lecture_24_2x2

# lecture_24_2x2 - Announcements and Such Three Songs(by...

This preview shows pages 1–3. Sign up to view the full content.

Announcements and Such Three Songs (by request) — Ratatat [ Classics ] “Loud Pipes” “Nostrand” “Spanish Armada” Final Exam will be: Wednesday, May 16, 5–8pm @ 141 MCCONE Possible Questions to be posted on May 1 Today: Skepticism II Finishing-up inductive skepticism from last time Paradoxes of confirmation (inductive support) Fallibility and general skepticism Nelson Goodman posed a “new riddle of induction”, which aims to show that there can be no purely formal conception of inductive support It is sometimes claimed that the premise of the following argument inductively supports its conclusion — and in a purely formal sense: All observed A ’s have been B ’s. Therefore, the next A observed will be B . Example: All observed emeralds have been green. Therefore, the next emerald observed will be green. Goodman purports to show that, whatever support the premise of such an argument might provide for its conclusion, it cannot be purely formal . Skepticism I Skepticism About Induction VII Goodman defines a predicate “Grue” as follows: x is Grue = x is green iff x has been observed Now, consider the following argument: All observed emeralds have been Grue. Therefore, the next emerald observed will be Grue. Since this argument is of the “good form”, its premise inductively supports its conclusion. But, this seems odd. Assuming that emeralds don’t change color over time, and that there are some unobserved emeralds, this is equivalent to: All observed emeralds have been green. Therefore, the next emerald observed won’t be green. This seems to show that IL is not purely formal . Skepticism I Skepticism About Induction VIII In other words, the assumption that there is a purely formal notion of inductive support seems to have led (the details are subtle) to a case in which: E inductively supports p, and E inductively supports ~ p Where, E and p are defined using “Grue”, as above. Goodman concludes ( via reductio ad absurdum ”) that there is no purely formal notion of inductive support. This is better than Popper’s argument. But, this also conflates (to some extent) logic and epistemology . Even if it turned out that this was a situation in which formal inductive support relations were “absurd”, what would that show? Analogy: if B is logically inconsistent , then B deductively supports p and ~ p ! So what ? Skepticism I Skepticism About Induction IX

This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.

View Full Document
I think there are better arguments against “purely formal” explications of inductive support. Carnap proposed a purely formal analogical inference principle to the effect that: The more properties two objects share, the more probable it is that they share a novel property.
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

{[ snackBarMessage ]}

### What students are saying

• As a current student on this bumpy collegiate pathway, I stumbled upon Course Hero, where I can find study resources for nearly all my courses, get online help from tutors 24/7, and even share my old projects, papers, and lecture notes with other students.

Kiran Temple University Fox School of Business ‘17, Course Hero Intern

• I cannot even describe how much Course Hero helped me this summer. It’s truly become something I can always rely on and help me. In the end, I was not only able to survive summer classes, but I was able to thrive thanks to Course Hero.

Dana University of Pennsylvania ‘17, Course Hero Intern

• The ability to access any university’s resources through Course Hero proved invaluable in my case. I was behind on Tulane coursework and actually used UCLA’s materials to help me move forward and get everything together on time.

Jill Tulane University ‘16, Course Hero Intern