SR137-IReS-Lidia - IPCS Special Report October 2012 137...

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Unformatted text preview: IPCS Special Report October 2012 137 Analyzing Failure Pakistan & the Failed States Index Lidia Leoni Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies B‐7/3, Safdarjung Enclave New Delhi 110029 91‐11‐4100 1900 © 2012, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies is not responsible for the facts, views or opinion expressed by the author. The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS), established in August 1996, is an independent think tank devoted to research on peace and security from a South Asian perspective. Its aim is to develop a comprehensive and alternative framework for peace and security in the region catering to the changing demands of national, regional and global security. Address: B 7/3 Lower Ground Floor Safdarjung Enclave New Delhi 110029 INDIA Tel: 91‐11‐4100 1900, 4165 2556, 4165 2557, 4165 2558, 4165 2559 Fax: (91‐11) 4165 2560 Email: [email protected] Web: About the Author Lidia Leoni Lidia Leoni was a Research Intern at the IPCS and wrote this essay during her internship. IPCS Special Report 137, October 2012 Analyzing Failure Pakistan and the Failed States Index Lidia Leoni Albeit a situation rated as critical, Pakistan climbed down the ranking of this year’s Failed States Index, (FSI), in terms of both score (102.30 to 101.60) and placement (12th to 13th). Although this development is consistent with its slowly improving trend since its worst ever results in 2009 (104.1/120), a deeper analysis of the causal factors and at the individual indicators delineates how Pakistan’s position deteriorated in three categories, Group Grievance, Poverty and External Intervention, while improvements in other categories can be traced back to external rather than internal factors. This report aims to pinpoint and contextualise what the 2012 Failed States Index means for Pakistan through an in‐depth analysis. The aim of the Index itself is to capture short and long‐term stability developments within different countries; for this reason, the analysis will compare Pakistan's current scores with previous ones. I OF FAILED STATES AND INDEXES The question of how to deal with states that do not comply with generally accepted Weberian rules of state behavior and organisation has become a much debated issue within the International Relations community. As an increasing number of research institutes and international organisations engage in designing assessment methods to identify the causes and find possible solutions, the whole concept lacks an authoritative and commonly accepted definition and terminology. State Failure, Fragility, Weakness and Collapse are just a few labels – in this paper the issue will be addressed as “State Fragility” as the terminology applied by the g7+ group of fragile states. Despite a general lack of consensus on what state fragility means, a path can be recognised in the stress allocated to the functional role of state as a provider of basic services. The definitions part when it comes to identifying which services are the basic ones; while some tend to be very precise by listing factors from security to education, factually equalizing non‐ fragility with a liberal Western‐style democracy, others leave more space for alternative systems, stressing especially security and control over the territory. Of all the indexes established so far, Fund for Peace's Failed States Index, which is published in collaboration with the authoritative magazine Foreign Policy, is the one that had the most powerful impact in popularizing state fragility. The term “failed state” has entered more than any other the public and media discourse. At the same time, it remains one of the most controversial terminologies. Even more than “collapsed”, the adjective “failed” does not allow any room for maneuver or improvement. When something or Pakistan and the Failed States Index someone has “failed”, it means that it or he did not succeed and has no chance to do so in future. Being a negative and widely popularised term, “failed states” contributed to influencing especially the Western perceptions of these states as places where there is no way back to stability. For this reason, the term is widely rejected by fragile states themselves and has been gradually challenged in the academic discourse, while newly developed assessment methods use more neutral terms like “state fragility”, “state weakness”, “fragile conditions” and the like. Nevertheless, “failed state” remains unchallenged in media and popular culture. The methodology employed in the index has also received widespread critique; the next section will take a closer look at its structure, while at the same time reflecting on its weaknesses. Fund for Peace’s Failed States Index: The Methodology The Index compiled by Fund for Peace (FfP) is composed of twelve social, political and economic indicators reflecting different challenges to state