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Prof. William H. Sandholm
Department of Economics
University of Wisconsin
Spring 2008
Syllabus  Economics 713, Part 1
Course Description
Economics 713 is a semester long course on game theory and information
economics.
I will teach the first half of the course (mostly game theory) and Jo Hertel
will teach the second half (mostly information economics).
Reading Materials
Andreu MasColell, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green (1995).
Microeconomic Theory
.
Oxford.
Roger Myerson (1991).
Game Theory
:
Analysis of Conflict
.
Harvard.
Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole (1991).
Game Theory
.
MIT.
Klaus Ritzberger (2002).
Foundations of NonCooperative Game Theory
.
Oxford.
R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa (1957).
Games and Decisions
:
Introduction and Critical Survey
.
Wiley.
Martin Osborne (2004).
An Introduction to Game Theory
.
Oxford.
Eric van Damme (1991).
Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria
,
2
nd
ed.
Springer.
InKoo Cho and David M. Kreps (1987).
“Signaling Games and Stable
Equilibria,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics
102, 179221.
George J. Mailath and Larry Samuelson (2006).
Repeated Games and
Reputations: LongRun Relationships
.
Oxford.
MWG is the best general reference on microeconomic theory.
Myerson, Fudenberg
Tirole, and Ritzberger are three fine graduate game theory textbooks:
Myerson covers a
selection of basic topics in detail; FudenbergTirole is encyclopedic; Ritzberger focuses
on foundational issues. LuceRaiffa is excellent on classical topics in game theory, while
Osborne is my favorite undergraduate game theory textbook.
van Damme is the
standard reference on equilibrium refinements.
ChoKreps is still the best starting point
for signaling game refinements.
Finally, Mailath and Samuelson’s new book is the
definitive treatment of repeated games.
A list of references to all of the works I will cite in lecture can be found at the end of
the syllabus.
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View Full DocumentReadings, Problem Sets, and Exams
The course is divided into five sections whose contents are described in the course
outline below.
The readings for the sections are as follows:
Section 1:
MWG, Sec. 1.B, 3.C, and 6.B, and Ch. 7
Fudenberg and Tirole, Sec. 3.4
Section 2:
MWG, Sec. 8.A, 8.B, 8.C, and 8.D
Luce and Raiffa, App. 2, 3, and 4
Fudenberg and Tirole, Sec. 2.2
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1
Section 3:
MWG, Sec. 8.F, 9.A, 9.B, and 9.C
Fudenberg and Tirole, Sec. 8.3 and 8.4
Section 4:
Fudenberg and Tirole, Sec. 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4
MWG, Sec. 8.E and 9.D
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 Spring '08
 SANDHOLM
 Game Theory

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