11crruzer - navies. the 5:5:3 ratio should not be extended...

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Unformatted text preview: navies. the 5:5:3 ratio should not be extended to cmisers. and any limitations agreement should allow the Royal Navy to maintain at least .54 light cnrisers and 2.5 heavies. This was a very large number of cruisers. much larger than any other naval power claimed to need.“ MEBICAN naval requirements in cruisers were dictated primarin by the need to maintain naval communications out to the Philippines and the Far East. Trade protection was not a major consideration. except in the Far East. so large numbers ofcruiscrs were not needed. However. large cruisers were vital. since American refueling facilities and naval bases in the Paci- fic were few. In addition. while the heavy cruiser would be useful in a war in the Pacific against Japan. it would also be valuable in the Atlantic and Caribbean in any contest with lI'Jreat Britain. which was considered a possible enemy by the LLB. Navy all through the Iiillls. Reasoning in the same way as the British. American naval officers saw the heavy cruiser as help- ing to offset the Royal Navy's advantage in numbers of cruisers. Hence the American preference was for the heavy cruiser ctr- clusively.‘ These considerations. plus insistence upon parity with the British. shaped the American position. First. the 5:5:3 ratio should be extended to cruisers. Second. no change in qualitative limitations should be allowed — i.e.. the maximum limits should remain team tons and 3-inch guns. Third.the total tonnage of cruisers the Americans were willing to accept for the 1.1.5. Navy. and hence for the Royal Navy. was no more than itflfldlflil] tons.‘I Even that amount would require con- siderable construction effort which it was not certain Congress would support. Japanese cruiser requirements were simpler than those of either the British or the Americans. Concerned with defending a smaller area. the Japanese had no need for a large number of cruisers and needed most ofthem for fleet work ralherthan trade protection. Hence they preferred the heavy cruiser. However. they already had several light cruisers and were willing to accept qualitative limits on future construction below those set at Washington. They also had no objection to the extension of the ratio principle to auxiliary warships. The one major point which the Japanese sought to secure at an arms limitation conference was a revision of the Washington ratio to it]: lift? for such warships. The Japanese position was the most flexible of the three major powers. Furthermore, they believed they had a good chance to secure their demand for a lit: tilt? ratio because their early start had given them a slight lead over Britain in cruisers launched or in commission. while their lead over the United States was pronounced.‘ The positions and initial proposals of the three delegations were set forth at the first plenary session of the conference on To June 192?. by their respective leaders of delegations.” The lines were drawn. The Americans and British did agree on the same ratio in heavy cruisers. but that was about the extent of the initial maltreated-inn cares meat. It was evident that the road to a limitations treaty at Geneva would be a difficult one. The delegations quickly realized that agreement on cruisers was "tacit-arr t0 tat-tire a comprehensive limitations accord; there- fore. most ofthe time at the conference was spent trying to solve the cruiser impasse. Furthermore. since it was decided that any agreements reached on the several warship types would have to be accepted or rejected as a single package. as various sub committees began to examine limitations proposals on battle- ships. destroyers. submarines. and other vessels they were acutely conscious of the fact that any agreements they might reach were pointless unless the cruiser problem was solved. Some headway was made on the cruiser issue. All three powers agreed to the extension ofthe ratio principle to auxiliary warships although they were not able to reach accord on a common ratio. The Japanese held out for lll:1lJ:l". while the Americans wanted the Washington 5:5:3 ratio. The British preferred the latter ratio only for heavy cruisers. insisting at 114 first that their needs required no quantitative restrictions on light cruisers. Later they offered to accept the ratio for all cruisers, if the Americans would agree to a total cruiser tonnage of 600.011] tons for each of the two navies and a limitation on further cruiser construction to light cruisers only. According to Vice Admiral Sir F. L. Field. the chief British naval delegate at the conference, when he told the Americans that British cruiser needs were a minimum of Til ships and HELEN tons. "they appeared somewhat dismayed.“ Actually. the Americans were astonished. Their preference for no more than Abilfltltl tons of cruisers was well under the British proposal. and to achieve even the lower figure the Americans would have to build More than thirty "MINI-ton heavy cruisers. The British Ambassador in Washington. Sir Esme Howard. noted that American concern was legitimate since it would force the development ofa large naval construction program. while in Tolryo the British Ambas- sador said he could hardly believe the figure advanced by the British. It must be a mistake. “otherwise conference is one of armament not disarmament.”" The British proposal was unac- ceptable to the Americans. The British in turn could not agree to accept the American tonnage proposal unless future cruisers built were well under the lfl.fltlll—ton sire. and this the Ameri— cans would not accept. Thus a. stalemate developed on the total cruiser tonnage to be allowed the major navies. The other major question. the differences among the delega- tions concomng the size ofthe individual cruiser. was ofeourse closely related to the question of total cruiser tonnage. and failure to agree on the one practically assured defeat of the other. The British. insisting on a minimum of “ill cruisers. therefore wanted smaller cruisers both for reasons of economy and to keep total tonnage within the limit demanded by the Americans. For their part. the Americans maintained their desire for larger cruisers up to the Emilio—ton limit. They had no objection to the British building smaller cruisers if they so desired. There was simply no solution to the problem without major concessions by one side or both. Both sides did malte efforts