Lec 3 - The Power of Institutions Same Preferences,...

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The Power of Institutions Same Preferences, Different Outcomes 1/20/09
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What have we learned? 1. Suffrage expansion--a political choice Relative power of incumbents v. opponents Preferences of opponents 2. Social Efficiency: greatest satisfaction (utility) of the greatest number of individuals Median voter More inclusive rules-->closer to median voter
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Paradox of Voting Individually preference ordering transitive If a>b, and b>c, then a>c Incoherent, inconsistent results Solution? Institutions Voter 1 Voter 2 Voter 3 a b c b c a c a b
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Paradox of voting Definition: Identical preferences (votes), aggregated (counted) by different methods can produce different social choices. Questions What is the Paradox of Voting? What is connection between Paradox and the 3 examples of elections Riker introduces in ch.2? What was going on in French elections of 1951? On what grounds does Riker charge that the results were a product of manipulation of the rules? What is the difference between ordinal and cardinal utility? Relevance
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Lec 3 - The Power of Institutions Same Preferences,...

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