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Unformatted text preview: 27/03/2008 07:08:00 II. Obstacles to Cooperation Concern with cheating o Monitoring problem: how to detect violations o Sanctioning problem: how to punish? III. What Makes Cooperation Possible/Likely? Some non-historical influences o Characteristics of the game/situation Low cost of opponent defection Little reason to worry about being cheated High costs of murutal defection (chicken) Crisis management, nuclear brinksmanship High benefits of joint cooperation (stag hunt) Many health, environmental, economic issues Air traffic control standards, anti-malaria o Verification or enforcement mechanisms Consider the future: time horizons o The shadow of the future PD: get 4 from DC, but 2 from DD (4-2-2-2-2 = 12) But you can get 3 per round from DC (3-3-3-3-3=15) Your value for future determines SR vs LR focus o But last period problem (Why worry when there is no future?)But last period problem (Why worry when there is no future?...
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This note was uploaded on 04/22/2008 for the course INR 3004 taught by Professor Hensel during the Spring '08 term at FSU.
- Spring '08