to close the gap. Cln the American side Admiral Hilary P. Jones. the chief US. naval delegate. proposed that if the British accepted the dfltlflit't aggregate tonnage figure for cruisers. the Americans would be willing to build BEND tons of that limit in smaller cruisers. provided they could mount 8-inch guns. Unfortunately, the proposal was made in such terms as to appear to be the final American position on the matter and Bridgernan tool: it to be an “ul- tintaium.” He was so concerned overthe wording and manner of delivery of the American proposal that he seems to have over- looked the major concession offered by the Americans. the offer to build cruisers smaller than more tons within the total ton- nage allowed the Americans being such a concession. [in the British side the concession involved a willingness to accept fewer than Tl] cruisers as the Royal Navy‘s minimum needs. This concession was due as much to Japanese views as to any desire to accede to the Americans. for the Japanese did not want to build as many cruisers as they would be required to do if the British tonnage proposals were accepted." ACED with a Japanese-American united front on this issue1 Bridgeman returned to London to confer with the Admi- ralty and the Foreign Gfiice. (in 23 July he presented new proposals to the conference. As far as the cruiser issue was concerned the British moved a long way toward meeting the American and Japanese objections to the large British overall tonnage demands. Unfortunately, the British tonnage proposals were still not acceptable to the other delegations. while the British insistence on division of the cruiser type into heavy and light categories remained unacceptable to the Americans. as the British must have known they would be. The British proposals of 23 July were probably not so much an attempt to resolve the cruiser issue as an elfort to throw responsibility for the failure of the conference on the Americans." IrlllJTAl-‘t't" AFFAIRS The Geneva Conference was clearly approaching an end. Even though a substantial measure of agreement had been reached on the destroyer and submarine categories. the stale- mate over cmisers prevented any positive accomplishment. By the end of the month all the delegations were looking desper- ately for ways to continue negotiations by presenting new proposals or asking for clarifications. Half-hearted Japanese and American proposals were turned down. Casting desperately about for some way to keep the conference going. the Australian representative even suggested at a British delegation meeting that perhaps a compromise could be worked out by adopting a T-inch gun as the maximum size for future cruiser construction. This brought an annoyed response from the other members.” It was hopeless to let the conference continue. and all the delegations finally agreed to end it. On 4 August a final plenary session was held. the chiefs of the delegations made statements. and the conference was adjourned. There was no treaty. thus no limitation on construction of auxiliary warships for the fore— seeable future. At the heart of the failure was the conflict over the cruiser. The British claimed American insistence on its light to build large cruisers with 3-inch guns. and refusal to limit these had caused the collapse ofthe conference. They noted also the hostility of large segments of the American press. which poisoned the public attitude toward the British position at the conference. The British also criticized the activities at the conference of William B. Shearer. a lobbyist for American steel and shipbuilding interests, who seems to have been actively pursuing. attempts to scuttle the conference. The Americans replied in kind. claiming that British insistence on large num- bers of small cruisers and their demand that the Americans accept such vessels for their own navy was the primary reason for the failure of the conference. Testifying before the House Naval Affairs Committee early in I923. Admiral Jones stated the matter simply from his point of view. The British showed. he saidr “a desire to standardize navies in types that were ofsmall value to us and fix the main limitations in types that would be of value to us.“'-“ .lones‘ statement implied some 'Itind of con- spiracy on the part ofthe British to weaken the future strength of l-l‘tttt U-S- Navy. Finally. something mu st he said concerning another criticism of the failure of the conference. It was alleged during the conference that both the British and American delegations were dominated by their respective naval delegates. and the in- flexibility shown by both sides could be traced directly to the naval oll'1cers. The British were particularly incensed by what they considered the stubbornness of Admiral Jones." it is probably true that on both sides the naval delegations achieved a certain degree of ascendancy which enabled their views to dominate. especially on the American side. When compared to the subordinate role ofthe naval experts at both the preceding Washington Conference and the later London Conference of l'EBtl. the position of the naval officers at Geneva becomes even more noticeable. Do the other hand. the diplomatic experts seem to have been reluctant to take the lead and to propose solutions to overcome the strong stands of the naval delegates. Perhaps the chances of success at Geneva would have been greater if each country‘s delegation had been headed by its Foreign Minister. Finally. it should be pointed out that the naval delegates were by no means as inflexible as they were pictured. Both the British and American naval delegates played major roles in developing the compromise proposals which were offered. "the collapse of the negotiations at Geneva meant that auxil- iary warships remained unrestricted. This resulted in another round in the armaments race. The British and Japanese were already firmly committed to major construction Programs. In the United States. where little had been done in naval con- struction beyond the eight cruiser authorization of 1934. the effect was more pronounced. The General Board submitted a building program calling for construction of 25 heavy cmisers .lUL'lIr 19-54 and many other warships over a peliod of five years. After considerable discussion a modified proposal was introduced in Congress early in 1923 and passed quickly by the House. It involved constntction of 15 cmisers to be laid down over a three-year period. After spirited debate in the Senate. the “Fif- teen Cruiser Bill" was