94755_I - 94TH CONGRESS 2d Ssion SENATE f J REPORT 1 No...

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Unformatted text preview: 94TH CONGRESS 2d Ssion SENATE f J REPORT 1 No. 94-755 FOREIGN AN]) MILITARY INTELLIGENCE BOOK I FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES UNITED STATES SENATE TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE VIEWS APRIL 26 (legislative day, APRIL 14), 1976 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 69-983 WASHINGTON : 1976 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $5.35 Stock No. 052-071-00470-0 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES FRANK CHURCH, Idaho, Chairman JOHN G. TOWER, Texas, Vice Chairman HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee PHILIP A. HART, Michigan BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona WALTER F. MONDALE, Minnesota CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, Ja., Maryland WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, Kentucky RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, Pennsylvania ROBERT MORGAN, North Carolina GARY HART, Colorado WILLIAM G. MILLER, Staff Director FREDERICK A. 0. SCHWARZ, Jr., Chief Counsel CURTIs R. SMOTHERS, Counsel to the Minority AUDREY HATRY, Cler of the Committee (II) LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL (By Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities) On January 27, 1975, the Senate established a Select Committee to conduct an investigation and study of the intelligence activities of the United States. After 15 months of intensive work, I am pleased to submit to the Senate this volume of the Final Report of the Committee relating to foreign and military intelligence. The inquiry arises out of allegations of abuse and improper activities by the intelligence agencies of the United States, and great public concern that the Congress take action to bring the intelligence agencies under the constitutional framework. The members of the Select Committee have worked diligently and in remarkable harmony. I want to express my gratitude to the Vice Chairman, Senator John Tower 6f Texas, for his cooperation throughout and the able assistance he has given me in directing this most difficult task. While every member of the Committee has made important contributions, I especially want to thank Senator Walter D. Huddleston of Kentucky for the work he has done as Chairman of the Foreign and Military Subcommittee. His direction of the Subcommittee, working with Senator Charles McC. Mathias of Maryland, Senator Gary Hart of Colorado and Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona, has been of immeasurable help to me in bringing this enormous undertaking to a useful and responsible conclusion. Finally, I wish to thank the staff for the great service they have performed for the Committee and for the Senate in assisting the members of the Committee to carry out the mandate levied by Senate Resolution 21. The quality, integrity and devotion of the staff has contributed in a significant way to the important analyses, findings and recommendations of the Committee. The volume which follows, the Report on the Foreign and Military Intelligence Activitie8 of the United State8, is intended to provide to the Senate the basic information about the intelligence agencies of the United States required to make the necessary judgments concerning the role such agencies should play in the future. Despite security considerations which have limited what can responsibly be printed for public release the information which is presented in this report is a reasonably complete picture of the intelligence activities undertaken by the United States, and the problems that such activities pose for constitutional government. The Findings and Recommendations contained at the end of this volume constitute an agenda for action which, if adopted, would go a long way toward preventing the abuses that have occurred in the past from occurring again, and would assure that the intelligence activities of the United States will be conducted in accordance with constitutional processes. FRANK CHURCH. NOTE The Committee's Final Report has been reviewed and declassified by the appropriate executive agencies. These agencies submitted comments to the Committee on security and factual aspects of each chapter. On the basis of these comments, the Committee and staff conferred with representatives of the agencies to determine which parts of the report should remain classified to protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods. At the request of the agencies, the Committee deleted three chapters from this report: "Cover," "Espionage," and "Budgetary Oversight." In addition, two sections of the chapter "Covert Action of the CIA" and one section of the chapter "Department of State" have been deleted at the request of the agencies. Particular passages which were changed at the request of the agencies are denoted by italics and a footnote. Complete versions of deleted or abridged materials are available to Members of the Senate in the Committee's classified report under the provisions of S. Res. 21 and the Standing Rules of the Senate. Names of