 the funnel of choices started to Widen again. . D But the funnel closed once more in 1911 with the second Morocican 01131: When France sent troops to help the Sultan of Morocco, Germany 611111311 est compensation in the French Congo and sent a gunboat to Agadir Ion t leggid of Morocco. Britain prepared its fleet. French and German ban ers do til.C against war, and the kaiser pulled back. But these events deeply affecte pu 1 ' ' ' fears about German inten ions. oplnfflrtlhilffglfatllsidealkan wars in 1912 and 1913 and the increased priessurte Austria set the scene for 1914, there was also a renewed effort at eten e 1d 1912. Britain sent Lord Haldane to Berlin, and the British and Germanlsl agreen on a number of the issues. Also, by this time it was clear that Britain a wo the naval arms race. Perhaps the funnel would open uplagain. h In June 1914, the feeling that relations were 1mprov1ng was strl()n(g enoung for Britain to send four of its great Dreadnought battleships to Kie i etrhrria for a state visit. If Britain had thought war was about to occur, the ast h 1nbgor would have done was put four of its prime battleships in an enfemy agum; Clearly, the British were not thinking about war at that pomt. IIln act, on Kiel 28, British and German sailors were walking together along th edqifiay in Aus. when they heard the news that some strange Serbian terrorist‘ a 5 ct an d trian archduke in a faraway place called Sarajevo. History has its surprises, an "probable" is not the same as “inevitable. Lessons of History Again Are there any lessons we can draw from this history? We must be carefgl 3:01;: lessons. Analogies can mislead, and many myths have been crezte ail 0 World War I. For example, some say that World War I was an aCCi en: X82 World War I was not purely accidental. Austria went to war deliberate h n if there was to be a war, Germany preferred a war in 1914 to a war later. ere J DHLANLC UI' PUWtH AND WORLD WAR I ere miscalculations over the length and depth of the war, but that is not the Line as an accidental war. It is also said that the war was caused by the arms race in Europe. But by )12, the naval arms race was over, and Britain had won. While there was con- 5m in Europe about the growing strength of the armies, the view that the war as precipitated directly by the arms race is too simple. On the other hand, there are some valid warnings. One lesson is to pay tention to the process of a balance-of-power system as well as to its structure distribution of power. Moderation comes from the process. Stability is not sured by the distribution of power alone. Another useful lesson is to beware complacency about peace or believing that the next crisis is going to fit the me pattern as the last crisis: 1914 was supposed to be a repeat of the Bosnian isis of 1908, though clearly it was not. In addition, the experience of World ar I suggests it is important to have military forces that are stable in crisis, thout any feeling that one must use them or lose them. The railway time- )les were not the major determinants of World War I, but they did make it )re difficult for political leaders to buy time for diplomacy. The world in the 1990s is different from the world in 1914 in two important ys: One is that nuclear weapons have made preventive wars disastrous, and a other is that the ideology of war, the acceptance of war, is much weaker In 14, war was thought to be inevitable, a fatalistic view compounded by social .rwinism’s argument that war should be welcome because it would clear the like a good fresh storm. On the eve of World War I that was indeed the Iod. Winston Churchill’s book, The World in Crisis, captures this feeling 'y well: There was a strange temper in the air. Unsatisfied by material prosperity, the na- tions turned fiercely toward strife, internal or external. National passions, unduly exalted in the decline of religion, burned beneath the surface of nearly every land with fierce, if shrouded, fires. Almost one might think the world wished to suffer. Certainly men were everywhere eager to dare.8 They dared and they lost, and that is the lesson of 1914. )TES Iichard Cobden, The Political Writings of Richard Cobden (London: T Fisher Un- vin, 1903); reprinted (New York: Kraus Reprint, 1969). Vinston Churchill, June 22, 1941, to his private secretary Colville, in Robert Rhodes ames, M.P., ed., Churchill Speaks 1897—1963 (New York: Chelsea House, 1980). Iernhard Von Bulow, Memoirs of Prince Von Bulow 1909—1919 (Boston: Little, Irown, 1932), pp. 165—166. 1. P. Cooch and Harold Temperly, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the Var, 1898—1914, Vol. III (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1928). 'varon Conrad von Hotzendorff in Sidney Fay, The Origins of the World War (New Ork: Macmillan, 1928), Vol. II, pp. 185—186. FURTHER READINGS 71 6 Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis I (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 139. 7. Ibid., . 144. O , 8. ~Winstdh Churchill, The World Crisis (New York: Scribner S, 1923), p. 188. SELECTED READINGS 1 Edward Culick, Europe’s Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton, 1967), . 1-34, 184—218. 2 J?mes Joll, The Origins of the First World War (New York: Longman, 1984), . 9—147. ' n ‘ . 