passed on 5 February 1929. This Naval Authorization Act of 1929 put the United States squarely in the cruiser race; yet while it stimulated Britain and Japan to con- sider increasing their own programs. it also increased the desire in all three countries for a naval limitations agreement to head off another shipbuilding raoe. Recognizing that the impasse over cruisers would have to be broken before another conference could have any chance of success. the British and American governments began intensive efforts to compromise their differences on the cruiser issue. After a fruitless attempt to find a solution by trying to develop a "yardstick" to compare mathematically the relative fighting power of the heavy and the light cruiser." the Anglo-American negotiators began to deal directly with their differences. hoping to narrow them enough to warrant the convening of another conference. By mid-1929 the opportunities appeared brighter. Herbert Hoover. who had become President in March. and Ramsay MacDonald. who had become Prime Minister in June. were both ideological pacifists committed to the principle that improvement of Anglo—American relations was more important than the preservation of any particular naval position. By the end ofJuly. both men had announced delays in the construction schedules ofcruisers in their respective naval shipyards. It was a symbolic expression of their intentions. During the late Sum- nter and early Fall the Iogiam was bnolten. and after a visit by MacDonald to the United States. compromise was reached on the main issues. For the British in particular agreement came none too soon. for the Admiralty. faced with the necessity of replacing nearly all the Royal Navy's cmisers during the next decade. was pressing the Prime Minister to secure an agreement to limit cmisers and allow the development of a reduced and orderly building program.“ The Hoover-MacDonald agreement on cruisers involved sov- eral concessions. First. the British. who had already agreed to parin with. the United States in cruiser strength. accepted a maximum of approximately 5t} cruisers totaling 339.31} tons.‘nl In return the Americans agreed to accept a smaller number of heavy cruisers than they had previously insisted upon. and to make up the rest of their allowable cruiser tonnage in light cmisers. For both countries these were major concessions. and were decided by the political leaders over objections by their respective naval advisors. Now the only substantive difference between them concerning cmisers was whether the Americans would have 2] heavy cruisers as they desired or would instead accept the British view that the number should be lit. The long-awaited conference to arrange a final accord could now begin. HE London Naval Conference of I939 began its delibera- tions on 2] January. ]t was involved with limitations covering all classes ofwarships. and several issues. particularly those concerning battleships. proved only partly amenable to solution. Thanks to the concessions made prior to the con- ference. the cruiser problem did not this time prove intractable. In fact. the more difficult problems at the conference arose out of French and Japanese reluctance to accept limitations for auxiliary warships along the lines of the capital ship ratio established in the Five Power Treaty. The only important difference between the British and the Americans. the number of heavy cruisers allowed the United States. was ironed out without much difficulty. It was an ironic result. for most diplomatic opinion on both sides of the Atlantic considered that the cruiser issue might well min the conference. The British. having made as many concessions as they felt possible. were especially pessimistic. In their view the Ameri- 115 cans would probably demand either 2| heavy cruisers or a reduction in overall British and American cruiser tonnage. These demands the British believed they could not aocept.’I 0n the American side the General Board was adamant in de— manding that the American delegation agree to no fewer than 21 heavy cruisers. Why did the cruiser problem prove much easier to settle than had been anticipated?I The fundamental reason was that both the British and American governments wanted an agreement. He- yond that. both governments had talren steps before the con- ference to assure greater flexibility in the negotiations by cle— ciding to allow naval officers ofthe two countries to talre part onlyr as advisers rather than as full members of the delegations.’ i That one decision meant that negotiations at London would be open to more concessions than those at lIlCi'reneva had been. Taken in conjunction with the desire of the participating governments to lay to rest this vexing issue. it may have been the most important single decision of the conference. The effect of the decision became clear within a short time after the conference began. The difference between the British and the Americans concerning the number of heavy cruisers to be allowed the LLS. Navy was the only significant obstacle in the way of a final agreement on cruisers. and this issue was discussed early. Stimson had probably already decided ten- tatively to concede to the British on this question, and, alter a meeting with MacDonald on 3 February, he decided definitely to do so. He realized also that the naval experts were divided over this question. At a meeting on 4 February, the American delegation mot With the naval advisers. and. although Admiral Hilary Jones made a valiant effort to persuade the delegates to stay with the General Board‘s recommendation, the earlier decision to accept a figure of IE heavy cruisers instead ofll was made final.” The American concession cleared away the last obstacle to agreement on the cruiser issue. as far as the British and Ameri- cans were concerned. However. the positions of the other delegations on the question now had to be considered. The Japanese attitude was based upon their own building program and their desire for a Ills? ratio in cruisers. They had already completed eight heavy cruisers and had four more under con- struction. and preferred not to scrap any of these. flbviousiy. the Anglo—American agreement related to the Japanese posi- tion. The American acceptance of 13 heavy cruisers would give a 5:3 ratio in tonnage with their Japanese counterparts built or building. The Japanese were not completely satisfied with this. since they insisted on a ltlz‘ir ratio. This disagreement was important enough so that an