individuals were deleted when, in the Committee's judgment, disclosure of their identities would either endanger their safety or constitute a substantial invasion of privacy. Consequently, footnote citations to testimony and documents occasionally contain only descriptions of an individual's position. Appendix Three, "Soviet Intelligence Collection and Intelligence Against the United States," is derived solely from a classified CIA report on the same subject which was edited for security considerations by the Select Committee staff. CONTENTS Page 1 I. INTRODUCTION -------------------------------------------2 A. The Mandate of the Committee's Inquiry----------------B. The Purpose of the Committee's Findings and Recommenda4 tions --------------------------------------------C. The Focus and Scope of the Committee's Inquiry and Ob5 staclesEncountered --------------------------------8 D. The Historical Context of the Inquiry --------------------E. The Dilemma of Secrecy and Open Constitutional Govern11 ---------------------------------ment II. THE FOREIGN AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE OPERA15 TIONS OF THE UNITED STATES:AN OVERVIEW ----------16 A. The Basic Issues: Secrecy and Democracy -----------------B. The Scope of the Select Committee Inquiry into Foreign and 17 Military Intelligence Operations -----------------------17 C. The Intelligence Process: Theory and Reality --------------19 D. Evolution 61 the United States Intelligence Community -----20 E. The Origins cf the Postwar Intelligence Community ---------22 F. The Response to the Soviet Threat -----------------------23 G. Korea: The Turning Point -----------------------------24 H. The "Protracted Conflict" ------------------------------25 I. Third World Competition and Nuclear Crisis --------------26 J. TechnologyandTragedy ------------------------------27 K. The 1970s ------------------------------------------28 L. The Task Ahead-------------------------------------III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR INTELLI31 GENCE ACTIVITIES -----------------------------------A. The Joint Responsibilities of the Legislative and Executive 31 Branches-Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances-33 - B. The Historical Practice C. The Constitutional Power of Congress to Regulate the Con38 duct of Foreign Intelligence Activity--------------------41 IV. THE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE -------------------------------42 A. The National Security Council --------------------------48 B. Authorization and Control of Covert Activities -------------61 C. Providing the Intelligence Required by Policymakers --------62 D. Advising the President on Intelligence Issues---------------65 E. Allocating Intelligence Pesources ------------------------71 V. THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE -----------73 A. The Producer of National Intelligence --------------------83 B. Coordinatorof Intelligence Activities ---------------------94 C. Director of the CIA ----------------------------------97 VI. HISTORY OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY_ A. The Central Intelligence Group and the Central Intelligence 99 Agency: 1946-1952 ---------------------------------109 B. The Dulles Era:1953-1961 ----------------------------C. Change and Routinization: 1961-1970---------------------115 D. The Recent Past: 1971-1975----------------------------121 E. Conclusion-----------------------------------------124 VII. THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: STATUTORY AUTHORITY------------------------------------------127 128 A. Clandestine Collection of Intelligence --------------------131 B. Covert Action --------------------------------------135 C. Domestic Activities -----------------------------------(V) Page 141 VIII. COVERT ACTION --------------------------------------143 A. Evolution of Covert Action ----------------------------149 B. Congressional Oversight ------------------------------152 C. Findings and Conclusions -----------------------------IX. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE -------------------------------163 163 A. Counterintelligence: An Introduction --------------------B. Current Issues in Counterintelligence --------------------171 177 C. Conclusions----------------------------------------X. THE DOMESTIC IMPACT OF FOREIGN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS: THE CIA AND ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS, 179 THE MEDIA, AND RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS ----------181 A. Covert Use of Academic and Voluntary Organizations ------191 B. Covert Relationships with the United States Media--------201 C. Covert Use of U.S. Religious Groups --------------------205 XI. PROPRIETARIES ---------------------------------------206 A. Overview ------------------------------------------207 ------------------------------------------B. Structure 234 C. Operation of Proprietaries -----------------------------236 D. The Disposal of Proprietaries --------------------------247 -----------------------------------E. Financial Aspects 251 F. Some General Considerations --------------------------257 XII. CIA