This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.
This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.
Unformatted text preview: 53 CHAPTER2 - MO make one with another, an
of nature. The promises an
betWeen the two men .111
Swiss and an Indian, in
binding to them, though
of nature in reference
keeping of faith belong to
members of soctety. state of nature, I . RY SELECTIONS
RALTHLO lves what to d0 0? not to agreemeilt 33:33:? file not by ourselves suf»
d0": bill orgdrnish ourselves with competent stor:1
£10131} t0 needful for such a life as our nature dot
(dfesiiilen—g: life ﬁt for the dignity of man~‘;l;1e::e::::
to supply those defects and unperfsietizrisehes we
in us as living single and solely y_ dfeﬁow_ , lly induced to seek communion an 'ﬁn
3“? “all? thers‘ this was the cause of men s uni g
:IEEnYdlve: at dist in politic societies”-—but I more- ' that state,
1 men are naturally in
WC! afﬁrm that 31 own consents they make (1 yet still be in the state
d bargains for truck, etc.,
Soldania, in or between a
the woods of America, are they are perfectly in a state to one another. For truth and men as men, and “0‘3 as extremes of extravagance and stinginess. work of Aristotle. ' CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GO OD will not only oppose the
ookerr—(Eccl. Pol., . ., _ , , - ,uu by theit . . - . . - of the JuchCiOUSEI which have been hitherto and remain SO mbel‘S o f some polltlc somety, and _1 The good IS the end of action. where he Says, .The laws f nature “do bind men themselvesme e uel of this discoursﬂ, to make it mentioned,” i.e., the laws 0 although they have doubt not, In the S q that us return once again to the good we are absolutely, even a
never any settled f / 5 they are men, lear.
ellowship, and nev very c okrng for, and consider just what it could be,
Vit is apparently one thing in one action or
and another thing in another; for it is one
in medicine, another in generalship, and so
he rest. a then, is the good in each of these cases?
t-rs that for the sake of which the other things
,- and in medicine this is health, in general—
to y', in house-building a house, in another
thing else, but in every action and decision
_ since it is for the sake of the end that
he other things. there is some end of everything that is er any solemn READING QUESTIONS 1. [Explain i yolll 0W“ Wnltl‘l [ha idea (If a natulal “gill.
2 1“ Elddltlﬂn t3 the lights to hfe! heaith, llbelty, and POSSESSIOIL this selection? what rights does Locke discuss in DISCUSSION QUESTIONS g that there are natural rights, mentioned by Locke in our are they any such rights not , Assumin , t natu- -. . . .
1 selection? . llaw concgpﬁon of morality. Does Locke s appeal 0 __on, this Will be the good pursued in
2. Both Aquinas and Loeke aﬁeﬁghﬁtl]; theory that is lacking in AqumaS? if th e are more ends than one, these will ral rights add anything tOt pursued in action.
as progressed, then, to the same
efére, that the highest end is the must try to clarify this still more. ,, M_WWMWWAMW “’ .
WW rently there are many ends, we m', e.g., wealth, ﬂutes and, in
because of something else; It the history of philosophy: .- d
heart Ethics, in which Aristotle.
