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Unformatted text preview: n increases? 2. Assuming that there are 2 firms only, repeat the results for problem 1 doing the following: a. Player 1 chooses her output quantity first. Player 2 observing player one then chooses his output quantity (note the solution of this sequential move game is known as a Stackelberg equilibrium). b. Players 1 and 2 move simultaneously, but choose price rather than output quantity (note that the solution to this game is known as a Bertrand equilibrium). 3. Compare the 2-firm profits made under Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand....
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This note was uploaded on 04/14/2009 for the course ISYE 4803 taught by Professor Staff during the Spring '08 term at Georgia Institute of Technology.
- Spring '08