242s02x1

# 242s02x1 - ECONOMICS 242 FIRST MIDTERM SPRING 2002 PLEDGE:_...

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ECONOMICS 242 FIRST MIDTERM SPRING 2002 PLEDGE:____________________________ NAME:______________________________ Multiple Choice Questions: 3 points each 1. In the following zero-sum game: Player 2 Left Right Player 1 Up 5 -1 Down -30 5 a. Both players have a dominant strategy. b. Both players prefer high payoffs to low payoffs. c. One of the players has a weakly dominated strategy. d. There is no Nash equilibrium. e. None of the above. 2. If event A happens with probability .2 and event B happens with probability .4, then if P(A∩B) = .1, the probability that A or B occurs is: a. .7 b. .6 c. .5 d. .4 3. Using the same probabilities as in question 3, the probability that A occurs given that B has occurred is: a. .6 b. .5 c. .4 d. .25 4. A constant sum game is a game where the players’ payoffs: a. Always add to zero, regardless of the strategies played. b. Always add to a positive number, regardless of the strategies played. c. Always add to the same number, regardless of the strategies played. d. Can add to different numbers, but the players are constantly renegotiating how to split that number.

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5. In the following game, Player 1 has strategies Up and Down, and Player 2 has strategies A, B, C, and D. What is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the game?
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## This test prep was uploaded on 04/22/2008 for the course ECON 242 taught by Professor Nonnenmacher during the Spring '06 term at Allegheny.

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242s02x1 - ECONOMICS 242 FIRST MIDTERM SPRING 2002 PLEDGE:_...

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