- ity in accordan de a tremendous impact 0 ‘ti 5 of Aristotle have ma . - ' h mac
The Thin ngd o The followmg selection is froln MC. 0 1 a life of activ
contll‘llle to O S ' happy or good life essentially invo ves begins by arguing that a ARISTOTLE - Virtue and Character 59 with virtue. He then goes on to deﬁne virtue as a disposition to avoid extremes in feeling and
action. For example, in matters relating to money, the virtue of generosity stands between the Recommended Reading: See virtue ethics, chap. l, sec. 2E, for a presentation of a con-
temporary version of a virtue—based account of right and wrong action that is inspired by the Hence, if only one end is complete, this will be what
we are looking for; and if more than one are com“
plete, the most complete of these will be what we
are looking for. CRITERIA FOR COMPLETENESS An end pursued in itself, we say, is more complete
than an end pursued because of something else; and
an end that is never choiceworthy because of some-
thing else is more complete than ends that are choice-
worthy both in themselves and because of this end;
and hence an end that is always [choiceworthy, and
also] choiceworthy in itself, never because of some-
thing else, is unconditionally complete. 3. Happiness meets the criteria for completeness, but other goods do not. Now happiness more than anything else seems
unconditionally complete, since we always [choose it,
and also] choose it because of itself, never because of
something else. Honor, pleasure, understanding and
every virtue we certainly choose because of them—
selves, since we would choose each of them even if it
had no further result, but we also choose them for the
sake of happiness, supposing that through them we
shall be happy. Happiness, by contrast, no one ever
chooses for their sake, or for the sake of anything
else at all. 60 CH AFTER 2 - 4. The good is self— The same conclusion [that h also appears to
Now what we con
sufﬁces for a solitary
isolated life, but w
dren, wife and in general
izens, since a human being
and children’s child
shall go on without another time
Anyhow, we regard something as self-sufﬁcient their functions and ac
when all by itself it makes a life choiceworthy and lacle none, and is by nature idle, without
ing nothing; and that is what we think happiness does. just as eye, hand, foot and, in g
part apparently has its functio
worthy; so is happiness. ascribe to a human being some
of theirs? 5. The good is most choice Moreover, [the compl
and] we think happiness goods, since it is not many. If it Were co
clearly, we think th
goods would make it
smallest good] that is
tity of goods
rial good], an
choiceworthy. [But w
make happiness more
plete and self—su MORALTHEO seems to be self— for friends an mall. Here,__ however, We
or if we extend the goo
ten and to
limit; but we must ex ete good is mos
is most choic
counted as one
tinted as one amon
at the addition of
more choiceworthy; added becomes an extra [so creating a good larger than the origi- d the larger of two
e do not t choiceworthy; he sufﬁcient,- so is happiness. goods en, is apparently s
fﬁcient, since it is things pursued in action. A clearer account cf the g activity expressing virtue. best good is. d fellow-cit— is a naturally political
must impose some
d to parents’ parents
friends of friends, we t choiceworthy,
eworthy of all RY SELECTIONS
i. lfsomething has afunction, its 9 for amine this good among
g many, then, the smallest of for [the
quan~ is always more hink any addition can nce it is most omething com-
the end of the cod: the human soul’s Then do the carpenter and function.
appiness is complete]
follow from self~sufﬁciency, since the Well, perhaps we shall find the best
sufﬁcient. ﬁnd the function of a human being.
nt as self—sufﬁcient is not what good, i.e., [doing] well, for a ﬂautist, a
person by himself, living an and every craftsman, and, in ge
hat suffices also for parents, chil— has a function and [characteris
depend on its function, the same seem a human being, if a hum function. th
tions, w 3. The humanfunction. this be‘? For living is apparent What, then, could shared with plants, but what special function of a human
and growth. The life n set aside the life of nutrition in order is som this too is appare
animal. The remaini of life of action of
reason. Clarification cf Now this [par
ferent ways], one as
part], the othe
[We intend both] Moreo
two ways [as capa
take [a human being’
activity, since this seem extent. hile a human being has
any function? 0r, .-
eneral, every [bodily]. e sort of life of
ntly shared, with
ng possibility, the [part of the soul r‘has reason” and “lyre.” thas two parts, whichhav
obeying the reason [in
r as itself having reason an city and as activity], an _
s special function to ood depends on its good. if we ﬁrst
For just as the
neral, for whatever tic] action, seems to s to be true
