IR postmidterm

IR postmidterm - Nuclear Power 16/10/2007 10:42:00 -Nuclear...

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Unformatted text preview: Nuclear Power 16/10/2007 10:42:00 -Nuclear Weapons have reversed traditional sequence of the use of force Conventional Weaponry- brute force, then coercive (diplomatic) violence Nuclear Weaponry- coercive (diplomatic) violence, then brute force exchange o Brute force is concerned with enemys strength o Coercive power is concerned with enemys intention -Nuclear Deterrence- should lower the probability of war- both conventional and nuclear- between two nuclear armed states - fear of loss of control if a crisis does erupt- crisis is limited (Kargill Crisis of 1999) Stability/Instability Paradox: 1. fear of general war leads to infrequent crises o fear will incite control, carefull 2. fear of general war leads to frequent crises o fear is exploited by one side- chicken- Nuclear Deterrence and Non Prieferation Three Nuclear Worlds: Mad World- mutual assured destruction o Good because it is stable Bad World- both assured of defense o Bad because it is unstable NMD World- great if you can get it but not likely Multiplier Effect: (X) 1 2 (Y) 3 (Z) 4 5 Acceptable SSCC= acceptable level of damage to attacker Probability of kill of each attackers missile Defenders force size (1 missile per missile site) Number of missiles targeted per silo FSCF Attackers required force level 25 .5 .50 1 (.50) 50 25 .5 100 2 (.25) 200 25 .5 200 3 (.125) 600 25 .5 300 4 (.083) 1200 o 1) Probability of column 4 computed as follows: x/y = z and pr (n misses) z to yield number of missiles targeted per silo. 2) x = number of returning missiles acceptable to attacker. y = number of defenders missile sites (one per site) z = probability of missing a site then x/y = z = % of returning missiles acceptable. 3) Column 5 = column 3 times column 4. Mad World vs. Bad World A. The Mad World (only offensive missiles for both) Defender (A) Attacker (B) 50 50 100 200 Doubled: Quadrupled 200 600 Doubled: Tripled 300 1200 50%: Doubled B. The Bad World (offensive versus defensive) CASE A 5,000 ABMS 1,000 ICBMS 5:1 exchange ratio for defender to attacker CASE B 5,000 ABMS 1,200 ICBMS 5:1 exchange ratio for defender to attacker CASE C 10,000 ABMS 500 ICBMS 5:1 exchange ratio CASES A & C: No Incentive for Attacker to Attack CASE B: Every Incentive for Attacker to Attack C. Conclusions 1. In a MAD world, large changes in force ratios (offense to offense) have (should have) small destabilizing strategic and political effects....
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This note was uploaded on 04/07/2008 for the course LGLS 110 taught by Professor Gaskins during the Spring '08 term at Brandeis.

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IR postmidterm - Nuclear Power 16/10/2007 10:42:00 -Nuclear...

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