arrangement was made to allow separate Japanese-American tallts to resolve the issue. The French and [talian positions on the cruiser issue were relatively simple. Both countries were constructing heavy cruisers but were not firmly committed to them in terms of naval doctrine. Neither country really cared much whether or not future cruiser programs for the major nav'ies included heavies. but they were lreenly interested in the final total cnliser tonnage agreed upon at the conference for each naval power. The Italians were firmly committed to parity with France in all classes of warships, while the French felt it necessary to maintain a navy superior to Italy‘s in all classes. That conflict. which could not be rcconctlcd at London. meant that whatever figures on ton- nages were adopted, the delegations of France and Italy would not agree. And so it proved. Thcre still remained, however, the question as to what maximum tonnage each future light cruiser should be allowed to displace. That question. together with the Japanese demand for a 10:? ratio, were the major remaining points at issue concerning cruisers. Un the matter of a final agreement regarding the light cruiser “HEDGE the issue was primarily over tonnage since all delega- tions had accepted the principle that the sis-inch gun would be the maximum allowed for light cruisers. The parameters of the controversy were set by the British who wanted an upper limit I15 for light cruisers of no more than ltlltl tons and the Americans who prefen'od retaining the Five Power Treaty limit of tilt:th tons. Except for the French. who tended to think the hilt!) limit too low. the general conccnsus tended toward the British posi- tion. The Americans. however. remained inflexible. The Gen- eral Board earlier had made it clear that American naval needs required cmisers of long range and good habitability. and such requirements could not be met with ships much smaller than ltJJJ'tlil Ions. Whenever the other delegations attempted to bring up the issue of lower tonnages for light cruisers. Stimson abruptly ended further discussion by saying the Americans would not accept further compromise.“ HE American mood tetward the end ofthe conference not to give in on the light cruiser tonnage issue may have been sharpened by the concessions made to the Japanese on the ltl:‘J ratio. The Japanese had made it clear since 1922 that their acceptance of the 5:3 ratio for capital ships and aircraft carriers had been most reluctant. and it was unlikely they would accept the extension of that ratio to any other warship types. In fact. since the Geneva Conference. the Japanese press had mounted such a strong campaign against it. associating the ratio with the branding of Japan as inferior by the Western powers. that it was practically impossible for any Japanese government to concede much on this issue. Also. the fact that Japan’s naval building program in the past few years gave her a better defects ratio in ships already built in most auxiliary categories gave the Japan- ese a much stronger position from which to demand a better ratio. Realizing that this question would have to be solved or the conference would collapse. the delegations assigned two men to concentrate upon working out a solution to the problem. These were Senator David A. Reed for the United States and Tsuneo Matsudaira. the Ambassador to Great Britain, for Japan. The Reed-Matsudaira Compromise was the last major ele- ment in the network of compromise agreements that made up the London Naval Treaty of l‘fltl. Although not directly involved in the talks. the British took a mediating position in making suggestions and relaying proposals from both sides which laid the groundwork for the talks to proceed. The American- Japanese negotiations produced a one-sided compromise in which the Americans conceded to the Japanese nearly every point at issue." The Japanese got full parity in submarine tonnage with the British and the Americans and a "1:? ratio on lighl cruisers and destroyers. The American view was upheld in only one area, involving the heavy cruiser. The Japanese agreed to accept a Ithfi ratio in heavies . but only ifthe Americans would delay laying the heels of new cruisers so as to give Japan an |t}:i|' ratio in these vessels up until the last year of the agreement. What may appear at first glance to be asurrenderto the Japanese is not really so drastic a giveaway as it seems. for the tonnage ratios and figures agreed upon required the Japanese to stop further building while not requiring more than some delay in the completion of the cruiser portion of the American program. Ultimately. the unwillingness of both the Americans and the Japanese to be saddled with the blame for failure to negotiate a treaty. the willingness of the Americans to recognize the reality of Japanese naval strength. and finally Stimson‘s and Reed‘s decision not to involve the American naval advisors in the discussions with the Japanese were the major factors in over- coming this last obstacle to a treaty.“ The major features of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 were the extension of another five years of the prohibition on battle- ship building adopted at Washington in I921. qualitative limits upon the sire and gun power ofdestroyers and submarines. and limits upon total tonnages of auxiliary warships. As we have seen. the cruiser controversy loomed large in the negotiations to secure those tonnage limits. As provided in the treaty. the total cruiser tonnage. as of the end of 1936. was to be no more than 323.500 tons for the United States. 339ml} tons for Great Bri- tain. and 203.350 tons for Japan. in addition. the number of HILITAFIJI" AFFAIRS heavy cruisers was fixed at is for the United States. 15 for Great Britain. and I: for Japan." Although none or the powers was completely satisfied. the treaty did give each a good portion of what it had demanded on cruisers. The Japanese got what amounted to a 19:7 ratio. and the British achieved their objec- tive of putting a satisfactory limit on the total number of heavy cruisers and of allowing a total tonnage in cruisers to meet their minimum needs. As for the Americans, they had successfully resisted British pressures to fix lower maximum tennages for individual cruisers and had maintained a 5:3 ratio in heavy cruisers at least in theory. Furthermore, the establishment of fixed tetal tonnage figures for cruisers for each navy meant that in order to reach those figures for the United States an ad- ditional Tahiti] tons of light cruisers would have to be built. For the United States at least the treaty represented naval expansion rather than limitation." All in all, it appears that the outcome of the London Naval Conference was a major triumph for Ameri- can diplomacy. This is especially so since the American naval position at the time of the conference was weak. Considering the Navy‘s strong preference for the largest possible vessels in each type, already shown in the controversy over the heavy cruiser. it was a foregone conclusion that the new light cruisers would displace the maximum tonnage permissible under the treaty. Yet the General Board did not immediately reach this decision. 