syllabus - Prof William H Sandholm Department of Economics...

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Prof. William H. Sandholm Department of Economics University of Wisconsin Spring 2008 Syllabus - Economics 713, Part 1 Course Description Economics 713 is a semester long course on game theory and information economics. I will teach the first half of the course (mostly game theory) and Jo Hertel will teach the second half (mostly information economics). Reading Materials Andreu Mas-Colell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green (1995). Microeconomic Theory . Oxford. Roger Myerson (1991). Game Theory : Analysis of Conflict . Harvard. Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole (1991). Game Theory . MIT. Klaus Ritzberger (2002). Foundations of Non-Cooperative Game Theory . Oxford. R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa (1957). Games and Decisions : Introduction and Critical Survey . Wiley. Martin Osborne (2004). An Introduction to Game Theory . Oxford. Eric van Damme (1991). Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria , 2 nd ed. Springer. In-Koo Cho and David M. Kreps (1987). “Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 102, 179-221. George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson (2006). Repeated Games and Reputations: Long-Run Relationships . Oxford. MWG is the best general reference on microeconomic theory. Myerson, Fudenberg- Tirole, and Ritzberger are three fine graduate game theory textbooks: Myerson covers a selection of basic topics in detail; Fudenberg-Tirole is encyclopedic; Ritzberger focuses on foundational issues. Luce-Raiffa is excellent on classical topics in game theory, while Osborne is my favorite undergraduate game theory textbook. van Damme is the standard reference on equilibrium refinements. Cho-Kreps is still the best starting point for signaling game refinements. Finally, Mailath and Samuelson’s new book is the definitive treatment of repeated games. A list of references to all of the works I will cite in lecture can be found at the end of the syllabus.
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Readings, Problem Sets, and Exams The course is divided into five sections whose contents are described in the course outline below. The readings for the sections are as follows: Section 1: MWG, Sec. 1.B, 3.C, and 6.B, and Ch. 7 Fudenberg and Tirole, Sec. 3.4 Section 2: MWG, Sec. 8.A, 8.B, 8.C, and 8.D Luce and Raiffa, App. 2, 3, and 4 Fudenberg and Tirole, Sec. 2.2 v a n D a m m e , C h . 1 Section 3: MWG, Sec. 8.F, 9.A, 9.B, and 9.C Fudenberg and Tirole, Sec. 8.3 and 8.4 Section 4: Fudenberg and Tirole, Sec. 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 MWG, Sec. 8.E and 9.D
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syllabus - Prof William H Sandholm Department of Economics...

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