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Unformatted text preview: Lecture 6 Monday, February 11, 2008 9:33 AM 1. Last time: certainty, uncertainty. Determine the threshold probability of indifference. Calculation of a Threshold. WILL HAVE TO WRITE A PAPER FOR THIS THEORY!!!!! 2. Perceptions and Misperceptions in international politics . By Robert Jerus. a. Just because something is percieved to be irrational does not mean it is actually irrational. Blah blah… b. Understanding of the personal rationality 3. Last time a Two period game: dynamic game. 4. This Time: 5. Simultaneous Game a. Deciding between flexibility and resolute b. Assuming both players have absolute knowledge, common knowledge assumption c. From player 1's perspective, will prefer resolute no matter what P2 does d. From p2's perspective, would prefer resolute. e. Out Come of game would be (Resolute, Resolute) f. Prisoner's Dilemma. Despite the fact that both players would be better off playing Flexible, Prisoner's Dilemma....
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This note was uploaded on 05/22/2008 for the course POL V53.0700 taught by Professor Satyanath during the Spring '08 term at NYU.
- Spring '08