{[ promptMessage ]}

Bookmark it

{[ promptMessage ]}

EMGT 505 Final Exam

EMGT 505 Final Exam - Final Exam Technology Marketing 505...

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Final Exam: Technology Marketing 505 Ulibarri, Spring, 2007 Due Date: May 8, 2007 9 am. 1. Conventional economic models of the patent-innovation relationship (e.g. Nordhaus, 1969), predict a ‘positive monotonic relationship’ between patent strength and innovation incentives. What are the counter-arguments to this “old-school view?” 2 . Use two “Cash-flow” diagrams to illustrate a “win-win” relationship between a technology patent holder (firm A) and a small firm wishing to innovate a product upon obtaining a license from A. Assume this game relates to problem 3. Firm B Invest in R&D Don’t Invest Firm A Invest in R&D 2,2 -3,5 Don’t Invest 5,-3 0,0 3. In the absence of an enforceable patent-license process what would be the Nash Solution to this game? Is it cooperative or no-cooperative? Suppose there is a possibility to make patent licensing a reality between A and B. What would be the Nash solution to the game? Is it cooperative or non-cooperative? 4. Comment on the following argument concerning firm-size and the chances of
Background image of page 1
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

{[ snackBarMessage ]}

Ask a homework question - tutors are online