History 136+NSC 68

History 136+NSC 68 - NSC 68: United States Objectives and...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–4. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 14, 1950) A Report to the President Pursuant to the President's Directive of January 31, 1950 TOP SECRET [Washington,] April 7, 1950 Contents Terms of Reference Analysis I. Background of the Present World Crisis II. The Fundamental Purpose of the United States III. The Fundamental Design of the Kremlin IV. The Underlying Conflict in the Realm of Ideas and Values Between the U.S. Purpose and the Kremlin Design 1. Nature of the Conflict 2. Objectives 3. Means V. Soviet Intentions and Capabilities--Actual and Potential VI. U.S. Intentions and Capabilities--Actual and Potential VII. Present Risks VIII. Atomic Armaments
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
A. Military Evaluation of U.S. and U.S.S.R. Atomic Capabilities B. Stockpiling and Use of Atomic Weapons C. International Control of Atomic Energy IX. Possible Courses of Action Introduction The Role of Negotiation A. The First Course--Continuation of Current Policies, with Current and Currently Projected Programs for Carrying Out These Projects B. The Second Course--Isolation C. The Third Course--War D. The Remaining Course of Action--A Rapid Build-up of Political, Economic, and Military Strength in the Free World Conclusions Recommendations TERMS OF REFERENCE The following report is submitted in response to the President's directive of January 31 which reads: That the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the
Background image of page 2
probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union. The document which recommended that such a directive be issued reads in part: It must be considered whether a decision to proceed with a program directed toward determining feasibility prejudges the more fundamental decisions (a) as to whether, in the event that a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, such weapons should be stockpiled, or (b) if stockpiled, the conditions under which they might be used in war. If a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, the pressures to produce and stockpile such weapons to be held for the same purposes for which fission bombs are then being held will be greatly increased. The question of use policy can be adequately assessed only as a part of a general reexamination of this country's strategic plans and its objectives in peace and war. Such reexamination would need to consider national policy not only with respect to possible thermonuclear weapons, but also with respect to fission weapons--viewed in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union. The moral, psychological, and political questions involved in this problem would need to be taken into account and be given due weight. The outcome of this reexamination would have a crucial bearing on the further question as to whether
Background image of page 3

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 4
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 04/21/2008 for the course HIST 136 taught by Professor Chavigny during the Spring '08 term at Sweet Briar.

Page1 / 33

History 136+NSC 68 - NSC 68: United States Objectives and...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 4. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online