gameoutline - Reading List Are 261, last two lectures I...

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Reading List Are 261, last two lectures I will discuss two types of dynamic games. In the first type ("Nash"), strategic agents make decisions simultaneously in each period (each instant of time). For example, agents extract a common property resource. In the second type ("asymmetric"), one group of nonstrategic agents solve dynamic optimization problems and have rational expectations. A strategic agent, such as the government or a monopolist, makes decisions which affect the behavior of nonstrategic agents. My objective is to leave you with an idea of the types of problems that can be analyzed and the methods that are used. I will not have time for detailed derivations. I’ll describe the type of problem, try to sketch how the solution is obtained, and tell you something about the solution. I will try to give you "the big picture". You can read the final set of notes on the web for an overview of the lectures. Here is an annotated reading list. I. "Nash" games: I suggest you begin with Kamien M and N Schwartz Dynamic Optimization 1991 North Holland part II, Section 23; This chapter outlines the basic methods for continuous time problems and discusses a number of examples. If you liked the other chapters in this book, you will probably find this one useful. The classic paper in this field using a discrete time model is
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This note was uploaded on 08/01/2008 for the course ARE 263 taught by Professor Karp during the Fall '06 term at University of California, Berkeley.

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gameoutline - Reading List Are 261, last two lectures I...

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