Problem_Set_7_Solutions

Problem_Set_7_Solutions - Kaushik Basu Spring 2008 Econ 367...

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Kaushik Basu Spring 2008 Econ 367 Game-Theoretic Methods Problem Set 7 1. Consider the extensive-form game described below. 2 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 A B C D 2 x 2 y L R 1 w (a) Describe this game as a normal-form (or strategic-form) game. (b) Locate all the Nash equilibria (in pure strategies) of this game. Which of these equilibria are subgame perfect? (c) What do you think the players would play in this game? Give a brief (no more than three or four sentences) explanation for your answer. (a) A, C A, D B, C B, D L 2, 2 2, 2 1, 1 1, 1 R 1, 1 4, 1 1, 1 4, 1 (b) The players’ best responses for each player are highlighted. And the pure strategy Nash Equilibria are: {(L, (A,C)), (R, (A,D)), (R, (B,C)), (R, (B,D))} In order to test if a NE is subgame perfect, we must show that the strategies are NE in every possible subgame (even those that will never be reached). The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is (L, (A,C)) and (R, (A,D)). (c) For this you need to say what you think and why.
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This note was uploaded on 05/31/2008 for the course ECON 3670 taught by Professor Basu during the Spring '08 term at Cornell.

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Problem_Set_7_Solutions - Kaushik Basu Spring 2008 Econ 367...

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