philosophy week 10, 11

philosophy week 10, 11 - Week 10"What am I Who am I...

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Week 10: "What am I & Who am I: Philosophical Anthropology" I. Philosophical Anthropology a. Substance Dualism : there is a body (material ) and then there is an immaterial subject (soul, spirit) with conscious states – feelings, sensations, thoughts, desires, intentional choices (beliefs) – which are had by an immaterial subject – the self (ego, I, soul); historical, commonsense view b. Physicalism : a human being is just a physical thing through and through (body and brain ) c. Consciousness : characterized by the having of certain mental states (MS): i. Sensation : a state of awareness of mental states such as sounds, pains, visual perception ( e.g., being aware of a high pitched sound; so in having of a sensation, being conscious is presumed) 1. Emotions are a subclass of sensations as they are a state of awareness of mental states in a certain kind of way ( e.g., sadness, happiness, excitement) 2. Ex : Sensation: feeling pain in the knee 3. Ex : Emotion: feeling sad about the memory of a scrapped knee ii. Thought : mental content expressible by a proposition 1. Ex : The knee bone is connected to the thigh bone. iii. Belief : a person's view of how things are 1. Ex : There are good looking knees and ugly ones; that the knee bone is connected to … iv. Desire : a certain felt inclination to do, have or experience certain things 1. Ex : Wanting to itch one's knee v. Act of will : a choice to act in a certain way for a particular purpose 1. Ex : Moving one's body knee-jerkily II. Dualist arguments that show mental states/properties/events are different from physical ones a. MS are not identical to PS i. Pleasurableness – some sensations are pleasurable/unpleasurable; PS are not so characterized 1. Ex: a cut in the knee (PS) is not unpleasurable; the event it causes (MS: viz., being in pain) is unpleasurable 2. Note: Too fine a distinction? Two reasons why not (and another distinction!): ii. Familiarity – MS have the property of "being familiar to" the subject ( e.g., a desk, a town) which are not had be PS (e.g., simply recognizing a desk or town) b. The Knowledge Argument (Mary didn't know) i. Thought-experiment: Suppose a scientist blind from birth (Mary) knows all the physical facts related to the act of seeing; later, Mary gains the ability to see; she gains knowledge of new facts which she did not previously have; these facts cannot be physical ; the must be mental c. Functional dependence is not identity i. Because one thing depends upon another does not
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