Lecture6 - 1/27/2009 Homework Due Friday 4:15PM Hand...

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1/27/2009 1 Homework Due Friday 4:15PM ± Hand homework in to your GSI during discussion section OR ± Turn in homework to the specially marked box outside Lorch Hall 109 by 4:15PM ± Be Reading Chapter 5 A Note About Equilibria ± Some games – ± Get feel for what an equilibrium might be ± Show that if everyone does it, nobody has an incentive to change ± Show everything else isn’t equilibrium: for each other possible strategy profile, somebody has an incentive to change ± Others games – when you’re clueless ± Calculate best responses ± Equilibria occur where best responses cross Continuous Strategy Sets ± Our examples have involved discrete action sets with a small number of possible actions ± Even chess and go are discrete ± We now consider strategy sets that are We now consider strategy sets that are continuous: ± Why? ± So we can use CALCULUS ± Players 1 & 2 take actions 0 3 e π Finding Nash Equilibria ± In general, NE occur where “best response curves” cross
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This note was uploaded on 03/13/2009 for the course ECON 398 taught by Professor Emre during the Spring '07 term at University of Michigan.

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Lecture6 - 1/27/2009 Homework Due Friday 4:15PM Hand...

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