Demonstratives - Demonstratives An Essay on the Semantics,...

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Demonstratives An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals David ~a~lan' 'This paper was prepared for and read (with omissions) at a syn~posium on Demon- stratives at the hlarch 1977 meetings of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association. The commentators were Paul Benacerraf and Charles Chastain. hfucl~ of the material, including the formal system of section XVIII, was originally presented in a series of lectures at the fabled 1971 Summer Institute in the Philosophy of Language held at the University of California, Irvine. @ 1977 by David I<aplan.
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Table of Contents I. 11. 111. IV. v. VI. (i) (ii) VII. VIII. IX. (iii) (iv) X. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. xv. XVI. XVII. XVIII. XIX. XX. XXI. XXII. Preface Introduction Demonstratives, Indexicals, and Pure Indexicals Two Obvious Principles Remarks on Rigid Designators Argument for Principle 2: Pure Indexicals Terminological Remarks Content and Circumstance Character Earlier Attempts: Index Theory Monsters Begat by Elegance Argument for Principle 2: True Demonstratives The Arguments The Fregean Theory of Demonstrations The Fregean Theory of Demonstratives Argument Against the Fregean Theory of Demonstratives Fixing the Reference vs. Supplying a Synonym Reichenbach on Token Reflexives The Meaning of Indexicals Dthat Contexts, Truth, and Logical Truth Summary of Findings (so far): Pure Indexicals Further Details: Demonstratives and Demonstrations Alternative Treatments of Demonstrations Epistemological Remarks The Formal System Remarks on the Formal System Adding 'Says' Russell on Egocentric Particulars and Their Dispensability On Proper Names
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Demonstratives 483 Preface In about 1966 I wrote a paper about quantification into epistemological contexts. There are very difficult metaphysical, logical, and epistemo- logical problems involved in providing a treatment of such idioms which does not distort our intuitions about their proper use and which is up to contemporary logical standards. I did not then, and do not now, regard the treatment I provided as fully adequate. And I became more and more intrigued with problems centering on what I would like to call the semantics of direct reference. By this I mean theories of meaning according to which certain singular terms refer directly without the me- diation of a Fregean Sinn as meaning. If there are such terms, then the proposition expressed by a sentence containing such a term would involve individuals directly rather than by way of the "individual concepts" or "manners of presentation" I had been taught to expect. Let us call such putative singular terms (if there are any) directly referential terms and such putative propositions (if there are any) singular propositions. Even if English contained no singular terms whose proper semantics was one of direct reference, could we determine to introduce such terms? And even if we had no directly referential terms and introduced none, is there a need or use for singular propositions?
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This note was uploaded on 03/01/2008 for the course PHL 332 taught by Professor Dever during the Fall '07 term at University of Texas at Austin.

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Demonstratives - Demonstratives An Essay on the Semantics,...

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