notes_5 - Knowledge and its Limits Seminar Chapter 4:...

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Knowledge and its Limits Seminar Fall 2006 Roush 1 Chapter 4: Anti-Luminosity An illuminating way of schematizing the whole argument (following Weatherson): Gradual Change There is a series of cases, each very similar to adjacent cases, that starts with a case where C clearly obtains, and ends with a case where C clearly doesn’t obtain. Luminosity Whenever C obtains you can know it does. Safety Only safe beliefs count as knowledge, so whenever you can know that C obtains it obtains in all similar cases. Luminosity and safety imply Tolerance Whenever C obtains, C obtains in all similar cases. But tolerance is incompatible with gradual change. Some premise is wrong. Most of my discussion will focus on three things: Definition of luminosity (L) For every case α , if in α C obtains, then in α one is in a position to know that C obtains. The bridge principle, I i (I i ) If in α i one knows that one feels cold, then in α i+1 one feels cold. What is reliability ?— (TWR) Some kind of safety… Overarching questions for this chapter (non-expository points in bold): I. Is the definition of luminosity that TW uses weak enough and strong enough and correct enough to do the job? A. Is it weak enough, or could the internalist get by with a weaker claim and swallow that there are no luminous states? E.g., coziness (see Hawthorne, and connects with C. and III. below) or other claim in which only some cases of a state are claimed to be accessible (cf. Conee’s Severe Pain and Paradigm Pain).
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Knowledge and its Limits Seminar Fall 2006 Roush 2 B. Is it strong enough? We want the internalist accessibility claim that is going to turn out to be false not to be true for knowledge of the external world. (Connects with II. below because it can turn out not-shown-to-be-false for the external world either for certain notions of reliability.) C. Is luminosity a useful target? That is, was the claim that the internal world is more accessible than the external world really the claim that with the internal world unlike with the external world we had perfect resolution? (No.) If not then the argument would seem to be irrelevant. However, what then was the internalist’s claim? (See Hawthorne, Conee.) For one thing the internal seems more accessible because it’s “closer in” and “mine”. These seem to me different ideas from “home”, so they might be useful ways of thinking of how to reformulate internalism. II. Is the definition of reliability that he uses weak enough and strong enough and correct enough to do the job? Its job is underwriting the bridge principle, I i . A. Safety . (S’s belief in p wouldn’t be false in worlds nearby (similar to) the one she believes it in.) α i+1 is similar to α i so if S knows she feels cold in α i then, by safety, if she believes it in α i+1 it must be true. That she does believe it in α i+1 doesn’t follow from knowledge requiring safety. Williamson thinks he can help himself to that as an independent part of the
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notes_5 - Knowledge and its Limits Seminar Chapter 4:...

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