PRODUCTION OF FINISHED INTELLIGENCE --------259 A. Evolution of the CIA's Intelligence Directorate -----------265 B. The Intelligence Directorate Today --------------------266 C. The Relationship Between Intelligence and Policy --------268 D. The Limits of Intelligence ------------------------------269 _-------------------------------E. The Personnel System 270 F. Recruitment and Training of Analysts -------------------270 G. The Intelligence Culture and Analytical Bias-------------H. The Nature of the Production Process: Consensus Versus 271 Competition I. The "Current Events" Syndrome-----------------------272 J. Innovation-----------------------------------------273 274 K. Overload on Analysts and Consumers --------------------276 L. Quality Control -------------------------------------276 M. Consumer Guidance and Evaluation --------------------277 N. The Congressional Role ------------------ ------------XIII. THE CIA's INTERNAL CONTROLS: THE INSPECTOR GEN279 ERAL AND THE OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL ----280 A. The General Counsel ---------------------------------289 B. The Office of the Inspector General ---------------------C. Internal and External Review of the Office of the Inspector 303 ---------General 305 XIV. THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE --------------------------305 A. Origins of the State Department Intelligence Function ......308 B. Command and Control -------------------------------315 C. Support Communications-------------------------------315 D. Production of Intelligence ------------------------------319 XV. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE -------------------------A. Objectives and Organization of the Defense Intelligence Com320 ----------------------------------munity-------328 B. The Defense Intelligence Budget -----------------------C. Management Problems of the Defense Intelligence Com341 munity ---------------------------------------------349 D. Agencies and Activities of Special Interest ----------------355 E. Military Counterintelligence and Investigative Agencies 359 F. Chemical and Biological Activities -----------------------363 G. Meeting Future Needs in Defense Intelligence ------------- XVI. DISCLOSURE OF BUDGET INFORMATION ON THE IN- Page TELLIGENCE COMMUNITY------------------------367 A. The Present Budgetary Process for Intelligence Community Agencies and Its Consequences -----------------------367 B. The Constitutional Requirement------------------------369 C. Alternatives to Concealing Intelligence Budgets from Congress and the Public------------------------------------374 D. The Effect Upon National Security of Varying Levels of Budget Disclosure---------------------------------- 376 E. The Argument that Publication of Any Information will Inevitably Result in Demands for Further Information--381 F. The Argument that the. United States Should Not Publish Information on Its Intelligence Budget Because No Other Government in the World Does-----------------------383 G. Summary and Conclusion -- -_--384 XVII. TESTING AND USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS BY THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY----385 A. The Programs Investigated-----------------------------387 B. CIA Drug Testing Programs----------------------------392 C. Covert Testing on Human Subjects by Military Intelligence Groups -----------------------------------------411 D. Cooperation and Competition Among the Intelligence Agencies, and Between the Agencies and Other Individuals and Institutions--------------------------------------420 XVIII. SUMMARY: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ------ 423 A. Introduction------------------------------------------423 B. General Findings------------------------------------424 C. The 1947 National Security Act and Related Legislation.. 426 D. The National Security Council and the Office of the President427 E. The Director of Central Intelligence--------------------432 F. The Central Intelligence Agency-----------------------435 G. Reorganization of the Intelligence Community ------------449 H. CIA Relations with United States Institutions and Private Citizens-----------------------------------------451 I. Proprietaries and Cover------------------------------456 J. Intelligence Liaison----------------------------------459 K. The General Counsel and the Inspector General ----------459 L. The Department of Defense---------------------------462 M. The Department of State and Ambassadors --------------466 N. Oversight and the Intelligence Budget-------------------469 0. Chemical and Biological Agents and the Intelligence Community -----------------------------------------471 P. General Recommendations ----------------------------472 APPENDIX I: Congressional Authorization for the Central Intelligence Agency to Conduct Covert Action------------------------------475 A. The National Security Act of 1947----------------------476 B. The CIA Act of 1949--------------------------------492 C. The Provision of Funds to the CIA by Congress-----------496 D. The Holtzman and Abourezk Amendments of 1974--------- -502 E. The Hughes-Ryan Amendment--------------------------505 F. Conclusion--------------------------------------------508 APPENDIX II: Additional Covert Action Recommendations----------511 A. Statement of Clark M. Clifford-------------------------512 B. Statement of Cyrus Vance-----------------------------516 C. Statement of David A. Phillips-------------------------518 D. Prepared Statement of Morton H. Halperin ---------------520 E. Recommendations of the Harvard University Institute of Politics, Study Group on Intelligence Activities ---------524 F. Recommendations of the House Select Committee on Intelligence Concerning Covert Action ------.