an being has some 2. What sorts tjthings havejunctions? e leatherworker have us, may We likew we are looking for is t
being; hence we sho__ sense-perception
horse, on and :1 th ver, life is also spok, s to be calledlif functions besides all-- 4. The ho '
man good 15 activity expressing virtue (a) We have found then that
is the S u ,H ' ' , ‘ , the human functi
havmg (33,133: Iaptiovlitlye (:lllilprtezxpresses reason [as itsgff
‘eas - '
flpptgpieN'owl the function of F, :ngififozlf‘liydgisleik
excellent 11:11 and, so we say, as the function of ,a:
:13 true ”Mani-gt? an excellent harpist. (c) The same
:‘the function t}: 1onally in every case, when we add to
he Viﬂue. for e Superior achievement that expresses
_ . ’ and}, Didalllpmt' 3 function, e.g., is to play the
fake the ghum arpist s is to do it well. (d) Now
f6 and take thighliigiriction to be a certain kind of
_ that exprmq r e to be the soul’s activity and
Keenan eason. (cl [Hence by (c) and (d)]
D E 1:Iifan s functlon is to do this ﬁnely and
.1. 011a; l:nction is completed well when its
dy-(e) . p1 sses the proper virtue. (g) Therefore
.- ._ an _ (1‘)] the human good turns out
5 actrvrty that expresses virtue. to be ood'must also be complete rebzp Eggnvmws than one, the good will
. .- ost complete virtue. Moreover
a complete hfe. For one swallow does nof
Sg III-t0; does one day; nor, similarly, does
__ . _ me make us blessed and happy. ' HARACTER 1N (lgéharacter .0. sorts, virtue of thought and vir-
of thought arises and grows
and hence needs experience
aracter [i.e., of ethos] results
: . its name “ethica ,“I slightly Anisr ' ‘ '
011.}: o Virtue and Character 61 Virtue co
mes about, not by a process of nature
, but by habituation. Hence it is a} so clear that no .
. - . ne of .
actei arlses Hi us naturally the Virtues 0f Char" 1' . I’Vhar is natural
. cannot be ch
by habituation. angled For if s ' '
habitu‘rjlﬁt())r1rliethmg is 'by nature [in one condition]
Stone 6 lpannot bring it into another condition A:
aﬁon,m.gi;1 y nature moves downwards and hab't
you threu .not make it move upwards, not eve1 uf
_, n "
“or COUlC\itvhitbt'ip ten thousand times to habituate i
bring a the :tuation make ﬁre move downward 1 ’
ny mg that is b n ' S, or
, atUI ' ' '
anather condition. y e in one condition Into
Thus the virtu ' '
. . es arise in us neith
a 11m . er b natur
t139:1“s:mr(iialtu1e,hbut we are by nature abljd to achriii:
, eac our complete perfection through habit 2. ' '
Natural CCIPCICIEIBS are not acquired Ely habituatirm, Further if someth' '
, mg arises in u b
hav . . s y nature, ‘
ﬂy entlliie-capamty for it, and later display thdv: if?“
no; ac :1 11: cigar in the case of the senses for wrfdvd
ahead; ha: theem byhfrequent seeing or hearing biit
. In w on we exercise , '
not \get them by exercising them d them, and dld
irt . ‘
crafts :esilby'contrast, we acquire, just as we acquit
learn ,a cyafpttpng prev1ously activated them For we
must pmd y producmg the same product that we
buﬂdﬂs sage 3hr: we have learned it becoming
, . ., y uilding and h ' ’
the bar . c arpists b 1a '
actionsp ,t as; also, then, we become just by doiangbfjiilsgt
b d . , perate by doing temperate acti
y omg brave actions. OHS, brave 3. L '
regulators concentrate on habituation What goes on in . . _ . - Cities 15 evide . . the 1 Bee for this a] ing tiiihlatm makes the Citizens gOOd by h:;£0r he fails ti) (End-m“ 15 the wish of every legislator-ail
. o it well he misses his goal. [The fight] 62 CHAPTERZ - MORALTHEt n is what makes the diffe habituatio
d a bad one. good political system an 4. Virtue and vice are formed by good and the case of a craft, Further, just as in
h virtue also ruin the harp makes bo
analogous in the case of builders building well makes goodbuilders, ones. If it were not so, no teacher Wou everyone would be born a go
It is the same, then, with the virtue dealings with [other] human
ple just, some unjust; actions in terrifying sit some brave and others co of situations involving app
or another sort of conduct in these si some people temperate and
ate and irascible. etites and anger; bituation. ion:The Importance ofHa Conclus To sum up, then, in a single accou
he repetition o acter] arises from [t
Hence We must display
ferences in these imply co
the states. It is not unimportant,
sort of habit or another, ri
it is very important, indeed all—
But our claims about habitu zle: How can we become the right act
rresponding d )RY SELECTiONS rence between a bad actions. means that develop eac it. For playing
th good and bad harpists, and it is and all the rest; for building badly, bad ld be needed, but od or a bad craftsman. s. For actions in beings make some peo—
nations and the acquired habit of fear or conﬁdence make
wardly. The same is true
for one tuations makes ,
gentle, others intemper- he mus nt'. A state [of Chara
f] similar activities. chance or by following someone else’s instructions.
