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Unformatted text preview: INTENTIONAL TORTS BATTERY 1 Intent, knowledge to a substantial certainty (intent to act, not necessarily to harm) Garrett v. Dailey A. Motive / Malice is immaterial – substantial certainty subjective test as to what actor THOUGHT would happen; B. Take victim as you find him Markley v. Whitman C. Transferred Intent – if you intend to hit one guy and hit the wrong guy, it is still battery 2 Contact : Δ ’s action must lead to a harmful/offensive contact with the person or something closely identified (wear/hold.) A. Injures, disfigures, impairs, pains, or offends a “reasonable person’s sense of personal dignity” Fisher v. Carousel B. “Offensive is Objective” - Hypersensitive reaction is insufficient Brzoska v. Olson 3 No Consent; not otherwise privileged A. MEDICAL – (i) Old rule: without consent = battery, even if medically sound (ii) Modern Rule: in maj. Internal operations, consent is taken to be general in nature in area of incision; exercise of sound prof. judgment B. EMERGENCY RULE: Can’t get it, can’t wait; ARP WOULD consent Moss v. Rishworth C. Conditional Consent – can be limited Ashcraft v. King (consented only to family blood) 4 Causation : touch caused harm, set cause in motion, “Thin-Skull” rule applies – overly-sensitive victims 5 D AMAGES- Compensatory; punitive when act was motivated by intent to injure or harm & punish Π 6 D EFENSES TO A SSAULT & B ATTERY A. Consent : express, implied, constructive (Emergency) B. Self-defense , defense of others (for 3 rd party, you must intervene for them – no “reasonable mistake”) (i) Proportionate (excessive = battery and further self-def. allowed); non-deadly(only as last resort to save another’s life) (ii) Reasonable apprehension of imminent contact (ARP in victim’s shoes Fraguglia v. Sala); more subj “jumpy” Nelson v. State (iii) Must be against culpably responsible actor ( Hattori ); third person unintentionally injured = oh well (Morris v. Platt) (iv) DUTY TO RETREAT – before using deadly force. No duty to retreat from home / business State v. Frizzelle C. Defense of Property (Actual v. Constructive force, Devices) (i) Mechanical Devices – can’t do indirectly what you can’t directly Katko v. Briney (ii) Right of Recapture – had possession when taken; taking was wrongful / no claim of right; incl. fraud D. Incompetents – kids have sufficient intent for battery; ins co. may have to pay; crazy = intent if voluntary ASSAULT (PROTECTS PEOPLE FROM FEAR OF HARMFUL / OFFENSIVE CONDUCT – EMOTIONAL INTEREST) 1. Act by – Δ words generally not enough; must alter conduct with threat; “leering” not assault State v. Ingram BATTERY ASSAULT TRESPASS NEGLIGENCE STRICT LIABILITY 1. Intent 1. Intent 1. Act 1. Duty 1. Absolute Duty 2. Harmful/Offensive Contact 2. Apprehension 2. Unauthorized Entry 2. Breach (Act/Omission) 2. Breach 3. No Consent (not privileged) 3. Imminence 3. Wrong 3. Cause in Fact 3. Cause in Fact 4. Causation 4. Causation 4. 4....
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This note was uploaded on 03/02/2008 for the course LAW 509 taught by Professor Keating during the Fall '05 term at USC.
- Fall '05