Econ398_PracticeQuestionsExam1

Econ398_PracticeQuestionsExam1 - Practice Questions for...

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Practice Questions for Exam 1 1. The following game has exactly one Nash equilibrium if COLUMN Down Right ROW Up 4,5 9,y Left x,6 10,2 a. x = 4, y = 2 b. x = 5, y = 2 c. x = 3, y = 6 d. x = 2, y = 7 e. None of the above 2. Suppose there are 10 people playing the following game: each player writes down an integer from 0 to 10 inclusive. If all of the numbers match, then each player gets a payoff equal to the number that he or she has written. Otherwise, each player gets a payoff equal to the negative of the number that he or she has written. How many Nash equilibria are there in this game? a. 0 b. 1 c. 9 d. 10 e. None of the above 3. In the previous problem, how many of the Nash equilibria (assuming there were any) are Pareto efficient? a. 0 (or there were no Nash equilibria in the previous problem) b. 1 c. 2 d. 10 e. None of the above
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Refer to this setup for the next 2 questions. Consider the following situation: There are 2 stores, each producing and selling widgets. Each store chooses how many widgets to
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This note was uploaded on 03/13/2009 for the course ECON 398 taught by Professor Emre during the Spring '07 term at University of Michigan.

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Econ398_PracticeQuestionsExam1 - Practice Questions for...

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