Philosophy Notes 30th of September

Philosophy Notes 30th of September - evidenc One is more...

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Philosophy Notes 30 th of September Closure Arg for Skepticism: 3 Main Responses to argument: 1. Deny the premise “I don’t know that im a BIV” Adopted by moore by saying he knows he has 2 hands+CP. Problem with moore is whether or not we know we have 2 hands, thus u cant make that assumption and the argument doesn’t work. You cant assume as a premise that we know we have 2 hands. It’s a circular argument. Another prob with denying premise one is that if you want to say that youre not a BIV, you should give a good reason for believing. A skeptic will say you don’t have a good enough reason to believe your not a BIV. So we went over which reasons for believing there are: the hypothesis that youre a BIV is more complicated than the hypothesis that you are a real person; we should relate simpler hypotheses to more complicated hypotheses. IN science we take simpler hypotheses, so why not do the same thing here? Suppose you have two scientific theories that are equally compatible with your
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Unformatted text preview: evidenc. One is more complicated than the other. Not a strong enough reason to make this claim knowledge. Another proble, Cohen speaks of, the claim I am BIV is a defeat. For any 2 propositions, p and q, p is an undercutting defeater for q, just in case, if p were true, this would undermine one’s reasons for thinking q is true. BIV is an undercutting defeater for thinking we have two hands. 2. Deny closure principle (Cp: if you know that p and you know that q follows from p, then you are in a position to know that q.) to know something, it must have a probability of 100% but if the prob is 100%, then you know it. if p entails q, the prob of p should be equal than or less than q. Knowledge is true belief and sensitive: The belief that p is sensitive, is to believe in p if it is true, and not believe it when it is false. Your beliefs track the truth 3. Contextualism...
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This note was uploaded on 02/24/2009 for the course PHIL 140g taught by Professor Kwon during the Fall '07 term at USC.

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