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plsc117_42208 - 8:41:00 AM Constraining State Behavior...

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22/04/2008 07:41:00 Constraining State Behavior Anarchy limit cooperation on security issues more than on other matters o Reputation Ambiguous implications. Advantage as being seen as a state that’ll react  aggressively. o Necessity Certain goals you can only achieve when you cooperate with  other states. Fewer with security goals. Trusting other states is sort of dangerous. o Reciprocity Tit-for-tat (cooperate with other states as long as they cooperate  with you) Only works if you think you’re cooperating them with in  the long run.  Collective Security o All states act together to deter aggression. Free-rider problem o League of Nations efforts, 1919-1939 Japanese invasion of Manchuria, 1931-1932 League failed to act. Japanese army had a lot of autonomy of state, and  ultimately basically took over the state. o Italy Invades Ethiopia, 1935-1936 Hailie Selassie, Ethiopian Emperor. February 1935: Italians invade Ethiopia fro colony in  present-day Somalia October 1935: Italian forces begin using mustard gas October 1935- November 1935: League of Nations  imposes sanctions on Italy February 1936: League unable to agree on further  sanctions
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