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Lec 12 - MixedMemberSystems TheBestofBothWorlds...

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Mixed-Member Systems The Best of Both Worlds? 2/19/09
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Mixed-member Systems MMS appears to have been the system of choice for electoral system designers during the 1990s. Why? Is it better than “pure” systems?
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Shugart’s notion of ‘efficiency’ Interparty dimension Identifiability Proportionality Tension/conflict between the two Interparty inefficiency Hyper-representativeness (e.g. Italy) Pluralitarianism (e.g. New Zealand)
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Shugart’s notion of ‘efficiency’ Intraparty dimension Local accountability Accountability to national party Intraparty inefficiency Hyper-personalistic (e.g. pre-reform Japan) Directs material resources to narrow interests High transaction costs for policymaking Hyper-centralization (e.g. pre-reform Venezuela)
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Pure Systems ‘Pure’ systems run the risk of degenerating into one the four forms of extreme inefficiency: Hyper-representativeness (Italy) Pluralitarianism (New Zealand) Hyper-personalistic (Japan) Hyper-centralization (pre-reform Venezuela) Each of these have made the switch to MMS in recent years
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Mixed Member Systems
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