HW#6 - Reading Assignment 6th Week David Lewis begins his...

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Reading Assignment 6 th Week David Lewis begins his essay by clearing up that he is not arguing for the identity theory on the grounds of simplicity or economy, but he is certainly arguing that it is a consequence of the claim that “physical phenomena have none but purely physical explanation.” His principal argument is presented this way: 1) The definitive characteristic of any experience is its causal role, its most typical causes and effects. 2) Causal roles, in fact, belong to certain physical states. 3) These roles belong to experiences. 4) Therefore, those physical states have the defining characteristics of experiences. 5) Those experiences are the physical states. Lewis then adds that physical states that are experiences are introspectible processes or activities, and that these physical states are not being claimed to be the intentional objects that these experiences are experiences of. He also states that experience-ascriptions have the same reference as neural state ascriptions, but they do not have the same sense. In his defense of the first premise, in which the particular causal role that defines any experience is expressed by
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This note was uploaded on 08/25/2008 for the course PHIL 262g taught by Professor Yaffe during the Spring '06 term at USC.

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HW#6 - Reading Assignment 6th Week David Lewis begins his...

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