GT-midterm-2008-answer

GT-midterm-2008-answer - ECON 601 Midterm(April 28 Monday...

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ECON 601 Midterm (April 28, Monday) Please write down all your answers in the distributed books. Be precise and concise. Please make your handwriting eligible. Good luck! 1. (30 points) A two player game is described by the following matrix: Player 1 Player 2 L C R T 1, 1 0, 0 2, 2 M 3, 2 0, 1 1, 1 B 2, 2 1, 1 3, 0 a) (10 points) For each player, f nd the strictly dominated strategies, if there is any? For player 1, T is strictly dominated; for player 2, C is strictly dominated. b) (10 points) Find the strategies that survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies (IDSDS). M and L are the strategies that survive IDSDS. c) (10 points) Find all Nash equilibria of this game. The unique Nash equilibrium of this game is: (M, L). 2. (30 points) There are 5 hunters in a village. Each hunter decides simultaneously whether to hunt for turkey individually or hunt for boar as a team. Hunters are di f erent in their ability in hunting for turkey. For hunter A, B, C, D, and E, their payo f swhen
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This note was uploaded on 07/17/2008 for the course ECON 601 taught by Professor Yang during the Spring '08 term at Ohio State.

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GT-midterm-2008-answer - ECON 601 Midterm(April 28 Monday...

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