notes_9_aftermath - Aftermath of Today's Seminar Concerning...

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Aftermath of Today’s Seminar Concerning Chapter 8 11/03/06 (B.F.) Today’s discussion was really useful (for me, anyway). I want to get a bit clearer on the line I was pushing today. This will involve (among other things) a better formulation of the sceptical worry. The key, it seems to me, in reconstructing the debate between Williamson and the sceptic (in a non-silly way) involves coming up with an explication of “ E is evidence for H for S in case C ” that does not give either side an immediate victory in the debate concerning either of the following propositions: ( A ) There is an evidential a symmetry in between the good case and the bad case. Specifically, E is evidence for H for S in the good case G , but it is not the case that E is evidence for H for S in the bad case B (for suitably chosen E , H , S , G , and B ). ( S ) As far as one knows there is an evidential symmetry in between the good case and the bad case. Specifically, S ’s actual evidence E ? does not favor ( H 1 ) S is actually in the good case over ( H 2 ) S is actually in the bad case ( for S , in her actual case A ). 1 Williamson believes that ( A ) is true, and I was suggesting today that the sceptic is worried ( inter alia ) that ( S ) is true. Of course, the skeptic is also worried that S doesn’t know H (or E ) in either the bad case or the good case, but I want to focus on ( S ) for now, since I think the worry is more gripping with respect to ( S ). In setting the stage for a non-silly debate about ( A ), I think we must take the following as a starting point: (1) E is evidence for H for S in the good case G . If we allow the sceptic to reject (1) at the outset, then he wins in a silly way, since TW already believes (2) It is not the case that E is evidence for H for S in the bad case G . So, we must take (1) as a presupposition, on pain of preventing (from the outset) Williamson from being able to accept ( A ). Hence, I will take (1) as a starting point. Thus, the ( A )-debate hinges on the following: ( A 0 ) Is E evidence for H for S in the bad case B ? Concerning this question, if the debate about it is going to be non -silly, we must not presuppose (TE) If E is evidence for H for S in case C , then E is true in C . Presupposing (TE) here gives Williamson a
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This note was uploaded on 08/01/2008 for the course PHIL 290 taught by Professor Fitelson during the Fall '06 term at University of California, Berkeley.

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notes_9_aftermath - Aftermath of Today's Seminar Concerning...

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