stability on a scale from zero to ten. A score of ten corresponds to most unstable and zero to most stable. The social indicators comprise Demographic Pressures, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Brain Drain and Group Grievance; the economic indicators are defined as Uneven Development and Poverty and Economic Decline. Finally, the political and military indicators group is formed by State Legitimacy, deliverance of Public Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, Factionalisation of the Elites and External Intervention. The methodology underlying the index is built on a content analysis of collected information about the different pressures, Of all the indexes established so far, Fund for Peace's Failed States Index, which is published in collaboration with the authoritative magazine For‐ eign Policy, is the one that had the most powerful impact in popularizing state fragility. whose result is then translated into a score through an algorithm weighting the impact of each pressure on a given county. In a further step, these scores are completed through qualitative and quantitative data based on major events during a year. Since the information for the index is collected during the year previous to the publication, the 2012 index translates events that took place in 2011. As already pointed out, the methodology used by Fund for Peace for compiling the index leaves room for criticism as well. The broad spectrum of indicators reveals in fact a narrow and very specific view of state success which is basically identified with a Western influenced liberal democracy. Moreover, a closer look at the indicators themselves highlights how some of them are so closely intertwined with each other that a separate treatment and analysis seems questionable. So for example Group Grievance can be seen as the result of Elites Factionalisation, but also of Uneven Development and internal as well as external migration (Refugees & IDPs). The protection of human rights is on the other side influenced by how the Security Apparatus works, if police is effective or if there is a military or paramilitary dictatorship persecuting IPCS Special Report 137, October 2012 political opponents. The Security Apparatus also influences the perceptions of the population about the state and its legitimacy, as do the deliverance of Public Services and External Intervention. Grievance worsened by 0.3 points increasing from 9.3 to 9.6. Given the migratory pressures Pakistan faced following the 2010 floods, as opposed to the smaller scope of the 2011 floods, it was predictable that the Demographic Pressures score would improve. Despite this development, Pakistan is yet to reach pre‐2010 scores. Similarly, the results of Refugees And Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) can be explained by the same factor, though in this case Pakistan improved only 0.1 points, showing the government's failure in dealing efficiently with IDPs due to either flooding or instability. II WHAT THE INDEX SAYS ABOUT PAKISTAN AND SOUTH ASIA Pakistan… The social indicators have seen an improvement of 0.3 points in Demographic Pressures scoring 8.5 out of 10 compared to 8.8 the previous year, and Brain Drain with a score of 7.2 against the previous total of 7.5 out of 10. In Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, Pakistan scored at 9 opposed to the previous year’s 9.2 score, thus improving by 0.2 points. At the same time, the indicator for Group As explained by the Fund for Peace in last year's Country Profile for Pakistan, the decreasing number of educated and Pakistan and the Failed States Index (2005‐12) The Indian Civil Nuclear Programme: Issues, Concerns, Opportunities Pakistan and the Failed States Index middle‐class Pakistani deciding to emigrate (Brain Drain indicator) was the result of the tightening of immigration laws in countries that are the main targets of such immigration. This year’s improvement of the indicator can be traced back to the same factor. In 2011 for example Kuwait banned visas for Pakistani nationals and the UK, a classical destination of the Pakistani diaspora, tightened its immigration laws significantly. The increased score of the Group Grievance indicator underlines how ethno‐ sectarian related violence deteriorated, equalling the 2009 score, the year that marked Pakistan’s worst performance in the index. In this respect, Human Rights Watch's Annual Report highlights how a spiral of violence against Shia Muslims and other minorities characterised the second half of 2011 in Pakistan. Attempts to amend the blasphemy law were silenced by the assassinations of two prominent politicians supporting the cause, Punjab Governor Salmaan Taseer and Federal Minister for Minorities Shahbaz Bhatti. Ethnic violence especially increased in Baluchistan, where the army and the paramilitary Frontier Corps are considered responsible for the disappearance of alleged militants and opposition activists, in what The Guardian has named Pakistan's “dirty little war”. At