Lecture 25

Lecture 25 - b. Check Stayout/weak is best response, which...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Lecture 25 Player 1: Enter/Strong, Stay out/weak Player 2: Coop/Enter 1. Check if belief is consistent with strategy a. Player 2 observe the action of player one and then come up with a belief b. p(Stong/Enter) = p(strong).p(strong/enter)/(ditto)+ p(weak)p(enter/weak) c. Said that is was 0.5 either way d. 0.5(1)/[(o.5(1)+0.5(0)] = 1 e. Confirm that belief is consistent with Bay's rule 2. Check that the strategy is consistent with the beliefs a. Check that cooperation gives a higher payoff than fight b. P(Coop) = 50 c. EP(fight) = 0 d. Plug in the payoffs from game one and game two. 3. Check for the EP of Player 1 a. Is enter (Enter/ strong) is the best response
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Background image of page 2
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: b. Check Stayout/weak is best response, which is not Player 1: Enter/Strong Enter/Weak Player 2: Coop/Enter P(strong/enter) = 0.5 Test Format 1. Mixed strategy 2. Medium Voter 3. Bayesian Equilibrium 4. T/F questions 5. Baye's Rule's Problem 1. p(s/e) = 0.5(0.5)/[(0.25) + 0.25) = 0.5 a. No updating 2. Check that Coop>fighting a. P(Coop) = 2[(o.5)(50)]= 50 b. EP(fight) = 0.5(0)+0.5(60)= 30 3. EP of player 1 a. Holding constant player 2 b. Enter/strong c. Enter/Weak Player 1: Enter/Strong Enter/Weak Player 2: Coop/Enter P(strong/enter) = 0.75 1. Not perfect Bayesian equilibrium...
View Full Document

Page1 / 2

Lecture 25 - b. Check Stayout/weak is best response, which...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 2. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online