Kant2 - Kant : Second Analogy RZMKTZ @ For : Prof. J .C....

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Unformatted text preview: Kant : Second Analogy RZMKTZ @ For : Prof. J .C. Morrison PH1312F - Kant 389316420 The pure concepts of the understanding serve none other than human knowledge as they are applied to experience. The categories are rules by which the understanding brings the "synthesis of a manifold" p161* to the "unity of apperception” p161, that is to a human consciousness. The "material of knowledge" 11161, the "intuition", is given by the object as appearance to sensibility. The manifold given in sensible intuition is determined by one of the logical functions of judgment, that is, one of the categories so that as "a single empirical intuition" p161 the manifold can be brought into on consciousness. "The manifold given in a sensible intuition is necessarily subject to the original synthetic unity of apperception, because in no other way is the unity of intuition possible" p160. And it is by way of he categories that "unity enters into the intuition" p161. The principles essentially teach judgment how to bring appearances under the concepts of understanding. Kant points out that his chief concern is with synthetic as opposed to analytic judgments. He is concerned with drawing connection between appearances rather than merely explicating a subject from At the heart of the principles is the faculty of judgment which will distinguish "Whether something does or does not stand under a given rule" p161. The rules for judgment would be supplied, decided Kant, not by General Logic, the logic of analytic judgment, but by Transcendental Logic. Drawing from the table of pure concepts of understanding Kant drew up the table of principles. The four titles of principles that he arrived at are (1) Axioms of Intuition, (2) Anticipations of Perception, (3) Analogies of experience and (4) Posnilates of Empirical Thought The first two he described as principles of "mathematical employment" p197 While the last two * All page references are to Immanuel Kant, Critiguj of Pure m trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan and 00., 1950). he described as principles of "dynamical employment" p197. While all four principles of understanding would lead to certainty the manner in which they would do so difl'ers. The first two titles employed intuitive means of arriving at certainty, hence the mathematical description. The last two employed "discursive" means, hence the dynamical description. Both will possess a priori certainty but while the first two will possess apodeictic certainty the last two will have recourse to "the condition of empirical thought in some experience” p196. The section of text I will be attempting to explicate is drawn from the third of the four titles, namely the Analogies of Experience. The principles are concerned only with the existence and relationships of appearances. All of which stands on a necessary relation to time as their determining factor. The first type of principle refers to appearances as they relate to their intuition, that is, to their representation in space or time. The second type of principle, the other principle of mathematical employment, refers to perception, that is, sensation in empirical intuition. The third type of principle, The Analogies of Experience, relate to the three modes of time. Each analogy attempts to draw from experience a "rule according to which a unity of experience may arise from perception" p211. The rule is drawn on the basis of "qualitative" rather than “quantitative relationship" p211. What is arrived at. "are merely regulative principles" p211, in that they do not consuuct. their object but justify the combining of the appearances. This combining according to the rules of the analogies yields the unity of experience, the unity of empirical knowledge. The three modes of time, writes Kant, are duration, succession and coexistence. In the first analogy, relating to duration, Kant places unchanging substance, the permanent, in the position of substratum underlying all change. All descriptions of change which involve a segmenting of time make sense insofar as they stand in relation to that which stands for all time as permanent. In much the same way as we need something to stand still in order to experience motion so the permanent must underlie change if we are to make sense of it. According to this analogy every change emerges from somewhere; there is never a void. And thus does Kant arrive at the second analogy of experience which states that "all alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect" p218. What is involved here is a "connection of two perceptions in time" p213. The connection, an act of the mind or cognition, is the "product of a synthetic faculty of imagination which detennines inner sense in respect of the time relation" p218. If one looks at naked apprehension of the manifold of appearance there is always an awareness of succession. All appearance is in time, wrote Kant, and so too are all our perceptions of those appearances. Each perception is preceded by a perception in the field of appearance. There is never a coming into being of a thing from nothing. Apprehension is always successive. What is it in appearance, asks Kant, that "contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension" p220, this connection in time. The designated section begins with the statement that an event, a coming into being of something, I'cannot be perceived empirically" p220 unless an appearance which does not contain that something in it precedes it. Empty time cannot be perceived. For an appearance not to precede an event would be to posit empty time in its place empty time, which could not happen in the order of apprehension. Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception hat follows upon another perception. Kant at this point draws our attention to the fact that the order of mere succession in an apprehension does not offer up a rule to determine the order of an event. The mere apprehension of an event does not distinguish the particular apprehension with which we are concerned from other apprehensions in the field of appearance. Kant makes a distinction betWeen two representations. The first representation is a house. In this representation the successive apprehension of the manifold of appearances occurs in arbitrary order. In this example there is no Sign of the rule which will determine our successive apprehension. In the second representation a boat floats down river. In this representation my perception of the appearance follows a particular order according to a rule contained in the order of the appearances in succession. The House example. The manifold in the appearance of a house is apprehended successively. Each perception at successive times are the representations. All representations taken together is the appearance and it is this appearance, the house, which is the object of the successive apprehensions or representations. HoweVer the order of the perCeptions of the house is completely arbitrary, in that1 in my perception of the house where I begin perceiving does not affect the connection of the manifold empirically. The manifold of appearances does not demand a specific order of apprehension. The purpose of the house example is to illustrate that mere succession Will prove nothing with respect to "the manner in which the manifold is connected in the object" p222. For in this example the "objective succession of appearances" p222 is equally as arbitrary as the "subjective succession of apprehension" p222. In Kant's example of the boat floating down the river arbitrary succession is anything but the case. The boat at position-time precedes in my perception the boat perceived further down the river at RT. . In this example the "objective succession of appearances" demonsn'ates a “necessary order" p221 which determines by the rule it contains the order in Which my perceptions Will follow each other. The "subjective succession of apprehension" with this example is derived, says Kant, from the "objective succession of appearances". What is here realized is that in an event, that is, in any occurrence in time, any change, there is contained in it a rule which makes the successive order of both appearances and apprehensions a necessary order. This is to say that the order of apprehensions will derive from the "order of the manifold of appearance; in conformity with a rule" p221. That rule is later drawn from he concept of cause. It is “that everything which happens has a cause" p224. Kant insists that we recognize that we do not ascribe succession to just any object unless we are compelled to do so by an "underlying rule" p224. It is this very rule which makes the "representation of succession in an object" p224 possible. Without the rule the experience of the object is indistinguishable from the "subjecn've sequence in our apprehension" p224. ...
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This note was uploaded on 06/12/2008 for the course PHI 312F taught by Professor Morrison during the Winter '97 term at University of Toronto- Toronto.

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Kant2 - Kant : Second Analogy RZMKTZ @ For : Prof. J .C....

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