0n 9' May 1930 a bill was introduced in the House to authorize the construction of enough tonnage to build the Navy up to treaty strength. This would include ‘rsnoo tons of light cruisers. I|i'v'he [I the General Board was requested to present details. it advocated cruisers of a type similar to the Omaha class already part ofthe fleet. and later. in connection with the 1951-1 building program. it recommended that two such cruisers be laid down." The firearm displaced Ti]le tens. It was not until Ill}? that the Board recommended the construction of larger light cruisers. when the Secretary ofthe Navy presented figures to the Senate Naval Affairs Committee which called for con- struction of seven It],tltltl ton light cruisers to reach treaty strength by 1931.“ Nothing was done about any of these re quests during the rest of the Hoover Administration. Shortly after the inauguration of the Roosevelt Administration, how— ever. The vastly expanded concept of public works to alleviate the heavy unemployment ofthe ltilreat Depression included the concept that naval construction should be increased to provide jobs in the shipbuilding industry. Accordingly. when the National Industrial Recovery Act was passed on In June 193-3. it included a provision authorizing construction of several naval vessels. and Roosevelt immediately made $238 million of relief funds available to begin the program.“ In this way the first four of the new 10,001] ton light cruisers were laid down before the end of the year. [t was the beginning of the last phase of the Cniiser Controversy. INCE no light cruiser hitherto built was of such size and gun power. the American action forced other naval powers to consider building ships of the same type. The Japanese adapted quickly and soon developed the stopover class cruisers. com- parable to the American vessels. The British. however, were not pleased with the new development for the same reasons they had not liked the heavy cruiser. The heavily-armed vessels were expensive to build and to operate. and required larger crews. Also, the total tonnage allotment for light cruisers in the Lon- don Treaty meant that if the larger cruisers were built. the British would reach the tonnage limit with fewer cruisers than desired. Unfortunately there was not much choice. The Royal Navy would be forced to have the larger light cruisers because other navies would have them. Accordingly. the Admiralty recommended that the 1934 program or construction already approved. which included four light cruisers ofa smaller type. be changed to include cruisers of a larger type to replace the smaller ones. As the design for these cruisers developed. they grew larger. until they were only slightly smaller and less dULlIIr 19M- heavily armed than their American and Japanese counterparts.” The London Naval Treaty had specified that in 1935 another naval conference should be held to provide a new limitations treaty to replace both the Five Power Treaty and the London Treaty 1when they expired at the end or I936. In the preparations forthis second London Naval Conference. the B ritish wanted to make certain that limitations on the heavy cruiser were ex- tended and. in addition. limitations on the large light cruisers would be included in any future accords. Preliminary dis- cussions among the three major naval powers were held during the Summer and Fall of 1934. with the British and Americans meeting first and later holding discussions separately with the Japanese. At the preliminary discussions wilh the Americans. the Brit- ish made clear their desire to limit the large cruisers further 1when they advanced a proposal that no more heavy cruisers be built and that "LBW ton light cruisers be limited to ten each for the LLB. and Britain and six for Japan.“ The figures for light cmisers corresponded to these which had already been laid down or authorized by the three powers. The British in effect wanted an end to all construction of large cruisers beyond what was already being undertaken. but they sought no major restric- tinns on smaller cruisers which they needed to build in large numbers to replace aging cruisers left over from World TWar I. The Americans indicated their opposition to these proposals. calling them unacceptable “even as the basis for discussion.”-" The preliminary conversations ended with no significant nar- rowing of the gaps among the positions of the various countries. yet they were important in that they marked the emergence of a clear Anglo-American front against Japan‘s demand for parity in all classes of warships. a demand which the British and the Americans could not concede. A general air of pessimism prevailed concerning the chances of success of another naval conference. for by the end of 1935 Mussolini was on the march in Africa. Hitler had started Ger- many's rearmament. and the Japanese were becoming more menacing in the Far East. The first part ofthe conference was taken up mainly with Japan‘s demand for parity.” Both the Americans and the British. who had already shown anxiety over the revival of Japanese militancy. closed ranks in the face of what they perceived to be a threat to the naval balance ofpower which had been so painfully developed since 1911. Un— fortunately. their unity probably intensified the Japanese sense of insecurity and hence stiffened Japanese resolve. After the Japanese failure to get their demands met culminated in their departure from the conference on IS January Wild. the con- ference began seriously to discuss substantive proposals for limitations. It was recognized. however. that Japan's action jeopardized the chances for any significant naval limitations agreement to be reached. The New Fort-Sun expressed ageneral view when it said. A naval agreement to which Japan is not a party being obviously of little value. the withdrawal of the Japanese delesation from the London Naval Conference makes the subsequent history of this gathering of slight interest.”