Unformatted text preview: Gov 312L Spring 2007 Week 7
0. High levels of poverty and inequality 1. Resentment of U.S. political and economic dominance 2. Fulgencio Batista's authoritarianism and repression The Roots of Revolution in Cuba U.S. Intervention in Cuba 3. Middle class origins--a nationalist, not a Communist 4. His travels and growing politicization 5. The failed attack on the Moncada army barracks 6. A defiant speech at his trial 7. Imprisonment then exile The Emergence of Fidel Castro 0. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. The return to Cuba: Dec. 1956 Initial difficulties The absence of urban uprisings Improving guerrilla tactics and success Batista responds with more repression A failed election to restore legitimacy The U.S. abandons him Castro enters Havana: January 1959 Castro's Guerrilla War 8. Mastery of guerrilla warfare 9. The Army's poor morale and leadership 10.Growing support from rural workers 11.A strong urban underground 12.Batista's unpopularity 13.The U.S. abandonment of Batista The Roots of Castro's Victory 8. A diverse rebel coalition 9. Castro asserts control 10. The execution of Batista's henchmen 11. Rising dissent and concerns about Communist influence 12. Imprisonment of former allies 13. Postponement of elections 14. Creation of Committees for the Defense of the Revolution 15. Control of unions, universities and the media Castro's Growing Authoritarianism 14. Nationalization of the economy, including U.S. owned property. 15. Turn toward Soviet bloc. Trade and military agreements. 16. Social reform. Land redistribution, literacy campaign, and expansion of health care. Three Main Policy Trends Castro's Polarizing Effect 16. Castro was initially popular among much of the population because: 17. Social reforms provided significant benefits 18. He exploited antiAmerican nationalist sentiments 19. Charismatic personality 20. Soviet aid covered up economic problems However, he also alienated a large sector of the population--many went into exile. Eisenhower endorses a CIA covert action program that includes: 17. Propaganda campaign 18. Espionage inside Cuba 19. Creation of an invasion force of 1,000 Cuban exiles in Guatemala. Eisenhower severs relations with Cuba in January 1961. U.S.-Cuba Relations under Eisenhower 21. Kennedy continues with the invasion plans but vetoes direct U.S. participation 22. Rebels move to Nicaragua and set sail for Cuba on April 14, 1961 23. CIA provides 16 B26 planes, which bomb Cuban airfields on April 15, but inflict little damage 24. Castro responds by arresting 100,000 people, including most CIA assets Kennedy and the Invasion Plans 20.The exile invasion force lands at the Bay of Pigs-- a hotbed of support for Castro 21.The rebels are detected and attacked by the Cuban Air Force 22.Many ships are sunk or chased away 23.The U.S. declines to intervene 24.No popular uprising occurs 25.1,180 rebels are taken prisoner The Fiasco at the Bay of Pigs 26.Castro looks tough but magnanimous 27.He holds rebels for a year and a half and then releases them for medical supplies 28.Kennedy looks weak and indecisive 29.This may have influenced his subsequent actions in the Cuban missile crisis The Aftermath of the Bay of Pigs 30.Kennedy comes under pressure to invade Cuba 31.Kennedy refuses to do so, but says that he will act if offensive missiles are installed there 32.Khrushchev assures Kennedy no offensive weapons will be placed in Cuba The Aftermath of the Bay of Pigs The Cuban Missile Crisis 33.There is mounting evidence that Soviet missiles are being placed in Cuba 34. On Oct. 4, 1962 the CIA decides to send a U2 spy plane over Cuba 35.Successful flight doesn't take place until Oct. 14 36.The resulting photos show clear evidence of Soviet missiles The Discovery of the Missiles 37.JFK calls a meeting of Ex Comm--12 high ranking officials 38.Military experts say that the missiles could be operational within a week 39.They estimate that they have the potential to wipe out most major American cities, killing 80 million Americans The Nature of the Threat 40.JFK and most advisers initially favor an air strike to take out the missiles 41.The JCS also want an invasion to get rid of Castro 42.McNamara initially wants to do nothing 43.A consensus gradually emerges for a blockade The Debate over How to Respond The Arguments against a Blockade 44.It will not remove the missiles--they are already there 45.It will not stop work on the missiles from proceeding 46.It would cause a confrontation with the Soviet Union 47.It would encourage the Soviets to blockade Berlin 48.It would demonstrate the seriousness of the U.S. 49.The pressure could be increased if necessary 50.It would not require a rapid response 51.A surgical air strike would be impossible 52.An air strike might lead to Soviet nuclear retaliation The Arguments for a Blockade 25. U.S. seeks support of allies and the OAS 26. Prepares legal justification for "quarantine" 27. Deploys 180 ships in the Caribbean 28. Orders B52 bombers in the air 29. On Monday, Oct. 22, JFK meets with Congress and delivers speech 30. The Soviets are informed of the U.S. plan one hour before the speech 31. The Soviets denounce the plan and deny they have put missiles in Cuba Preparing the Blockade 32. The quarantine goes into effect on Oct. 24 33. The Navy is ordered to stop all ships proceeding to Cuba 34. Soviet ships continue to move toward Cuba joined by submarines 35. At the edge of the quarantine, the ships suddenly stop 36. The U.S. searches some ships and allows others through Implementing the Blockade 53. On Oct. 26, Khrushchev sends JFK a personal letter stating that they will remove the missiles if: 54. U.S lifts the blockade 55. Promises not to attack Cuba 56. The next day, a formal letter arrives suggesting that: 57. The U.S. would also need to remove its missiles from Turkey Khruschev's letters 37. Oct. 27, a U2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba and the pilot was killed 38. The Ex Comm wants to attack right away, but then decides to wait 39. The same day, U.S. depth charges nearly hit a Soviet submarine 40. The sub commander wants to fire a nucleartipped torpedo, but is dissuaded Near Crises The U.S. Response to Khrushchev's letter 58.The State Dept. initially plans to reject the trade of missiles 59.RFK suggests they only respond to the earlier Khrushchev letter 60.The Soviet ambassador raises the issue of missiles in Turkey 61.RFK says they want to remove the missiles but can't do so under duress 62.The next morning, the Soviets agree to withdraw the missiles 63.The accord over Turkey is kept silent 64.Castro refuses to allow the U.S. to inspect the missile sites 65.The U.S. monitors the removal of the missiles from the sky and sea The End of the Crisis ...
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This note was uploaded on 03/01/2008 for the course GOV 312L taught by Professor Madrid during the Spring '07 term at University of Texas.
- Spring '07