Mayhew%202%20Fall%2008 - Mayhew – Designing an...

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Unformatted text preview: Mayhew – Designing an Institution an Institution POLS 4600 Dr. Crespin Crespin Collective Collective Action Problem and Incentives for Party Formation Three Three members of Congress • A, B, C Three Three bills • X, Y, Z Different Different values of “utility” for each for bill bill • Zero utility if bill fails Collective Collective Action Problem and Incentives for Party Formation Bill Legislator A B C X 5 2 -8 Y 2 -8 5 Z -8 5 2 Vote Vote on X, what happens? X wins, 2-1 because A and B vote for it it Payoffs Payoffs A=5, B=2, C=-8 C=• (5,2,-8) ,- Collective Collective Action Problem and Incentives for Party Formation Bill Legislator A B C X 5 2 -8 Y 2 -8 5 Z -8 5 2 Vote Vote on Y, what happens? Y wins, 2-1 because A and C vote for it it Payoffs (2,Payoffs (2,-8,5) Collective Collective Action Problem and Incentives for Party Formation Bill Legislator A B C X 5 2 -8 Y 2 -8 5 Z -8 5 2 Vote Vote on Z, what happens? Z wins, 2-1 because B and C vote for it it Payoffs (Payoffs (-8,5,2) Collective Collective Action Problem and Incentives for Party Formation Bill Legislator A B C X 5 2 -8 Y 2 -8 5 Z -8 5 2 Total Total payout if X, Y and Z pass Payoff: (-1,-1,-1) ,- ,- Collective Collective Action Problem and Incentives for Party Formation Bill Legislator A B C X 5 2 -8 Y 2 -8 5 Z -8 5 2 What What if nothing passes? Payoff: (0,0,0) (0 Pareto Pareto Optimal – no one can be made better better off Collective Collective Action Problem and Incentives for Party Formation Bill Legislator A B C X 5 2 -8 Y 2 -8 5 Z -8 5 2 What What not form parties? A and B decide as a party to only vote yes and on on X A has the incentive to defect on Y and also vote yes Prisoner’s Dilemma Prisoner Dilemma Two Two players are arrested for committing committing a crime Each Each are held in different rooms • Can’t talk to each other Given Given two choices • Cooperate – keep quiet • Defect – squeal on their partner squeal Prisoner’s Dilemma Prisoner Dilemma Player 2 Player 1 Cooperate Defect Cooperate (3,3) (4,1) Defect (1,4) (2,2) Values Values are still utility • First number is player 1’s utility, second is player player 2’s Each Each player picks depend on what the other other player will do. Prisoner’s Dilemma Prisoner Dilemma Player 2 Player 1 Cooperate Defect Cooperate (3,3) (4,1) Defect (1,4) (2,2) Player Player 1 – if player 2 cooperates, what should he do? Defect Defect •4>3 Prisoner’s Dilemma Prisoner Dilemma Player 2 Player 1 Cooperate Defect Cooperate (3,3) (4,1) Defect (1,4) (2,2) Player Player 1 – if player 2 defects, what should he do? Defect Defect •4>3 Prisoner’s Dilemma Prisoner Dilemma Player 2 Player 1 Cooperate Defect Cooperate (3,3) (4,1) Defect (1,4) (2,2) Player Player 2 – if player 1 cooperates, what should she do? Defect Defect •4>3 Prisoner’s Dilemma Prisoner Dilemma Player 2 Player 1 Cooperate Defect Cooperate (3,3) (4,1) Defect (1,4) (2,2) Player Player 2 – if player 1 defects, what should she do? Defect Defect •2>1 Prisoner’s Dilemma Prisoner Dilemma Player 2 Player 1 Cooperate Defect Cooperate (3,3) (4,1) Defect (1,4) (2,2) Final Final Outcome – Both defect Prisoner’s Dilemma Prisoner Dilemma Player 2 Player 1 Cooperate Defect Cooperate (3,3) (4,1) Defect (1,4) (2,2) Best Best outcome – both cooperate Back to Mayhew Back to Mayhew… Part Part 1 Members Members are only interested in reelection reelection Activities Activities • Advertising • Credit Claiming • Position Taking Processes and Policies Processes and Policies First structural First – structural units • Offices, committees, parties Second functions Second – functions of Congress Third Third – Institutional Maintenance Fourth Fourth – Comparative look Fifth Reform Fifth - Reform Structure Structure The The organization of Congress meets remarkably remarkably well the needs of its members members Satisfying Satisfying electoral needs is not zero zero-sum • As long as members don’t attack each other, everybody wins other everybody Offices Offices 535 535 offices, each with its own staff • Washington staff Chief Chief of staff, legislative director, press secretary, legislative assistants, constituent staff • District staff District District Director, constituent workers, field representative, representative, scheduler Incumbency Incumbency Advantage – everyone gets an office and some staff ff Help Help with advertising and credit claiming Committees Committees House House • 20 standing committees Prestige Rules, • Prestige – Rules, Appropriations, Ways and and Means (Tax) • Constituent – Agriculture, Transportation and Infrastructure Senate Senate • 14 Standing Committees • Prestige – Appropriations, Finance Committees Committees Most Most work is done in committees After After bills are submitted, they go to a committee committee Members Members “mark up” bill, amend it etc. in sub and full committee Have Have hearings on relevant issues by experts experts Committees Committees Committees Committees are good for position taking taking • Ex. HUAC, Foreign Relations, Education HUAC Foreign Education and and Labor Also Also good for credit claiming • Public Works, Interior, Appropriations, Transportation Ways Transportation, Ways and Mean • This is called “distributive” politics Committees Committees Provides Provides a division of labor • Allows members to specialize Small Small groups so individuals are important – especially chairs • Lobbied by interest groups Can Can credibly claim credit Committees Committees Seniority most Seniority – most senior member of majority majority party gets to be chair Property Property right – Once a member is on a committee, cannot be taken off itt Parties Parties How How could parties work? Take everything away from minority • Too much to lose Act as strong teams Act • Members need to be able to take the right positions, not pass party programs Parties Parties “…the best service a party can supply to to its congressmen is a negative one; it it can leave them alone.” Mayhew Mayhew sees little party pressure • Conflicts with members’ goals No No admission standards – anyone can be a Democrat or Republican Consequences Consequences With With reelection goals and institutions set set up the way they are, what are the policy consequences? Possibilities Possibilities • Lots of legislation with particularized benefits • Servicing of the organized • Symbolic legislation Please Please one audience with legislation for another another Consequences Consequences If If everyone focused on electoral goals, goals, how does Congress survive? • Institutional Maintenance Problem Three Three categories • Allocation – who gets what All • Economy – short and long term • Spending and Taxes Solution Solution “Hire” someone to do the work Hire someone Members need some sort of selective incentive incentive to do the work Paid in institutional power and Paid prestige Solution Solution Pr Prestige Committees Co • Hard to get on, lots of work, but lots of reward Rules Rules • Scheduling for pet projects Keep Keep the trains running on time Appropriations Appropriations • Money for pet projects Keep Keep spending trimmed Ways Ways and Means • Special Tax Provisions Keep Keep tax plan sound Reform Reform Give Give Power to the President Strengthen Strengthen Political Parties • Runs counter to reform to date • Reed Rules and Speaker Cannon “open” “open” political process Reform Campaign Finance Reform ...
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This note was uploaded on 04/16/2009 for the course POLS 4600 taught by Professor Staff during the Fall '08 term at University of Georgia Athens.

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