lecture8-secure-bgp

lecture8-secure-bgp - Lecture 8 Securing the BGP Routing...

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1 1 Lecture 8 Securing the BGP Routing Protocol Adrian Perrig 18-731: Network Security Spring 2009 2 Overview Administrative issues HW1 expected to be out today
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2 Sample Reading Critique (Very Good) Summary The paper describes bugs and possible attacks that apply to trusted computing systems based on static root of trust for measurements SRTM. It then presents a design and implementation a Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM). Such a design is not vulnerable to the previously presented attacks. 3 Things I learnt Current implementations of trusted computing systems based on SRTM suffer from many bugs. All publicly available TPM-enabled bootloaders violate the assumption that there is no code that is executed but not hashed. In one implementation, the file is loaded twice, first for extraction, and later for hashing into a PCR. As program code is loaded twice from disk or from a remote host over the network, an attacker who has physical access either to the disk or to the network can send different data each time. Bios attacks are another weakness. Currently the Core Root of Trust for Measurement CRTM of many machines is freely patchable. It is stored in flash and no signature checking is performed on updates. This violates the assumption that the first code running and extending PCRs after a platform reset is trustworthy and cannot be replaced. A design based on DRTM is not vulnerable to the TPM based attack. 3 Possible improvements The paper explains why a DRTM resists to the three attacks that apply to SRTM. It would be useful if it could explain why, apart from these attacks, it provides the same security properties as a SRTM based system. In other words, it would be helpful to explain why using a DRTM does not introduce problems that do not exist when using a SRTM. A performance analysis of a system using DRTM. A detailed and systematic comparison of SRTM and DRTM, security wise and performance wise. 3 Sample Reading Critique (Not so good) OSLO: Improving the security of Trusted Computing The paper deals with the issue of trusted computing. It starts with what trusted computing means and how the TPM is involved. It then goes into the problems with the TPM due to the 3 assumptions needed for it to work being violated. It then goes into specific examples of bootloaders, reset, and BIOS violating the conditions. It then goes into the primary contribution of the paper with the OSLO, designed for trustable booting of the computer. Things learned : 1. What trusted computing really means. 2. That TPMs have been designed with a reset switch (seems like bad planning). 3. The difficulties involved in writing secure bootloader code Problems : 1. OSLO not fully completed 2. Ultimately moot as long as TPM is still resettable 3. Lack of portability of other platforms of OSLO 4
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3 Sample Reading Critique (Too Long) Document Reviewed: Towards characterizing and Classifying Communication-based Automotive Applications from a Wireless Networking Perspective.
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This note was uploaded on 03/31/2009 for the course ECE 18731 taught by Professor Perrig during the Spring '08 term at Carnegie Mellon.

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lecture8-secure-bgp - Lecture 8 Securing the BGP Routing...

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