lecture_25_2x2

lecture_25_2x2 - Announcements and Such One Song Funkadelic...

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Announcements and Such One Song — Funkadelic “I’ll Stay” from Standing On the Verge of Getting it On Final Exam will be: Wednesday, May 16, 5–8pm @ 141 MCCONE Possible Questions to be posted on May 1 Today: Skepticism III Closure vs Relevant alternatives (review) Closure, foundationalism, “easy knowledge” Knowing, showing, and order confusions Interlude – The Paradox of the Knower Next Time: Skepticism IV On a “relevant alternatives” account of knowledge, S ’s belief that p constitutes knowledge if S’s total evidence rules-out (not all possible , but) all relevant alternatives to p . So, Dretske’s account is weaker than ( BUP ), hence, weaker than ( C ). This allows him to reject closure (and related principles like E and BUP ). At the same time, this also allows Dretske to maintain that we do know some things. For instance, we know that it’s zebra before us, since our evidence rules-out all relevant alternatives to this (think: normal zoo stuff). But, we don’t know it’s not a cleverly painted horse , since our evidence doesn’t rule-out all relevant alternatives to this possibility. Dretske calls such (odd) possibilities “heavyweight”. Skepticism III Entailment and Inferential Grounds IV Skepticism III Entailment and Inferential Grounds V ~p all alternatives p* p CP/BUP/E/Closure E Rules Out Relevant Alternatives relevant p*'s p irrelevant p*'s E Rules Out Skepticism III Entailment and Inferential Grounds V It's a giraffe. It's a goat. [ NOT "it's a horse"!] p = it's a zebra. It's a cleverly painted horse (which looks exactly like a zebra). E Rules Out Question about Dretske’s line: Why can’t “it’s a horse” be among the relevant alternatives to p ?
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The answer comes from the following fact: Fact . Assume (1) S knows that p , (2) p* is an irrelevant alternative to p that is not ruled-out by S ’s grounds ( E ) for p, (3) p* entails q . Then: (4) q must be an irrelevant alternative to p . Why ? Assume, for reductio , that (1)–(3) are true, but that (4) is false. That is, assume (1)–(3), but that q is a relevant alternative to p . If q is a relevant alternative to p , then q must be ruled-out by (E), since (1) S knows p . But, if E rules-out q , then it also rules out p* , since (3) p* entails q . But, if
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This note was uploaded on 08/01/2008 for the course PHIL 122 taught by Professor Fitelson during the Spring '07 term at Berkeley.

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lecture_25_2x2 - Announcements and Such One Song Funkadelic...

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