911 Commission Report (Bureaucracy)

911 Commission Report (Bureaucracy) - The 9/11 commission I...

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The 9/11 commission I. Executive summary The events of September 11 th were a shock not a surprise. The Bush administration began developing a new strategy with the state goal of eliminating al Qaeda three within three to five years. The system light was blinking red. The specific threat information, however, pointed overseas. However, no analytic work foresaw the lightning that could connect the thundercloud to the ground. Operational failures were many (1) not watch listing future hijackers (2) not sharing information (3) not taking adequate steps (4) not linking the arrest of Zacarias Moussaoui (5) not discovering false statements on visa applications (5) not recognizing passports manipulated in a fraudulent manner (6) not expanding no-fly lists (7) not searching airline passengers (8) not hardening aircraft cockpit doors. The most important failure was one of imagination . Also, the United States government did not find a way of pooling integlligence and using it to guide the planning and assignments of responsibilities for joint operations involving CIA, FBI, the State Department. Furthermore, intelligence was deemed credible enough to warrant planning for possible strikes to kill Bin Ladin. But in each case the strikes did not go forward, because senior policymakers did not regard the intelligence as sufficiently actionable. As far at the intelligence community is concerned, there was no comprehensive review of what the intelligence community knew and what it did not know. Domestic agencies : the State department’s consular officers nor the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s inspectors and agents were ever considered full partners in a national counterterrorism effort. The GAA did not use TIPOFF data. The hijackers had to beat only one layer of security—the security checkpoint process. In senior levels, communication was poor. Senior military and FAA leaders had no effective communication with each other. The chain of command did not function well. The President could not reach some senior officials. Congress, responded slowly to the rise of transnational terrorism. They did not systematically perform robust oversight to identify, address and attempt to resolve the man problems in national security and domestic agencies that became apparent in the aftermath of 9/11. Recommendations : The long-term success demands the use of all elements of national power: diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, law enforcement, economic policy, foreign aid, public diplomacy, and homeland defense. Three dimensional strategy: ( 1 ) attack terrorist and their organizations (a) root out sanctuaries (b) strengthen long-term United States and international commitments to the future of Pakistan and Afghanistan (c) confront problems with Saudi Arabia. ( 2 ) Prevent the continued growth of Islamist Terrorism (a) stand as an example of moral leadership (b) stand for a better future (c) communicate and defend American ideals (d) offer an agenda of opportunity (e) develop a
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This note was uploaded on 03/01/2009 for the course POLY SCI 207 taught by Professor Glasgow,g during the Fall '08 term at UCSB.

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911 Commission Report (Bureaucracy) - The 9/11 commission I...

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