Summarized by Alexander Newman-Wise Congressional Oversight Overlooked (Summary) Mathew D. McCubbins, Thomas Schwartz 1984 McCubbins and Schwartz discuss the issue of Congressional responsibility in overseeing “administrative compliance with legislative goals,” and address the perception that Congress neglects this oversight responsibility. The authors argue against this perception, and develop a model of Congressional oversight to illustrate their point of view. This model is based on three assumptions, the technological assumption, the motivational assumption, and the institutional assumption. The first of these (Technological) is that “Two forms of oversight are available to Congress: police-patrol oversight and fire-alarm oversight.” Police-patrol oversight is described as actively reviewing a sampling of executive procedures to ensure compliance with legislative goals, and fire-alarm oversight is fixing irresponsible actions of the executive branch as they arise. The assumption states “Congress can choose either form or a
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This note was uploaded on 05/02/2008 for the course PLSC 113 taught by Professor Danielbutler during the Spring '08 term at Yale.