To be a grammarian, then, we must both produce
something grammatical and produce it in the way in produces it, i.e., expressing which the grammarian
grammatical knowledge that is in us. Crafts versus Virtues. Second reply:
3 true of crafts is not
3 of a craft determine
pro- ny case what i Moreover, in a
the product true of virtues. For
by their own character whether they have been duced well; and so it sufﬁces that they are in the
right state when they have been produced. But for actions expressing virtue to be justly [and hen
themselves in ce well] it does n
the right state. Ra also be in the right state when he doel must know [that he is doing v end he must decide on them,
t also do them fro themselves; and, third,
ﬁrm and unchanging state.
As conditions for having a cr knowing itself. As a conditi count, except for the
however, the knowing coun
y a little, wher__ for having a virtue,
ther] for onl for nothing, or [ra
the other two conditions are very important, i
two condition done temperately or
ot sufﬁce that they are - '
ther, the agent must-_-_' ivities, since dif- ifferences in
then, to acquire one
ght from our youth; rather, impottant....
ation raise a puz- good without being good all-important. And these other achieved by the ate actions.
Hence actions do. But the just and te
does th who [merely] frequent doing of jus they are the sort that a just or also does them in ' t and tern are called just or temp temperate person
mperate person is notith
ese actions, but the on the way in which just or tem already?
However, someone might raise this puzzle “What people do them.
become just we must It is right, then, to say that a person come
in doing just actions and temperate f do you mean by saying that to ﬁrst do just actions and
ﬁrst do temperate actions musicians. In the same way
or temperate, we must already be j First reply: Conjormi But surely this is not s
is possible to produce something gr to become temperate we must ‘2' For if we do what is gram- st already be grammarians or
, then, if We do what is just ust or temperate.”
ty versus understanding. 0 even with the crafts, for it
aminatical by just fro
temperate actio becoming good P The many, hOWever, do u take refuge. in at
doing philosophy, an ns', for no one Virtue requires habituation, a ractice, not just theory. from failing to do them. nd their-gratel’ﬁq ot do thes _
guments, thinking. the
d that this is the wa crate __w_ excellent peg - 1316- In this thg . . -
who lis . Y die like a sick
of his £1652: lattentively t0 the doctor, but acts oieilrsion
not impmv (Eons. Such a course of treatment will
the inany’ e 6 State Of his body; any 1130113 than w'l] S Way Of doiii ' . 1 state of their souls. g Philomphy improve the A STATE INTERMEDIATE
BETWEEN TWO EXTREMES
. D INVOLVING DECISION, gs, capacities state . .,. )5. Next we in ' nu 1 ust exam Be :1: .131n1ce there are three conditions all? . _- ui'celings, ca a " .- must be one of these. P 01333 and StateSi eelm ' _ gjs) I inean appetite, anger fear conﬁ , y, ove hate, ion ' '1 , h .- _ . . . , ' ging, jealous ' al f:lzllz'itever implies pleasure or pain y, 1311335 61:: I meljm what we have when we are eo t ese feelings . . . —ca abl ' ry r. afraid or feeling pity. P e or, egg épug-1 what we have when we are Well
a ion to feelings If .. .. . ,e.g.,ourfe Ji 0 la 6 n
is" :k, we are badly off in relation t5 ___in ermediate, we are well off' and the other cases. , EXCE?S nor Vices are feelings. (a)
. eat or base in so far as we
es, not in so far as we have feel-
f1' praised nor blamed in so far
8:32:31: not praise the angry
.. , c not blame the per-
13 y‘:abutB only the person who
Hy. . ut we are praised or ave Virtues or vices. (c) We
put decision; but the virtues ARIST ‘ '
0TH; - Virtue and Character 63 are decisions ‘
. Oi some kl
- nd 01- [r th .
