notes_4_2x2 - Branden Fitelson Philosophy 290 Notes 1...

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Unformatted text preview: Branden Fitelson Philosophy 290 Notes 1 Conditionals Seminar: Day 4 Administrative: Ive added some papers to the website (also, OUP links to all chapters !) Especially interesting are Stalnaker, Weatherson, Davis, and von Fintel Todays my last day. Next: Peter on Ch. 6. Then, Alan H. on Ch. 5. Well skip Chs. 8 & 9, so we can do more . Ch. 7 (Week 7) volunteer? We have Wks. 8 (Aaron) and 11 (Ellen) covered. See web & volunteer! I plan to meet with presenters Monday afternoons, prior to meeting. Today: Chapter 4 Stu ff (and my quick take on the chapter 5 stu ff ) Probability and Acceptability: Bennetts Strong Assumption About Them Lottery Paradoxes: A Cautionary Tale about Probability and Acceptance The Equation (and my take on the Lewisian attacks on it) * Bennetts Defence of the Equation The Ratio Formula * My Favorite Lewis-Style Triviality Proof (Milne) * A Conflict Involving Import-Export, The Equation, and non--Analyses * Postscript: Confirmation, Indicative Conditionals, and Import-Export UCB Philosophy C 4 ( C 5) B 09 / 21 / 04 Branden Fitelson Philosophy 290 Notes 2 Chapter 4: The Equation 19 (Other Approaches) Strawsons ( non- ) idea was that the meaning of involves a metaphysical connection between antecedent and consequent. Counterexamples? If she apologized to him, then he lied to me. (Even) if he apologizes, I shall (still) be angry. Davis and Stalnaker give ( non- ) possible world semantics for (later on). Lycan has yet another ( non- ) approach, which well also discuss later on. Bennett thinks the Ramsey Test is key to a correct ( and non- !) analysis of . The acceptability of A C for a person at a time is governed by the probability the person then assigns to C on the supposition of A [Pr p C | A q ]. Bennett makes some strong assumptions here about acceptability and Pr: . . . acceptability depends upon probability and nothing else: you ought not to accept what you do not find probable, and there is no obstacle to your accepting what you do find probable. So we can move to the thesis that the probability for you of A C is proportional to your probability for C on the supposition of A . UCB Philosophy C 4 ( C 5) B 09 / 21 / 04 Branden Fitelson Philosophy 290 Notes 3 Digression: Why Acceptability May Depend On Something More Than Probability Let R p x q mean there is no obstacle to your accepting x . Let Pr p x q r say that x is probable, according to your (rational) Pr. Consider the following claim about high Pr and there being no obstacle to acceptance (NOA)....
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This note was uploaded on 08/01/2008 for the course PHIL 290 taught by Professor Fitelson during the Fall '06 term at University of California, Berkeley.

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notes_4_2x2 - Branden Fitelson Philosophy 290 Notes 1...

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