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Unformatted text preview: I. Agency a. Principal;-agent relationship. (employeremployee) b. No written document required c. Intent of the parties d. Breach of contract between principal and agent can sue for damages but not for specific performance. e. Principals are liable on contracts made by their agents i. Jenson Farms v. Cargill (1981) Warren backed by Cargill, Cargill tells them when to issue dividends, and inspects the farm. Cargill buys 90 % of Warrens grain. Warren buys grain and defaults, Cargill CAN liable for the loan. 1. There was consent that they would act on principals behalf 2. consent to be controlled 3. agent was a willing participant. f. Negligence i. Common law principal is held liable for negligence of an agent. 1. Actual authorityagent did what he was instructed to do by communication from the principal. 2. Apparent authorityagent has signaled to a 3 rd party that he has authority to act on principals behalf. 3. Inherent authorityif the agent would ordinarily have the authority to enter into that agreement and the 3d party would have no reason to doubt it. 4. Nogales Services center v. Atlantic (1980) Tucker said that ARCO would lend money for an expansion project, and give them a discount, ARCO never approved. ARCO held liable, inherent authority, burden on ARCO to monitor the dealings of their agent. Very low threshold. g. Tort liability i. Master-servant relationship, master held vicariously liable. (within the scope of employment) ii. Independent contractor, agent is held liable. iii. R 220skill matters, whether or not the agent is employed in principals business iv. Humble Oil- Humble owns gas station, managed by Schneider, car rolls away and injured family. Schneider held servant of Humble, Humble had total control, Humble controlled operating hours, owned the goods. v. Hoover v. Sun Oil Sunoco attendant lights a cigarette causes an explosion. Barrone the agent held liable as independent contractor, he set the hours, could sell non-Sunoco products. II. Fiduciary duties agent owes principal a. Burden is on agent b. Duty of loyalty i. R 388, R 390agent must disclose evidence of business dealings. ii. Tarnowski v. Resop (1952) Tarnowski wants to buy a business, hires Resop, Resop tells him the business is in great financial shape, Resop was working for the business also. Tarnowski is awarded Resops secret commission. (deterrence interest of discouraging similar behavior) iii. In Re Gleeson (1954) Gleeson dies, Colbrook executor, Colbrook had purchased land from Gleeson before his death. With the lease about to expire, Colbrook re-leases the land to himself, increases the rent and tells the beneficiaries. Violated his duty of loyalty, conflict of interest. Even though this was beneficial, he should have removed himself from one side of the transaction....
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This note was uploaded on 02/14/2008 for the course LAW 7060 taught by Professor Haas during the Spring '07 term at Yeshiva.
- Spring '07
- The Hours