This preview shows pages 1–3. Sign up to view the full content.
This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.View Full Document
Unformatted text preview: Collective Action Study Guide Pol S 270 Study Guide POL S 270 Collective Action & Institutional Design (including lecture & Anderson & Hill) The following study guide is to be used in conjunction with the readings, lectures and section discussions. Their purpose is to facilitate the learning process, not substitute for it. Some of the terms and questions presented in this study guide will not be discussed directly in class; they can only be found in the readings. Also, some of the questions dont have definitive answers but are presented to stimulate your thinking. Important Terms Define and identify the significance of each of the following terms: From lecture: paradox of cooperation game theory prisoners dilemma assurance game public (collective) good nonuniqueness non-excludability jointness of supply time horizons externalities (negative & positive) tragedy (dilemma) of the commons negative sum / positive sum games From Anderson & Hills The Not So Wild, Wild West : property rights institutions frontier rent * rent seeking transaction costs rent dissipation agency costs collectives contracts economies of scale principle of first possession preemption rights cattlemens associations homesteading / Homestead Acts Sooners amenity values residual claimancy Hernando de Soto * Note: Prof. Gill will have a slightly different definition of rent, albeit one that is consistent with Anderson & Hill. Collective Action Study Guide Pol S 270 Short Questions The following questions are designed to help you think more critically about the readings and lectures. We may or may not discuss them in class. They may or may not appear as exam questions. In any event, think your way through these questions and realize that many of the questions do not have a right answer. Why might individuals pursuing their own self-interest lead to sub-optimal social outcomes? What does this say about Adam Smiths invisible hand, wherein the pursuit of self-interest is considered the most efficient method of maximizing total social welfare? How do public goods fit into this? What type of group is more likely to produce a public (collective) good without the use of coercion or selective inducements: a large group; a small heterogeneous group; or a small homogenous group? Why? Even in such cases when coercion and selective incentives are not needed, will the optimal amount of the collective good be supplied? Explain. Consider the lighthouse example used in class. To what extent do these lighthouses represent a public good? To what extent does a political (hierarchy- based) solution need to be found for the provision of lighthouses? Might a private (market) solution be more feasible? Why? (Historical note: The lighthouse example is the focus of a classic debate in political economy. Paul Samuelson used lighthouses as an example of a pure public good in his often-used introductory economics textbook. In 1974, Ronald Coase wrote an article challenging this example and pointed out numerous examples in Britain where...
View Full Document
This note was uploaded on 05/20/2008 for the course POLS 270 taught by Professor Anthonygill during the Spring '08 term at University of Washington.
- Spring '08
- Political Economy