Final Notes

Final Notes - 3/5/08 I. Philosophy of Mind a. Mind/Body...

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3/5/08 I. Philosophy of Mind a. Mind/Body Problem i. Body’s are physical things ii. The mind is not physical 1. IF Deny a. Mind = brain iii. Mind and body interact iv. Physical things only interact with other physically things 1. Science ensures it a. The opposite is inconceivable 2. IF Deny a. Substance dualist/interactionist 3/10/08 I. Philosophy of Mind a. Physicalism/Materialism i. = Mind is not non-physical ii. Question: Is artificial intelligence possible? 1. No: a. (pi) free will necessary for thinking b. (pii) no machine can have free will c. (c) no machine could think d. (ii) Can’t produce new things i. true in principle e. (iii) mind not physical 2. Yes: What evidence? a. (i) learn i. test behavior b. Behaviorism reductive theory i. Mental event = reaction to stimuli 1. Pain (mental) = (non-mental)(purely physical events) to say things like “ow”; jerk away from damage/danger; say “yes” when asked if in pain, etc… a. Pain is not mental, but actually a physical event 2. Objectives a. Counterexample i. Complete paralytic with mental life b. Mental events have no causal power 3/12/08 I. Philosophy of Mind a. Behaviorism i. Main Objection: 1. Mental states CAUSE behavior, but Behaviorism mental states = behavior. b. Identity Theory i. All mental types can be reduced to certain physical types 1. Pain (type of mental state) = firing of C-fibers (type of neuron) 2. Having a red experience = firing of (say) r-fibers 3. Like behaviorism, in the fact they are both reductionistic, but avoids main objection in behaviorism 4. Believing that the Pythagorean Theorem is true = firing fibers ii. Objections 1. No free will (Only an implication)
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a. Identity Theory (IT) = mental events totally deterministic i. Does this imply no new thoughts? 1. First time those fibers have fired 2. Multiple Realizibility a. It looks like different systems can also have these experiences even if they have different fibers. i. EX. Marvin the Martian still feels pain even though made of Silicon. ii. If this is true the type fails – mental type c. Functionalism i. Analogy 1. IT = all chairs made of plastic 2. Functionalism = All chairs are whatever physical thing that plays the right causal role a. EX. Stimuli Pain (can also cause other mental states) Reaction/behavior i. Sometimes referred to as type-token physicalism 3/14/08 I. Functionalism a. Inverted Spectrum i. Could we find out if someone had an inverted spectrum? 1. Yes: look for physical differences a. Brain scan different parts fire 2. No: No physical differences would imply different subjective experiences b. Qualia i. (pi) mental states of us + Marvin are functionally identical ii. (pii) mental states are different iii. (c) some mental states, namely qualia mental states, are not functionally definable II. Jackson’s Mary Argument a. Epiphenomalism i. Physical states = brain states… ii. Mental states correspond with physical states iii. Physical states are not the same as mental states, but are caused by physical states
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This note was uploaded on 05/03/2008 for the course PHIL 1000 taught by Professor Heathwood, during the Fall '07 term at Colorado.

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Final Notes - 3/5/08 I. Philosophy of Mind a. Mind/Body...

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