-------533 G. Article from Foreign Affairs by Harry Rositzke: America's Secret Operations: A Perspective ----------------------534 H. Article from Saturday Review by Tom Braden: What's Wrong with the CIA? ------------------------------------547 I. Recommendations of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (the Murphy Commission) Concerning Covert Action --------554 VIII APPENDIX III: Soviet Intelligence Collection and Operations Against the United States -------------------------------------------A. Introduction---------------------------------------B. Organization and Structure----------------------------C. The GRU-----------------------------------------D. The Scope and Methods of Anti-United States Operations by the KGB and the GRU----------------------------E. Eastern European Security and Intelligence Services-------ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR FRANK CHURCH--------ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATORS WALTER F. MONDALE, GARY HART, AND PHILIP HART ---------------INTRODUCTION TO SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATORS JOHN G. TOWER, HOWARD H. BAKER, JR. AND BARRY M. GOLDWATER-------------------------------------------SEPARATE VIEWS OF SENATOR JOHN G. TOWER -----------INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER ----SEPARATE VIEWS OF HOWARD H. BAKER, JR --------------SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF SENATOR CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR-------------------------------------------ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER GLOSSARY OF SELECTED INTELLIGENCE TERMS AND LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ------------------------------------NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE CHARTS ------------------------SENATE RESOLUTION 21 -----------------------------------STAFF LIST ------------------------------------------------- Page 557 557 558 560 561 561 563 567 571 573 577 594 609 615 617 634 636 649 I. INTRODUCTION The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities has conducted a fifteen month long inquiry, the first major inquiry into intelligence sinbe World War II. The inquiry arose out of allegations of substantial, even massive wrong-doing within the "national intelligence" system., This final report provides a history of the evolution of intelligence, an evaluation of the intelligence system of the United States, a critique of its problems, recommendations for legislative action and recommendations to the executive branch. The Committee believes that its recommendations will provide a sound framework for conducting the vital intelligence activities of the United States in a manner wich meets the nation's intelligence requirements and protects the liberties of American citizens and the freedoms which our Constitution guarantees. The shortcomings of the intelligence system, the adverse effects of secrecy, and the failure of congressional oversight to assure adequate accountability for executive branch decisions concerning intelligence activities were major subjects of the Committee's inquiry. Equally important to the obligation to investigate allegations of abuse was the duty to review systematically the intelligence community's overall activities since 1945, and to evaluate its present structure and performance. An extensive national intelligence system has been a vital part of the United States government since 1941. Intelligence information has had an important influence on the direction and development of American foreign policy and has been essential to the maintenance of our national security. The Committee is convinced that the United States requires an intelligence system which will provide policymakers with accurate intelligence and analysis. We must have an early warning system to monitor potential military threats by countries hostile to United States interests. We need a strong intelligence system to verify that treaties concerning arms limitation are being honored. Information derived from the intelligence agencies is a necessary ingredient in making national defense and foreign policy decisions. Such information is also necessary in countering the efforts of hostile intelligence services, and in halting terrorists, international drug traffickers and other international criminal activities. Within this country certain carefully controlled intelligence activities are essential for effective law enforcement. The United States has devoted enormous resources to the creation of a national intellig...
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