the same time, non‐Baluchi civilians became increasingly target of Balochi nationalist militancy. The Ahmadi community was also subjected to systematic discrimination through blasphemy and community specific laws as well as social discrimination, as for example the expulsion of ten Ahmadi students from a school in Hafizabad, Punjab. This indicator had improved in the 2011 Index over 2010; a development explained by FfP as connected to the lack of ethnic violence during and as a result of the floods; this year's escalation score denotes how sectarian violence was resumed, as a result of the lack of widespread flooding. IPCS Special Report 114, February 2012 IPCS Special Report 137, October 2012 Economic Indicators Within the economic indicators, the Uneven Development has improved, while at the same time remaining in the range of above 8 points, which is a constant result since the first publishing of the Index in 2005. The Poverty and Economic Decline (7.2/10) Indicator has increased its score by a whopping 0.6 over last year’s score of 6.6, making for Pakistan's biggest jump in this year’s Index. The Pakistani economy has been on a steady downfall since 2010; when compared with the first Index in 2005, the Poverty score worsened by 3.9 points. Pakistan's GDP growth is currently at 3.6 percent, remaining decidedly lower than other countries in the region, such as Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and India. Inflation is also on the rise, even with a tightened monetary policy theoretically containing it. Inflation, power shortages and an insecure political situation have a negative impact on Foreign Direct Investment, as noted by the World Bank's Global Economic Prospects released in June 2012. Despite recovering from the floods of 2010, Pakistan remains exposed to the risk of heavy rains and power shortages damaging standing crops and affecting this year’s harvest, which has the potential of undermining the agricultural performance of a mainly agricultural country. Political & Military Indicators In the political indicators, the Legitimacy of the State indicator shows further improvements (0.3 jump from 8.6 in 2011). Since the end of the military dictatorship in 2008 the score has been constantly decreasing, although it remains fairly high at 8.3. The relative stability of the elected government despite significant challenges as well as the emergence of new political forces such as Imran Khan's increasingly popular Pakistan Tehreek‐e‐ Insaf influenced this score. It should be kept in mind, however, that the data for the index is antecedent to the recent clash between the executive and the judiciary, which caused the resignation of PM Yousuf Raza Gilani. This development could renew a general lack of confidence in the political which will probably be reflected by the 2013 index. Pakistan and the Failed States Index The score related to the condition of Public Services remains high at 7. Gas, water and power shortages have become a constant feature and challenge of the Pakistanis' every‐day‐life. Surprisingly, this represents Pakistan’s best performance among all the indicators, and an improvement of 0.3 points from last year; this represents its best performance in this category since the first publishing of the Index in 2005. Given the fact that 2011 was marked by an explosion of riots related to power shortages which caused outages of up to 18 hours per day, this result comes rather unexpected. The absence of significant infrastructural improvements during last year and a lack of information available in the public sphere make it difficult to put this result in context. One possible explanation is that increased poverty affected the total number of people able to afford public services so that better deliverance of extant services to a restricted group of people within society who can still afford the same. According to Human Rights Watch, Pakistan's performance on the protection rights record is related to its traditional weaknesses – the centrality of tribal and kinship structures within Pakistani society, as well as systemic abuses by security forces. This is reflected by the fact that Pakistan always scored above 8 since the first edition of the index, showing that Human Rights issues remain a constant in Pakistan regardless of the type of government in power. The Security Apparatus indicator also remained consistent with last year’s score, with a minimal improvement of 0.1 over last year’s 9.4, but still critical at 9.3 out of ten. This score underlines how, despite the civilian government having been in charge since 2008, the army is still playing a crucial role in the Pakistani decision‐ making process, with a veto on foreign and defence policy as well as on its own economic interests. Beside of the presence IPCS Special Report 137, October 2012 of an over‐powerful army, Pakistan has to deal with the insurgent groups challenging its authority in some parts of its territory, despite the retaking of the Swat region in 2009 and