lecture_12_2x2

lecture_12_2x2 - Announcements and Such One Song Yes...

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One Song — Yes, Classic Yes I’ve Seen All Good People No office hours for Branden today Essays to be returned next week Tuesday after class Today: Inference and the Extension of Knowledge II This is where we start getting into some serious theoretical epistemology . Next time: Part I of three parts on the Architecture of Knowledge ( very serious theoretical epistemology) A deductively valid argument (from premises P to conclusion C ) is such that it is impossible for P to be true and (at the same time) C to be false. An inductively strong argument is one such that the probability of C , given P, Pr( C | P ), is high . Precisely, this means that Pr( P C ) ≈ Pr( P ). There are various kinds of inductive arguments: Analogical arguments a is similar to b . Fa . Therefore, Fb. Abductive arguments H is the best explanation of E . E . Therefore, H . Generalizational arguments Fa & Ga . Therefore, all F ’s are G ’s. Inference and the Extension of Knowledge Deductive and Inductive Inference (Review) Audi distinguishes deductive and inductive transmission of justification and knowledge. Let’s think about justification first. He suggests that deductive transmission of justification requires that the underlying argument be valid . But, one of his examples is a bit puzzling. He suggests that if one takes oneself to be reasoning deductively, then the underlying inferential structure must be a deductively valid argument. But, why isn’t the proper necessary condition here being justified in believing that the underlying inferential structure is valid? After all, we’re just talking about justified belief here, not knowledge. I found this puzzling. We say this about testimony , for instance… Inference and the Extension of Knowledge And, what if the argument I’m relying on is valid, but I am justified in believing that it is not valid? Why not say this doesn’t transmit justification? It seems to me that this condition should be: Deductive inferences ( i.e. , inferences S takes to be deductive ) transmit justification only if S is justified in believing that the inference is valid. Note: this is a necessary ( not sufficient ) condition! I write a long (non-fiction) book. I am justified in believing each claim I make in the book P1 , P2 , P3 ... And, I ( knowingly ) validly infer their conjunction C = P1 & P2 & P3 …. I also have very good reason to believe that all long books contain at least one false claim . Here, I could fail to be justified in believing C . Sufficient
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This note was uploaded on 08/01/2008 for the course PHIL 122 taught by Professor Fitelson during the Spring '07 term at Berkeley.

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lecture_12_2x2 - Announcements and Such One Song Yes...

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