Lecture4PoliSci274Feb2

Lecture4PoliSci274Feb2 - PoliSci 274 Lecture 4 Today Finish...

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PoliSci 274 Professor Scott Gehlbach Lecture 4 2/2/09 Today Finish Arrow Voting Rules 1) Arrow’s Theorem Continued a) Theorem---is a statement proven given a basis of assumptions i) Given: (1) Group has at least 2 members and at least 3 alternatives under consideration ii) Proven: No mechanism (Voting Rule) for translating preferences of rational individuals into coherent (transitive) group preferences that satisfies: (1) U: Universal admissibility (2) P: Pareto optimality (3) I: Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (4) D: Non-Dictatorship (5) One of these rules is either broken or there will be a possibility of incoherent preferences (a) Which means majority rule or democracy is inheritably has possibility of incoherence (b) There is no such thing as a perfect voting rule b) How to fight the depression of Arrow’s Theorem i) Even though a voting rule might produce perverse outcomes in some circumstances….it doesn’t produce perverse outcomes in others (1) Majority Rule
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Lecture4PoliSci274Feb2 - PoliSci 274 Lecture 4 Today Finish...

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