lecture_13_2x2 - Announcements and Such One Song - Mark...

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Announcements and Such One Song — Mark Knopfler “Why Aye Man” from The Ragpicker’s Dream First essays to be returned today (after class) Second essay will be assigned on March 20th. Today: Part I of three parts on the Architecture of Knowledge ( very serious theoretical epistemology) First, one leftover from last time… It seems that knowledge can be transmitted, even through inductive inference , and even if some justification/probability is “lost in the inference”. Last time, I used one of Audi’s examples to illustrate this point, which wasn’t so compelling. But — so long as we have some knowledge that has been transmitted (at some stage) through some inductive (scientific) inference — the point stands. The alternative is inductive skepticism (more later). Moreover, knowledge can fail to be transmitted even when the probabilities are very high . You know that you hold one of a million tickets in a fair lottery, which will have one winner. You infer —  with very high probability — 0.999999, that you will lose. You do not know you will lose. Inference and the Extension of Knowledge Inferential Transmission of Knowledge Revisited I Here’s the reductio argument for the claim that you do not know that you won’t win the lottery: 1. Assume that you do know that you won’t win the lottery. [This is our reductio assumption.] 2. Then, each ticket holder knows that they won’t win the lottery. [Because there’s nothing special or privileged about your epistemic situation.] 3. Since knowledge implies truth, (2) implies: ticket #1 won’t win & ticket #2 won’t win & & … & ticket #1,000,000 won’t win. 4. But, (3) implies that no ticket will win , which contradicts the set-up of the example. QED . A few further remarks are in order here. Inference and the Extension of Knowledge Inferential Transmission of Knowledge Revisited II We’re assuming that knowledge implies true belief : S knows that p S believes that p, and p is true But, we’re not assuming that knowledge is infallible . That is, we’re allowing for: S knows that p S has conclusive grounds for p We’re also not assuming that knowers have second- order knowledge. That is, we’re allowing for: S knows that p S knows that S knows that p This is the denial of what is called the KK- principle. KK plays a crucial role in arguments for skepticism. We’ll discuss it at length later on. OK, moving on to the architecture of knowledge… Inference and the Extension of Knowledge Inferential Transmission of Knowledge Revisited III
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This chapter is concerned with how an epistemic agent S ’s knowledge (and beliefs) is structured .
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lecture_13_2x2 - Announcements and Such One Song - Mark...

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