Lec20_F03_mine - CLASS #20: AXELROD AND EVOLUTION OF...

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CLASS #20: AXELROD AND EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION I. Review A. Goals of the scientific study of politics 1. Explain, predict, understand real world phenomena 2. Theory oriented, theory directed research 3. Use the scientific method 4. Justify that the theory’s predictions correspond to the facts (or come to grips with the facts) B. Science is about argument 1. Setting up the premises 2. Drawing a conclusion 3. Justifying that the conclusion comes to grips with the way the world is 4. Look for better ways to explain and come to grips II. The Collective Action Problem A. Definition: When individuals desire public goods from which they cannot be feasibly excluded and when each individual's contribution to the production process yields a directly consequential benefit that is less than the cost involved, rational individuals will have a strong incentive to take a free ride. B. Michael Taylor suggests that there are two conditions underlying the conventional characterization of the collective action problem: 1. Condition A: Neither player finds it profitable to provide the good by self (DD>CD) 2. Condition B: The value of the good provided by the other player alone exceeds the value of the public good provided by joint cooperation less the costs of cooperation (DC > CC) C. Three kinds of collective action problems 1. Both conditions in effect Prisoner’s Dilemma 2. Relaxing Condition A means at least one player finds it profitable to provide the good by themselves (CD>DD) Chicken 3. Relaxing Condition B means the value to at least one player alone does not exceed the value of the total amount of the public good provided by joint cooperation less the costs of cooperation (CC>DC) Stag Hunt D. Symmetric 2x2 games – 24 possibilities 1. There are four games where cooperation may or may not occur 1
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2. Common good is subverted by individual rationality – there is some temptation to defect a. Each desires the other’s cooperation but is tempted to D b. CC > CD – you are better off when the other player returns your cooperation c. DC > DD – you hope the other player C when you D d. There are several collective action problems, each with a somewhat
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This note was uploaded on 04/21/2008 for the course PLS 200 taught by Professor Idk during the Fall '08 term at Michigan State University.

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Lec20_F03_mine - CLASS #20: AXELROD AND EVOLUTION OF...

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