improvements in police training. At the same time, however, the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies underlined in its Security Report how terrorism related violence declined during 2011. The Factionalisation of Elites indicator scored 9.1 like last year, thus remaining constant in this year’s Index. The poor record of Pakistan in this category is the result of communal violence and powerful communal‐based groups, either on religious or ethnic grounds. At the same time, the ethnic polarisation reflected by the score delineates a rather weak feeling of national identity. The External Intervention indicator increased marginally from 9.3 to 9.4; this can be traced back to an increased publicity for the American drone campaign on Pakistani soil, as well as manned incursions such as the one that killed Osama Bin Laden in May 2011. Although the U.S. campaign has been enduring since 2004, the 2011 campaign was increasingly more visible, including the highly publicised killing of Pakistani soldiers in October, after which Pakistan banned ISAF Government’s many initiatives, such as the Islamic Bank, Islamic Univer‐ sity, Islamic pownshop and Islamic economic foundations, imply that non ‐Malays, Chinese in particular need to double up and become more competi‐ tive. These are the parts of ‘Malay first’ policy of NEP. supplies to Afghanistan from passing through its territory. This ban was lifted only recently after an official apology by the US government in July 2012. …and South Asia How do these scores look like when put in a South Asian context? The chart shows the results of the South Asian region in the 2012 FSI. A first glance at the numbers reveals how Pakistan’s score are close to Afghanistan, a country rated by the 2012 index as the 6th least stable worldwide. While Pakistan faces challenges that are not shared by its neighbours, or not to the same extent, its performance in some of the indicators is comparable or not very far other countries in the region which are generally considered stable. This is especially the case for the Uneven Development, where no country in the region except for the Maldives scores under 7.8. In fact it is interesting to notice how India, whose economic growth has been much praised during the last years fails to distribute these newly acquired resources evenly, scoring with a 8.4 worse than Pakistan does. A regional trend can also be recognised in the Group Grievance indicator, where five out of eight countries scored 8.9 or higher and seven out of eight 7.6 or higher. This is the case for an established democracy like India (7.9 out of 10) and an ethnically homogenous country as Bangladesh (8.9 out of 10). These scores are the result of polarisation within society and the difficulties faced by the state in containing them due to a weakness in integrating different groups. Similarly, this trend is reflected also by the Factionalised Elites indicator, in which five out of eight South Asian countries score above 9. Pakistan and the Failed States Index Another regional problem seems to be a lack of legitimacy of and confidence in the state structures. All countries in South Asia with the exception of India, which has an established democratic system, and Bhutan, score 7.9 or higher out of 10. This trend is influenced by corruption which is a widespread phenomenon across the region, and by the fact that many South Asian states have experienced changes within their political systems and thus lack established structures. Challenges in protecting Human Rights also seem to be present on the regional level. Of the eight South Asian countries considered here, four show poor results in this respect, scoring 8.2 or worse, while only India and Bangladesh score under 7. The traditional kinship and tribal structures which challenge the authority of the states and undermine the protection of human rights are not an exclusively Pakistani feature; they are also common in other stat6es across the region. Even India, although scoring best in the region, still lags with 5.8 behind other established democracieswhich mostly reach scores of around 5. What Pakistan means for Failed States Index A closer look at Pakistan's score in the 2012 Failed States Index highlights how the Brain Drain indicator’s results are the consequence of an external and extraneous variables, while the Demographic Pressures and Refugees & IDPs indicator improvements are related to extraneous factors like the lack of floods of the same scale as the ones in 2010. It does not reflect a substantial effort by the Pakistani government to deal effectively with the problem. Being antecedent to the recent developments within the Pakistani institutions, the result of the Legitimacy of the State indicator is somewhat outdated, and thus encounters difficulties in highlighting the current situation. Rumours like the ISI sponsoring of supposedly popular political movements, mainly the Pakistan Tehreek‐e‐Insaaf, have not been ...
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