3 qul Kennedy, "The Kaiser and German Weltpolitik, in John Rohl and Nicholas Sombart eds., Kaiser Wilhelm II: New Interpretations (Cambridge, England: Cam- bridge University Press, 1982), pp. 143—168. FURTHER READINGS Fischer Fritz, World Power or Decline: The Controversy over Germany’s Aims in the First World War (New York: Norton, 1951). Kennedy, Paul M., The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism.- 1870-1914 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1980). ' ' . Lebow, Richard Ned, Between Peace and War: The Nature of I nternational Crisis (Bal- timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). “ - —- ” ' Rotberg and Theodore Babb, ' Ch les 5., Wargames. 1914 1919, in Robert I ' ' Maids The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (New York: Cambridge UniverSity Press, 1989), pp. 249—280. Miller Steven, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera, eds., Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniverSity Press, a u D h. Organski A. F. K. and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: UniverSity of C icago Press, 1980). I . . l Rock Stephen R., Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historica Perspective (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1989). Sagan Scott "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense and Stability,” International Security, Vol. 2, N0. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-176. V . Snyder Jack L. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). . ' Trachtenberg, Marc, History and Strategy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniverSity Press, 1991), Chapter 2. Tuchman, Barbara, The Guns of August (New York: Macmillan, 1962). Turner L. C. F., The Origins of World War I (New York: Norton, 1970). Williamson Samuel R., “The Origin of World War I,” in Robert Rotberg and Theodore Babb eds., The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars (New York: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 1989), pp. 225—248. 72 BALANCE OF POWER AND WORLD WAR 1 STU DY QUESTIONS 1. Was World War I inevitable? If so, why and when? If not, when and how could it have been avoided? 2. How might you apply Waltz’s images to the origins of World War I? 3. Which of the following factors do you consider most significant in explaining the out- break of World War I? a. alliance system- 4. Thucydides argues that the underlying cause of the Peloponnesian War was the _ b. public opinion c. military doctrine or military leadership (specify countries) d. political leadership (specify countries) e. economic pressures or forces f. misperception 9. other “growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta.” To what extent was World War I caused by the growth of German power and the fear this caused in Britain? Or the growth of Russian power and the fear this caused in Germany? 5. To what extent, if any, was World War I “accidental”? Does it make sense to talk about “accidental” wars? What about “unintended” ones? 6. What might be some “lessons” of 1914 that might help policymakers avoid war today? CHRONOLOG Y: THE ROAD TO WORLD WAR] 1905— 1906 1908 1911 1912 1913 1914 June 28 July 5 July 23 July 25 July 26 First Moroccan crisis: Kaiser visits Tangier as Germany attempts to supplant France; settled to France’s satisfaction at the Algeciras conference Austria proclaims annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slavic territo- ries it had administered since 1878; Serbia threatens war but power— less without Russian backing; Germany supports Austria-Hungary, deterring Russia Second Moroccan crisis: German gunboat Panther appears at Agadir in attempt to force France into colonial concessions in other areas in re- turn for German recognition of French claims in Morocco First Balkan War: Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece defeat Turkey and gain Thrace and Salonika; Austria-Hungary helps create Albania as check to Serbian power Second Balkan War: Serbia, Greece, and Romania defeat Bulgaria and gain territory at the latter’s expense Assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife at Sarajevo Austria seeks and obtains German backing against Serbia Austria sends harsh ultimatum to Serbia Serbia rejects some terms of ultimatum; seeks Russian support British Foreign Minister Sir Edward Grey proposes conference to re- solve the crisis; Germany and Austria reject proposal July 28 July 29 July 30 July 31 August 1 August 2 August 3 August 4 LLHHUNULUUI: In: nunu nu "yum, . _ - Austria declares war on Serbia Austrian forces bombard Belgrade; Russia and Austria order general m 10 kilometers from German border . h . I delivers ultimatum to Russia, demanding demobilization; Rus- Russia mobilizes against Austria obilization; French troops withdraw Germany sia does not reply Germany declares war on Russia; Britis lizes as German forces invade Luxembourg I Germany demands unimpeded passage through Belgium Belgium rejects German ultimatum; Germany declares war on France German troops march into Belgium; Britain declares war on Germany h fleet mobilizes; France mobi- ...
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Reading 4 - UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

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