POLS_110_-_Lecture_30

POLS_110_-_Lecture_30 - Yet another insight brought to you...

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Chapter 18 (cont’d): AN INVITATION TO STRUGGLE?
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Foreign Policy Powers at Odds? The Executive Branch Article II, Sections 1,2 & 3 of the U.S. Constitution The Legislative Branch Article I, Sections 1, 8 & 9 And Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution
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An Invitation to Struggle? These powers often set the institutions at odds Some authors characterize it as an Executive – Legislative Tug-of-war Inherent in checks and balances design Ambition counters ambition
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Area of Particular Concern Treaties United Nations Charter Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty Convention Concerning Shrimp Conservation Executive Agreements Agricultural Commodities Agreements Military Mission Agreements NAFTA International Agreements:
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Influence v. Evasion The Evasion Hypothesis: The President retains more foreign policy power by circumventing Senate Advice and Consent proceedings in conducting an executive agreement as opposed to a treaty. (supported by Margolis, 1986) The Influence Hypothesis: Congress retains considerable power in foreign policy even in the conduct of executive agreements. (supported by Martin, 2000)
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The Most Recent Debate: NAFTA
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Evidence of a Struggle: Senate refusal to ratify the Treaty of Versailles without significant amendment and Supreme Court rulings upholding executive agreements set the stage The UN Charter does not suffer the same fate, but executive agreements begin to rise Causes real Congressional concern about its role in foreign policy
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Congressional Assertions of Authority: 1950-1954: Senate consideration of the Bricker Amendment 1970-1972: Passage of the Case-Zablocki Act 1976-1977: GAO Report, Congressional Pressure and Executive Memorandum 1978: Passage of the State Department Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1979
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This note was uploaded on 04/17/2008 for the course POL unk taught by Professor R.smith during the Spring '08 term at DePauw.

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POLS_110_-_Lecture_30 - Yet another insight brought to you...

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