-"' The delegations remaining in London pressed on in hopes of achieving something. The British took the lead in formulating proposals which formed the basis for the agreements eventually reached. The British proposals called for reduction in dis- placement and gun power of battleships, and for a six-year building holiday in construction of cruisers displacing more than 3.01.31] tons. American naval otthcrs were generally op- posed to both proposals. but in the interest of securing an agreementt Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Norman Davis. the head of the American delegation, and AdmiraI William H. Standley. the chief naval adviser, decided to make the con- cessions necessary to do so. In the case of the cruiser proposals. the start of construction of ten “LBW—ton light cruisers in addition to the heavies already under way led naval opinion to conclude that a six-year delay in starting any more cruisers would not unduly harm overall American naval strength." Will] 11? further American concessions on the battleship question. it was possible to draw up a new limitations treaty. The London Naval Treaty of lilid. signed only by the delega- tions of the United States. Great Britain, and France. marked the formal end ofthe Cruiser Controversy.“ It is significant that in both the case of the heavy cruiser accords in the loll] London Treaty and those concerning the large light cruiser in this last mmor naval limitations agreement. the United States made major concessions not desired by general naval opinion. With- out the ISM treaty. additional cruisers laid down by the Ameri- cans after I930 would undoubtedly have been heavies. while the restrictions on cruisers written into the 1936 treaty meant that further cruiser construction would have to be ofthe smaller type not suited to American naval needs. In any event. it made little difference. The powers were already in the process of con- structing a large number of new cruisers which would not be affected by the treaty. Furthermore. the failure of J upon to abide by the treaty's qualitative restliclions in building programs after 1936 led the signatory powers to invoke ttte escape clauses which were such an important part of the treaty. By 1938 the treaty was for all practical purposes no longer in effect and. since the Five Power and less London treaties had lapsed at the end of 1936. naval limitations ofany hind no longer existed. The experiment in naval limitations had come to an end. arid the world was moving rapidly toward war. Epilogue HAT does the Cruiser Controversy have to say to us today about the processes and problems involved in arms limitation in general, and also about the nature of arms limi- tation agreements? It was an issue which had clear relevance as an armaments competition in a Specific type of weapon and was addressed over a long period of time by nations which tools conflicting positions arising from their differing conceptions of national security. At times it appeared to be an insoluble prob- lem. yet it was finally settled by compromise. The first general conclusion which emerges from analysis of the Cruiser Controversy. and ofother issues in aims limitations negotiations as we", Iconcents the close relationship of the nature of the weapon itself to the agreements reached. Al] the participants in the negotiations in the cruiser issue had clear views of how they wished to use the cruiser in the broad scheme of naval operations. and each delegation sought to include provisions in final agreements which would give scope to fullest use of the cruiser itself from its point of view. Of course it proved impossible for the different national positions to be completely reconciled; hence the need for compromise and to secure the most advantage possible for each delegation. The specific provisions of the limitations treaties show clearly where the balance was struclt. The second conclusion follows from the first. If any serious armaments limitation agreement is to come into being, there must first be compromise over the issues. in some cases, as in the American decision to accept a cap on the number of heavy cruisers and to build the rest oftheir cruiser tonnage in lights. or the British decision to accept fewer than to cruisers in a limi- tations accord. the compromise is basically political rather than technical and may even involve strong disagreement from the military experts. ‘r'et 1--'--'ithli‘a.tt such compromises no agreement is possible. in other words. purely military considerations necessarily had to yield to political ones in order to produce progress in arms control. The subordination of military con- siderations to political needs, in a responsible sense. produced the Five Power Treaty and the London Naval Treaty of l93fl; the inability to achieve such subordination gave history the fiasco at Geneva in 192?. The third condusion follows inescapably from the second. Since compromise is the essential ingredient in the success of arms control negotiations. it follows that agreement can be 113 reached only if the participants in the negotiations desire an agreement. [I is true that in the process of a compromise to secure an accord one nation‘s delegation may concede more than another‘s. resulting in an agreement which is more satisfac- tory to one country than to another. In such a case. however. if we assume no failure of competence on the part of the nego- tiators. any perceived dil'f'erenees in the value of an agrcment to one reentry as compared to another will probably be the result of differences in the bargaining positions of the negotiators. The next conclusion is concerned with bargaining positions. An assessment of the provisions of The Five Power Treaty and the two London Naval Treaties indiciates that the ability of each nation‘s delegation to secure benefits rested fun- damentally upon the naval strength of the nation concerned when negotiations were getting under way. 111 this sense, the term “naval strength“ meant not only ships in the water but also those on the way or planned and for which appropriations had been made. Beyond these specific factors the term also included assessments of “national will" as including a willirtgness and ability to support naval construction into the foreseeable future. Thus the Japanese naval construction program ol'the was gave the considerable