Sion. d B ' - , ’ a 31’] re uire d '_
are saddle Sides: 111 SD tar as we have 'feilingq 6C]
or Vices mOVed; but in so far as we have v: smWB
, We are said t . ‘ 1r es
' 0 be . .
than moved. In some condltlon rather Or a capacity , .. F 01‘ these r
. 63.30115; the Virt
either; . , L165 are not Ca ‘
bad in :Sff we are neither called g00d nofigiltlieg
Further wlliilleaivji are Simp 1y Capable of feeling:
5 ave Capaciti - .
nm b es by natur
c ecolne good or bad by Dature- e, We F10
ussed thIS before. , We haw,- dis- BUF a state If, then th ' ities the :evntues are neither feelings nor ca ac States And pillaging! possibility is that theyparf;
. ' * e a - Virtue 13, V6 said What the genus of The Differentia But we must . 533’ not only as W 13 a , e alread h -
state, but also what sort of state it is?i 3V6, that H V'
irtue and the Human Function It should be said then that US -, , every virtue ' ' '
Ifjun:::q:;;:j1lfhm a good state and to perfdlrlilrsietlidi:
and their ﬁlm;- evn‘tue of eyes, e.g., makes the eyes
see wen; and Sigiﬁipg excellent, because it makes us
the horse exec“ arly, the Virtue of a horse makes
at €81.14),ng m gut, and thereby good at gallopin
of the enem , r11f er and at standing steady in the fad:
Virtue Ofah 1ym‘mtliiis is true in every case, then the
makes a human beiZing Will likewise be the state that
his function wen. _ - . g good and makes him perform N 1‘ M H at.
11-19 [“116 ECG] 3t} and the 11430“ llel ”‘3 to US In BVBIyﬂllng CU “1111130118 and dl‘rlSlble We C6111 take
111016, “398 and equal, alltl edch 0‘1 thelll Ethel l“. the MORAL THEORY SELECTIONS
much and too little, and in both ways not well; but
" ' , about the [having these feelings
right things, towards the right peop ,
end, and in the right way, is the intermediate and condition, and this is proper to virtue. Similarly
excess, deﬁciency and the 64 CHAPTER 2 - to us', and the equal is some object itself or relative
cess and deﬁciency. intermediate between ex
By the intermediate in the object I mean what is equidistant from each extremity; this is one and the
same for everyone. But relative to us the intermediate best
is what is neither superﬂuous nor deﬁcient; this is not ' one, and is not the same for everyone.
If, e.g., ten are many and two are few, we take six as intermediate in the object, since it exceeds [two] and is exceeded [by ten] by an equal amount,
[four]; this is what is intermediate by numerical proportion. But;- that is not how We must take the intermediate that is relative to us. For if, e.g., ten pounds [of food] are a lot for someone to eat, and two pounds alittle, it does not follow that the trainer
will prescribe six, since this might also be either a
little or a lot for the person who is to take itifor
Milo [the athlete] a little, but for the beginner in
gymnastics a lot; and the same is true for running
wrestling. In this way every scientiﬁc expert
ency an and
d seeks and chooses avoids excess and deﬁci
what is intermediater—but intermediate relative to us, not in the object. Now virtueis concerne
in which excess and deﬁciency ar blame, while the intermediate con
and wins praise, which are both proper feature
virtue. Virtue, then, is a mean, in so far as i what is i...
View Full Document
- Fall '10
- Organic chemistry