(Lecture 5) - PS 280 War I September 7 2016 Announcements...

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Unformatted text preview: PS 280: War I September 7, 2016 Announcements, Regroup I I Next week, first homework assignment due. Updated syllabus. Exercise I The HW is out of 10 points. You currently have the ability to earn 5 points based on your answers. I This class, you’re playing a game against an opponent for the remaining points. I Pair up. Decide who is Player 1 and who is Player 2. The Game I You have 30 seconds to talk with your partner and (potentially) agree to divide one of the remaining points. I An agreement: I I I I I A “legal” division of the point. How much each of you gets. Shake on it before time expires. If agreement: it’s final and you get what you agreed to. If no agreement: neither of you gets that point. Round 1 I http: // I Write your names on one sheet. Title it ICA 5.1. Number each round. Record outcome (agreement, no agreement, the division). I I I I “(1) A/NA. {P1’s share, P2’s share}.” Outcomes and Predictions I Predictions about how many reached an agreement? Shares? Outcomes and Predictions I Predictions about how many reached an agreement? Shares? I How many reached an agreement? I Why do you think this number was so high/low? Outcomes and Predictions I Predictions about how many reached an agreement? Shares? I How many reached an agreement? I I Why do you think this number was so high/low? What was the range of divisions? Outcomes and Predictions I Predictions about how many reached an agreement? Shares? I How many reached an agreement? I Why do you think this number was so high/low? I What was the range of divisions? I Will these numbers change for round 2? Round 2 I Same as Round 1. Round 2 I Same as Round 1. I How many reached an agreement? What was the range of divisions? I Round 2 I Same as Round 1. I I How many reached an agreement? What was the range of divisions? I What would increase the percentage that agree? Round 2 I Same as Round 1. I I How many reached an agreement? What was the range of divisions? I What would increase the percentage that agree? I I I Longer timer? More points at stake? Guarantee half the point? Nash Equilbrium? I Would anyone like to change the strategy they played in the last game? I (Recall: A Nash Equilibrium is a set of strategies such that neither player wants to change their strategy, given what the other player is doing.) Round 3 I Same as Round 1 and 2 except... I If there is no agreement, we’ll flip a coin. I Heads: P1 gets the point. Tails: P2 gets the point. I . I Round 3 Outcomes I Agreements? Range? I How did this change your strategy? Round 4 I Same as round 3 except... I If there is no agreement, we’ll roll a dice. I 1,2,3: P1 gets the point. 4,5,6: P2 gets the point. I . I Round 4 Outcomes I Agreements? Range? I How did the change affect your strategy? Round 5 I Same as round 4 except... I If there is no agreement, we’ll roll a dice. I I 1,2: P1 gets the point. 3,4,5,6: P2 gets the point. Round 5 Outcomes I Agreements? Range? I How did the change affect your strategy? Round 6 I Same as round 4 and 5 except... I If there is no agreement, we’ll roll a dice. I I 1,2,3,4,5: P1 gets the point. 6: P2 gets the point. Round 6 Outcomes I Agreements? Range? I How did the change affect your strategy? Round 7 I Same as round 4,5,6 except... I If there is no agreement, we’ll roll a dice. I I I 1,2,3: P1 gets the point. 4,5,6: P2 gets the point. If no agreement, the winner only gets half of a point. Round 7 Outcomes I Agreements? Range? I How did the change affect your strategy? Round 8 I Same as round 4,5,6 except... I If there is no agreement, we’ll roll a dice. I I I 1,2,3: P1 gets the point. 4,5,6: P2 gets the point. If no agreement, the winner only gets one tenth of a point. Round 8 Outcomes I Agreements? Range? I How did the change affect your strategy? Round 9 I Same as round 1 except... I I If there is no agreement, the person with the higher birthday day wins the point. DO NOT SAY YOUR BIRTHDAY. If there’s a tie, we’ll flip a coin. I If no agreement, the winner gets a full point. I Round 9 Outcomes I Agreements? Range? I How did the change affect your strategy? Round 10 I Played over two mini-rounds. I Part 1: same as round 3 (fair coin flip). I Part 2: same as round 4 (dice roll) except... I I I Whoever got more in Part A: they win with 1,2,3,4,5. Whoever got less in Part A: they win with 6. If no agreement, the winner gets a full point. Round 10 Outcomes I Agreements? Range? I How did the change affect your strategy? Fundamental Features of War I It’s costly. Fundamental Features of War I It’s costly. I Where in our games did we add costs? Fundamental Features of War I It’s costly. I I Where in our games did we add costs? There’s no guaranteed winner. Fundamental Features of War I It’s costly. I I Where in our games did we add costs? There’s no guaranteed winner. I Where in our games did we see this? Nash Equlibrium in Our Game I Recall... a NE is “a set of strategies where neither player can do better by changing their strategy.” I I Suppose we’re playing the game where neither player gets the point if the timer runs out... And suppose you didn’t agree in time... I Could either player do better by changing their strategy? Nash Equlibrium in Our Game I Recall... a NE is “a set of strategies where neither player can do better by changing their strategy.” I I Suppose we’re playing the game where neither player gets the point if the timer runs out... And suppose you didn’t agree in time... I Could either player do better by changing their strategy? I So is there any NE where the players fail to agree on something ? Nash Equlibrium in Our Game I Recall... a NE is “a set of strategies where neither player can do better by changing their strategy.” I I Suppose we’re playing the game where neither player gets the point if the timer runs out... And suppose you didn’t agree in time... I Could either player do better by changing their strategy? I So is there any NE where the players fail to agree on something ? Then why the heck didn’t you agree???? I Nash Equlibrium in War Bargaining I Why do countries fight? Nash Equlibrium in War Bargaining I Why do countries fight? I Why do countries fail to agree? I Even though war is costly, and there’s always a better option than war. ...
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  • Fall '14
  • Dr. Joseph Hinchcliffe
  • Game Theory, Nash Equlibrium

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