leverage at tendon in I533!) to demand and finally gain a revision in their favor of the 5:5:3 ratio established for capital ships at Washington in I912. In a similar way the threat posed by the American IS-eruiser program of I??? gave some substance to the American insistence on establishment in the treaty of a favorable ratio over Japan. even though Japan had far greater strength in cruisers actually in operation. Furthermore. the specific agreements regarding treaty strengths in various weapons categories correspond closely to existing strength in those categories. The Japanese could de- mand and gain parity in submarine strength with the United States and Great Britain because they had as much submarine tonnage already in commission as did either of the other two countries. Presumably a country would be extremely reluctant to accept treaty provisions leaving it relatively wealter than the strength it already possesses in a particular weapon. whether the weapon be emisers. submarines. or any other weapon. In this regard one could easily predict Soviet rejection of every proposal so far advanced by the United States concerning Intermediate range ballistics missiles in Europe. A final point needs to be made concerning arrns limitations agreements. A close examination ofthe Five Powerand London Naval Treaties shows that with one notable exception these arms limitation agreements accomplished little in the way of real limitation in the sense understood by the prublics of the nations involved — that is, limitation in the sense ofhalting the proliferation of weaponry. The significant exception concerns limitation ofcapital ships. In that case the prohibition upon the construction of new battleships and the agreement to scrap most of those then being built did effect a significant overall re- duction in that type of warship as compared to what would have been the case without the treaties. Little was done. however. to establish any limitations upon destroyers and submarines, and in the case of the cruiser the limitations agreed upon served more to expand rather than to contract the total numbers and tonnage of that type of warship. especially in the case of the United States. It is doubtful that without the cruiser limitations of the treaties the total cruiser tonnage would have been signifi- cantly larger than it actually was with the limitations, and it is lilter that without the quantitative tonnage limits for cruisers established in the 193D London Treaty the light cruiser tonnage built by the United States would have been substantially less. So what is the outlook for the future of arms limitation agreements In our ttme'.’ Based upon the historical record. and given the attitudes and obvious distrust displayed by both the United States and the Soviet Union in the present context, it is unlikely that any arms agreement of any importance will be forthcoming in the foreseeable future. other than perhaps one which does not significantly limit armaments. MILITARY AFFAIRS Emmet Andrade. Jr. has been ontha faculty oftha University of Colorado at Denver since 1969. with the rank of Protease-r since 192?. A graduate of the Univer- sity of Hawaii, he received his PhD. from Michigan State Uni- varsity. He has published ssvsral articles. mainly upon 1.1.5. naval policy and naval shipbuilding as affected by the naval limitations treaties of the inlervuar period. This article was accepted Ior publication In .January 1934. REFERENCES 1. US. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Conference on the Limitation ofArmarnents. Sen. Doc. no. 1215. fi'i'th Cong. 2nd sess. (Washington. I922}. hill-E12. The French view is stated on 3111, 314-316. 2. The 11.8. Navy‘s General Board had been considering cruisers of about this size in future construction plans as far back as 19l9. and the Board‘s recommendations to Hughes concerning allowable cruiser characteristics shaped the pro- visions of Articles KI and XI]. lGeneral Board study GB 949 [fill-Bl. (5 March 1921]). General Board Records, Navy Oper- ational Archives. Washington. D.C. 3. US. Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations oftne United States. 1’921’, ItWashington 1N2}. l-.'i. Hereafter cited as i‘Rtt'S. 4. Stephen Rosltiil. Nat-at Policy Between the Wars. is The PHin ofAngio-Atnerieon Antagonism, FIJI-£929 {New York, 19651.412. 41s. fill}. Also ADM 116(33'1'1. War Plans Div. Memo PD92SiIi-I'2‘i ( 11' March 192?}. Admiralty Records. Public Record Office. lite-iv. England. 5. ADM 1168-911. Appendix B. "Ten Year Building t'ro- gramme Revised” (6 March 1925}. ti. ADM lltirl'li‘l, Memo cited in note a above. Even the Americans made claim to no more than 32 cruisers. GB 1133 (429-2). (ll Dec. 1925]. 'J. The American appreciation of the superior power of the heavy emit-er is shown in the preparation of the ori inal design of the new type of cruiser prior to the Washington Conference. "Hearings Before the General Board of the Navy," I92llI 309-323. Hereafter cited as “Gen. Ed. Hearings.“ 9. GB 1342-14 {is} {4331. (2 June I922}. 305. 9. In mid-I923r the Japanese had two heavy cruisers in com- mission and four more launched. The British had launched five. The Americans had only laid down the heels of two. .iane's Fighting Snips. i931. 320-324. 32—44. 410—422. 111 The initial proposals of the delegations are in LLS. Sen- ate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Records of tire- Can- ferent‘ei'ot‘ tile Limitation of Naval Armament l'felttI at Geneva. Switzerland. from Jane 29 to August 4‘, i922. 192B (Japan). 26-2? {1.1.5.}. 31] {Britain}. Hereafter cited as Geneva Conference. 11. Geneva Conference. IDS—I06. ADM “H2609. Minutes of the 4th Conference of British Delegates (29 June I922}. F0 1133159. Howard to Foreign Office (5 July I922]: Foreign Office Records. Public Record Office. How. England. ADM llol2bt19. Sir J. Tilley to Foreign folce (4 July 1921'}. 12. Geneva Conference. 16L Itifi. F0 | lj-rEJj9.Bt-idgeman to Chamberlain (h July 192?). 13. Geneva Conference. Appendix I. l‘i'i—li‘it. ADM ltd-(2699. British Delegation to Foreign Office [16 July 19221. For their part. the British considered the Jones "ultimatum" of 5 Jul as an American attempt to fill responsibility for failure on the "fish. 14. For an assessment of the agreements on destroyers and submannes see Ernest Andrade. IL. “United States Naval Pol— i.ll.IL"Ir 19H icy in the Disarmament Era. 192l-193'i“ (Ph.D. dissertation. Michigan State University. 19%}. 