philosophy week 10, 11

philosophy week 10, 11 - Week 10"What am I Who am I...

Info iconThis preview shows pages 1–2. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
I. Philosophical Anthropology a. Substance Dualism : there is a body (material ) and then there is an immaterial subject (soul, spirit) with conscious states – feelings, sensations, thoughts, desires, intentional choices (beliefs) – which are had by an immaterial subject – the self (ego, I, soul); historical, commonsense view b. Physicalism : a human being is just a physical thing through and through (body and brain ) c. Consciousness : characterized by the having of certain mental states (MS): i. Sensation : a state of awareness of mental states such as sounds, pains, visual perception ( e.g., being aware of a high pitched sound; so in having of a sensation, being conscious is presumed) 1. Emotions are a subclass of sensations as they are a state of awareness of mental states in a certain kind of way ( e.g., sadness, happiness, excitement) 2. Ex : Sensation: feeling pain in the knee 3. Ex : Emotion: feeling sad about the memory of a scrapped knee ii. Thought : mental content expressible by a proposition 1. Ex : The knee bone is connected to the thigh bone. iii. Belief : a person's view of how things are 1. Ex : There are good looking knees and ugly ones; that the knee bone is connected to … iv. Desire : a certain felt inclination to do, have or experience certain things 1. Ex : Wanting to itch one's knee v. Act of will : a choice to act in a certain way for a particular purpose 1. Ex : Moving one's body knee-jerkily II. Dualist arguments that show mental states/properties/events are different from physical ones a. MS are not identical to PS i. Pleasurableness – some sensations are pleasurable/unpleasurable; PS are not so characterized 1. Ex: a cut in the knee (PS) is not unpleasurable; the event it causes (MS: viz., being in pain) is unpleasurable 2. Note: Too fine a distinction? Two reasons why not (and another distinction!): ii. Familiarity – MS have the property of "being familiar to" the subject ( e.g., a desk, a town) which are not had be PS (e.g., simply recognizing a desk or town) b. The Knowledge Argument (Mary didn't know) i. Thought-experiment: Suppose a scientist blind from birth (Mary) knows all the physical facts related to the act of seeing; later, Mary gains the ability to see; she gains knowledge of new facts which she did not previously have; these facts cannot be physical ; the must be mental c. Functional dependence is not identity i. Because one thing depends upon another does not mean it is identical with the other ii. MS seem to depend on PS; but this does not make
Background image of page 1

Info iconThis preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full DocumentRight Arrow Icon
Image of page 2
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

This note was uploaded on 07/14/2008 for the course PHIL 214 taught by Professor Park during the Spring '08 term at Biola University.

Page1 / 4

philosophy week 10, 11 - Week 10"What am I Who am I...

This preview shows document pages 1 - 2. Sign up to view the full document.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
Ask a homework question - tutors are online