242s01x1 - ECONOMICS 242 FIRST MIDTERM SPRING 2001

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Unformatted text preview: ECONOMICS 242 FIRST MIDTERM SPRING 2001 PLEDGE:____________________________ NAME:______________________________ Multiple Choice Questions: 3 points each 1. A rollback equilibrium: a. Is a way to solve simultaneous move games. b. Is also a Nash equilibrium. c. Always starts by solving the first subgame of the game and moving towards the back. d. All of the above. 2. The following game: Player 2 Left Right Player 1 Up 4, 4 3, 5 Down 5, 3 2, 2 a. Has no Nash equilibria. b. Has three Nash equilibria. c. Resembles a Prisoners Dilemma game. d. Resembles a game of chicken. 3. Mike and Steve are playing the following game. Mike flips a coin. He cannot affect whether it comes up heads or tails. If it comes up heads, then Mike pays Steve $1. If it comes up tails, then Steve pays Mike $1. This is a game with no: a. Skill b. Strategy c. Chance d. (a) and (b). 4. In a Nash equilibrium: a. Both players are getting their highest payoff. b. One of the players is getting her highest payoff. c. Neither player has an incentive to play a different strategy, given the strategy of the other player....
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242s01x1 - ECONOMICS 242 FIRST MIDTERM SPRING 2001

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