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# mgf1107notes10 - [The Hare System and Plurality with Runoff...

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THE FIVE DESIRABLE PROPERTIES OF VOTING SYSTEMS: 1) THE PARETO CONDITION : If every voter prefers alternative A to alternative B, then alternative B cannot be the winner. [Sequential Pairwise Voting fails the Pareto condition] 2) THE CONDORCET WINNER CRITERION : Either there is no Condorcet winner or, if there is, the Condorcet winner wins the election. [Every system fails this criterion except Sequential Pairwise Voting.] 3) MONOTONICITY: If an election is held in which alternative A is the winner, and a second ballot is held after a change that is favorable only to A, then A is still the winner.

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Unformatted text preview: [The Hare System and Plurality with Runoff fail this miserably!]. 4) MAJORITY CRITERION : If an alternative receives a majority of the first-place votes, then that alternative should win. [The Borda Count fails this condition] 5) INDEPENDENCE OF IRRELEVANT ALTERNATIVES (IIA): If alternative A goes from being a loser of an election to one of the winners of a new election, then at least one voter had to reverse his or her ranking of A and the first winner. [ EVERY SYSTEM we have studied fails this criterion.]...
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## This note was uploaded on 04/29/2008 for the course MGF 1107 taught by Professor Storfer during the Spring '08 term at FIU.

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mgf1107notes10 - [The Hare System and Plurality with Runoff...

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