152-155. “Log of H.C‘.. Tram“ (1 Aug. 1921'}: “Diary of Admiral Schofield." 193—195. Gen. Board Disarmament Records, Series VI, ADM “$2609. First Lord to Foreign Office (2 Aug. 1922}; Forei n Office to BHdgeman (3 Aug. 192?]. ADM 1 Itit'2ti'139, Minutes Delegation Meeting“ Aug. I927). 15. Arnbamador Sir Esme Howard commented frequently "pout hostile cornmeal in the ILS. FD “Sill-153. Telegrams to Foreign D tcet21. 22 lune 192?]; FD 115.8159. Telegrams 5 and 2 July 1927. Bosltill. 50o: Gerald E. Wheeler. Prelude to Pearl Harbor.- The United .‘i'tures Navy and tire Far East. JEN-Nil (Columbia. Mo.. 1963]. loft-ISL U.S. House Naval Affairs Committee. Hearings on: Sundry Legislation. t922-t923 (Washington. 1923}. 1129. in. Sir Esme Howard reported a conversation he had with Kellogg and Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce. in Whioh Hoover said. "[ 1wish they would leave this to be nego- tiated by civilians. Then I believe we should t an agreement at once." Kellogg added. “11" Sir Austen wou go to Geneva. 1 would go too.‘ ADM 1160699. Howard to Foreign ltC‘tffice (19 July 1921'}. ADM notices. Bridgetnan to Foreign lfo'lce (12 July 1921'}. 17. GB lib? (420—2). {3| Dec. I922}. 15. GB 1439 {438-1}. (I Aug. 1929‘]; ADM llfit'flil. TD 2&9li29. PD fl332tt'29 (13- Iune 1929}. See also H. L. Vieltery. "A Naval 1't"tin:lsitit:|t,," Foreign flairs. B (Clot. l929}. I424“; Raymond G. O‘Connor. “The Yardsticlt and Naval Disar- Tflflfllflfll ll'l “13 19205," The Mississippi Valley Historical Re- view. 45 (Dec. less}. 453. 19. New Tori: Times (25 July I929}. 1. The announcements were prearranged. Dawes to Stimson (22 July 1929}. FRUS. i929. l. 154. ADM lit-(3321. PD 033551'29. “Memorandum on the Cruiser Position" (I Aug. I929). 29. Raymond G. O'Connor. in Perilous Equilibrium: The United State‘s anti lite launder: Naval Conference of J9EE (Law- rence. Kan. 19621. to. calls the British recognition of parity “probably the most important concession made by any states- man during the negotiations that preceded the London Naval Conference of I939." MacDonald to Dawes (B Aug. 1929), FREE. i929. l, lilo-183. The Ell-cruiser figure was accepted by the Admiralty only with great reluctance. ADM Hater-ta Memo by Adm. Sir Charles Madden. “Basis of British Naval Strategy" (I? Jan. 1939'}. 21. ADM llbt'2'i'l'l. "Naval Conference 193-9. Draft Mem— orandum Respecting Proposals to be Submitted to HM IGov- ernment in the UK to the Conference.“ by Adm. Lord Jellicoe. 22. Campbell to Stimson (ll Nov. 1929]; Stimson to Ca- mph-ell (l2 Nov. l92'9}. FRUIT. WEB. lr 221-273. 23. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy. flit Arrive Sen-ice in Peace ana’ II-l-iar {New York. I942]. loll-163. "Log of gilt. Train " (26 Jan. I'flfll. O'Connor. Perilous Equilibrium. 24. ADM llfii2244. "Notes of Private Conversations of Heads of Delegations" {2 March 1930}. 25. ADMliiS-il'icfi. “Summary of Conversations. Japanese Ratio Question" (13 Feb. 19m}; "Conversation" (3 March .1930}. The Reed-Matsudaira negotiations are well summarized I11 O‘Connor. Perilous Equilibrium. Tit-Bl . See also Stimson to Hoover. FREE. NM, 1, til-63. For a scholarly view of the Japanese side of the discussions. consult Tatsuji Takeuchi, War ana‘ Diplomacy in tire Japanese .Et'ilpire (Chicago, 1935}. 232-293. 26. The American naval advisors were not informed about the Reed-Matsudaira talks and told about them only after the agreements were reached. “Log of H.C. Train." 11 (14. 22. a 24 March 1939]. _ 2?. Part II. Article 16 of the treaty. The full test ofthe treaty Is in the U.S. Senate. The London Naval Treaty ufi93ii'. Sen. Doc. no. I41. Tlst Cong. 2nd sess. (Washington. 19301.11ar11l. which fitted the total tonnage limits for cruisers. destroyers and aubmannes. was not accepted by France and Italy. Part [II also allowed the United States the option of building to the same total tonnage lfl cruisers as Great Britain. provided the number of U.S. heavy cruisers be reduced from lit to IS. 23. This point was made by Stimson in the hearings con- ducted on the trealy by the Senate Naval Affairs Committee. LLS. Senate. Naval Affairs Committee. Hearings on the Lun- 11B aggflwafiet Treaty of Hit-I. Tlst Cong. 2nd sess. (Washington. 1 ]I. . 29. Congressional Record. LXXlll, ETDT. GB 1493 “Ell-ll. 112 Sept. 193:1}. on nest-1211141. 1211 April 1931}. 30. Hearings Before the Senate Naval Affairs Crrmmi'rre-e. 11132. 1‘1; GB 1518(42-11—2),1[II SEPL 1932}. 31. LIES. Statutes at Large. HLVIII, 1. EDI; Federal Emerg- ene].r Administration of Public Works. Principal Acts and Exec- utive flrders Pertaining to Public Works Administration {Wash- ington. 1933}. El. 32. ADM Ill-1’83. “Admiralty Board Minutes” {27 Jul}r l'flll. This was the Minotaur Class of light Cruisers. later fl:- named Southampton. ADM Iii-TIES. “Memo for Board - ti” Cruisers of l933 Programme: Sketch Design“ [3| Del. 15113331: ADM lfilfiilil. “Admlralty Board Minutes" {3 March and 15 March [934}; ADM lfil'rlil. “Memo for Board —- Paniculars of the E" GU11 Cruisers, Minotaur Class, "3'33 Programme." 33. “Corrected Minutes of Naval lIC‘eanversations" (June 21]. 1934}. State Dept. File SD filliltlfiaflleii State Department Materials, National Archives. Washington. DC. 34. Hull to Davis [26 lune 1934}. FRUS £934. l. Zi'fi-ZTT. 35. The most comprehensive account of the Japanese attitude toward and participation in the second London Naval Con- ference is in Stephen E. Pealz. Rare to Pearl Harbor: The Failure afrae Ears-ad London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War 11' [Cmbrid . Mesa. 19141. 36. Enclosure in Hul to Davis {17 Jan. 19363. SD Sillhlfifififfill. 3'1". Davis to Hall [2E1 Ian. Willi}: Hull to Davis {3-1 Jan. 193151; Hull to Davis {15 Feb. IBSISII. FRUS. £9315. I. 43. 53. ST-SE. 33. The text of the treaty is LLS. State Department. The London Naval Conference. 1935. Report ofthe Delegates fifthe United States of America. Text of the London Naval Treat}.r of 1936, and Other Documents. Conference Series no. 24 {Wash— ington. lfilfil. Ell-#5. MI“ SEAL MEMBERSHIP FINE National Headquarters has a limited number of AMI Seal Membership Lapel pins available to members at $2.25 each (including mailing}. Send name. address. and check made out to “Alt-[1” to Dr. B. F. Cooling, Executive Director. National Headquarters. AM[. 3309 Chestnut St.. NW Washinflton 11C. 12a “UTAH? AFFAIRS ...
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11crruzer - navies. the 5:5:3 ratio should not be extended...

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